On Not Learning Chinese: Multiple Chineseness of the Chinese Schools in the Philippines by Chien, Ker-wei
0 
 
 
 
On Not Learning Chinese: 
Multiple Chineseness of the Chinese Schools  
in the Philippines 
Ker-wei Chien 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Department of Sociology  
University of Essex  
  
October 2018 
  
1 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
It is a bit surreal for me to finally reach the end of the PhD and to have a chance writing 
acknowledgements at this moment. I am completely sure that I could have not kelp 
going without generous supports from many people.  
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Yasemin 
Soysal who did not give up me when I almost gave up myself. I am not a particularly 
active PhD student and sometimes shied away from meeting supervisor. But she is 
always supportive, instructive, but strict in helping me complete the PhD step by step 
even when I faced extremely difficult situations. You are a good teacher for not only 
your intelligence, but your kindness and toughness. 
I am also indebted to the Ministry of Education of ROC (Taiwan) as my sponsor 
offering me the governmental scholarship. The reason why I choose to come back to 
Taiwan without second thought is because I feel obligated to pay it back to not only the 
scholarship, but my family and my homeland who nurture me. 
Many thanks to all my teachers, classmates, friends, colleagues, and students of 
National Chung Cheng University and National Tsinghua University. You all help me 
formulate my target as an educationalist and provide me a ground to practise my ideals. 
I am grateful to all administrators, teachers, students of the Chinese schools, all my 
friends, and those who have contributed to my PhD study in the Philippines. You are 
all so generous when I worked and subsequently conducted my fieldwork in Manila. 
See you soon! 
Finally, I would say that the thesis is dedicated to my family. I met my wife, Bing, in 
the beginning of my PhD and she gave birth to our daughter, Tonia, by the end of the 
PhD. Thanks for your supports and company during the journey we shared. I Love you. 
The completion of the PhD is particularly for my sister, my father, and my mother. 
Words fails me in terms of how grateful I am to them. My mother left me during the 
PhD. You always said you don’t have to see me if I am away somewhere but happy. 
Now we can’t see each other, but I believe you are in a place and happily pursuing your 
goal. I promise I try my best to happily pursue my goal too. I miss you.    
  
2 
 
Abstract 
 
In light of the ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ of Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider 
(2006), this thesis aims to investigate the multiplicity of Chineseness produced in the 
Chinese schools in the Philippines. The study draws on participant observation based 
on my one-year teaching in a Philippine-Chinese school, on-site interviews with 
students, parents, administrators, educationalists and officials, and archival and 
documentary research. The major findings of the study reveal that: (i) viewed from 
different perspectives, three versions of Chineseness generated in Chinese school 
emerge: Huaqiao Chineseness with the nationalistic view of China as the motherland 
embodied by the traditional teaching approach involved in ‘teaching Mandarin as a 
national language’; Huaren Chineseness which proposes to seek a balance between the 
younger generations’ Mandarin learning and Filipino outlook; ‘communal Chineseness 
for integration’ by which the younger generations are provided with community-based 
resources to enter the upper-middle class in the social stratification of the Philippine 
mainstream society; (ii) Mandarin education practised in Chinese schools is 
predominated by the view of Huaqiao Chineseness which not only has a devastating 
effect on the effectiveness of its teaching but also impedes the educational reform 
launched by the supporters of Huaren Chineseness from promoting the teaching 
approach fit for Chinese-Filipino identity of the younger generations by means of 
teaching Mandarin as a second language; (iii) As the current Mandarin education fails 
to be adapted to the local environment, it is ‘communal Chineseness for integration’ 
that plays a role in their integration into the mainstream and in helping them enter 
upper-middle class positioning in the Philippine social stratification; by contrast, 
Mandarin education has become increasingly irrelevant to their everyday life and career 
development. These findings have implications for further researches that (1) the eye 
of methodological cosmopolitanism can help explore the extent of cosmopolitanisation 
in an overseas Chineseness community’s Chineseness in general and Chinese education 
in specific; (2) the extent of cosmopolitanisation of an overseas Chinese education in 
constructing and projecting Chineseness can affect its cultural preservation in the 
destination country and forge a unique path of integration into the mainstream society 
for an overseas Chinese community.   
 
Keywords: Cosmopolitanisation; Chineseness; Chinese education, the Chinese in the 
Philippines 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is derived from a negative experience of teaching Mandarin. In 2009, I was 
a Mandarin teacher at a Chinese school in the Philippines sent by the Overseas 
Community Affairs Council (OCAC) of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), one of 
two governments – the other being the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that claims 
to legitimately represent all of China, on a mission to counterbalance the PRC’s 
influence on the Philippine Chinese community. Before my departure, I had discovered 
that Mandarin ability among the Chinese in the Philippines was in decline, despite news 
of ‘Mandarin fever’ and ‘the rise of China’ prevalent in the media. In contrast to a 
growing number of non-Chinese eagerly establishing ties with China by learning 
Mandarin, studying abroad and working in China, it is particularly astonishing to me 
that these ethnic Chinese appear reluctant to learn it.  
My one-year teaching experience furnished evidence of this decline in the form of 
students’ lack of interest in learning Mandarin. Their reluctance to learn Chinese made 
me put more pressure on them to conform to instruction, resulting in a troubled teacher-
student relationship and a deeply frustrating experience. My own bitter frustration was 
shared by almost all fellow Taiwanese teachers in Philippine-Chinese schools. As the 
discussion over the raising global status of Mandarin emerges, such as a new ‘global 
language’ (Gil, 2011), ‘the language of future’ (Pak, 2012), and even one of the ‘G2 
languages’ (along with English) (Zhang, 2011), it is particularly intriguing that the 
students had turned down this ‘global language’.    
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In addition to my personal inexperience and lack of proper teaching skills, some 
contextualised factors contributed to the students’ reluctance. The teacher supply 
program of which I had been a part was jointly developed by the ROC government and 
a group of local Philippine-Chinese educationalists. Between the two parties, there 
seems to be a tacit agreement that the former is still the ‘fatherland’ of the latter, at least 
culturally. Chinese schools’ complex relationships to the fatherland characterises the 
whole Chinese school system, resembling a father/son relationship of perplexity and 
contradiction. A similar tacit agreement also exists between the PRC and other local 
Philippine-Chinese and Chinese schools through ‘Teacher Volunteers’ programs, which 
also seek to confirm the ties between China and Philippine-Chinese. It seems that 
Mandarin teaching has become a vehicle by which both the PRC and ROC can pretend 
to be the fatherland of Philippine-Chinese and Philippine-Chinese can be overseas 
Chinese citizens. Yet students’ reluctance to learn Mandarin can be seen as an act that 
casts doubt on this pretence: to them, it is incomprehensible that they have to be 
‘genuine’ Chinese (as defined by the fatherland) and learn Mandarin just because of 
their Chinese descent1.  
Defined by the proponents of Chinese nationalism, three ideas—a recognition of the 
eternal ties with the Chinese state, a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation, and the 
ability to speak the national language of China—together constitute the traditional 
definition of being Chinese. Therefore, the students’ reluctance can be seen to reflect a 
reserved attitude towards the China-centred view of ‘Chineseness’2. Educationalists in 
the Philippines and Chinese-education researchers tend to attribute students’ turning 
away from Chineseness to failures in the Chinese school system. Thus, they focus on 
                                                     
1  
2 By Chineseness, I mean the nature and extent of being or identifying as Chinese. 
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analysing and solving the problems of Chinese education that they perceive to have 
contributed to this decline. The problems that they have identified are mostly technical 
and pedagogical ones, such as outdated teaching methods, textbooks unfit for 
Philippine students, aged faculty, students’ low motivation, and a lack of qualified 
teachers. Both governments, the PRC and ROC, are devoted to providing educational 
aids, such as teacher training programs, textbook and teacher supplies, student summer 
camps, and so on, to solve these problems for the Chinese schools in the Philippines.  
Irrespective of Chinese students’ Philippine citizenship, it seems that the Chinese 
schools and both governments are committed to the ideal of ‘one nation (the Chinese 
nation), one people (the Chinese people), one culture (Chinese national culture), and 
one language (Mandarin)’, and seek to instil this in students by restoring their Chinese 
national identity and Mandarin ability. The decline of both of these, however, shows 
that the governments have had limited success. This decline causes considerable 
concern among the old generation of the Philippine-Chinese, who tend to equate the 
loss of Mandarin ability with the loss of Chineseness.  
Considering these issues, a series of questions comes to mind, such as to what extent 
Chinese schools still cling to a China-centred view? Why do these Chinese students not 
seize the opportunity to learn Mandarin when, seemingly, the rest of the world does? In 
gradually losing the ability to speak Mandarin are they becoming less Chinese? What 
are the Chinese schools for if students do not learn Mandarin? And what kinds of 
Chineseness are the Chinese schools producing, if not a China-centred one? 
The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the multiplicity of forms of Chineseness produced 
by the Chinese school in the Philippines. Exposed to various local, national, and 
transnational influences, Chinese schools show considerable potential to perform the 
10 
 
multiplicity of being Chinese, thus producing various versions of Chineseness. I 
suggest that the Chineseness defined by the Chinese governments is likely to represent 
only one version of Chineseness whereas, as my findings show, Chineseness in the 
Philippines varies from the China-centred, the destination country-centred, and the 
community-based. Each version of Chineseness reaches different levels of 
entanglement with Chinese nationalism. This thesis also focuses on how Chinese 
schools reposition Chinese education, specifically, and Chineseness generally to adapt 
to the changing contextual backdrop of the ‘two Chinas’ and to political, cultural and 
social life in Philippine society.    
What makes this case special and worthy of investigation? The Chinese in the 
Philippines held Chinese citizenship until 1975, when a mass naturalisation took place3’. 
Consequently, the old-generation Chinese have the strongest sense of being Huaqiao4 
(overseas Chinese nationals) among their counterparts in other southeast Asian states, 
and so it is Huaqiao Chineseness that predominates in Chinese schools. Compared to 
Malaysian Chinese (who emphasise Malaysian national identity despite effective 
Mandarin teaching) and Thai Chinese (who have lost Mandarin ability and been 
assimilated into the mainstream), Philippine-Chinese schools, in teaching Mandarin as 
a national language, still cling to ‘Huaqiao education’.  
                                                     
3 Chapter 2 will expand on the circumstances behind, and significance of, the 1975 naturalisation. 
4 ‘Hua’, according to the Zuo Zhuan, an ancient Chinese narrative history was used to refer to the 
beautiful clothes that the Chinese people wore. In modern usage, ‘Hua’ represents the Chinese nation 
and civilisation as a whole. The word ‘qiao’ means a temporary stay. The literal meaning of the 
combination of the two words is ‘temporary Chinese expatriates’. The implication behind the term 
‘Huaqiao’ is noteworthy, namely, that the people residing outside China are still considered Chinese 
and part of Chinese civilisation. Also, as China is seen as the only cultural centre of all Chinese, from 
the perspective of China itself, it is doubtless that Huaqiao will eventually return back to the homeland, 
either physically or spiritually. 
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The issue of Huaqiao Chineseness in Philippine-Chinese schools particularly deserves 
an investigation since the Philippine-Chinese were the latest to lose Huaqiao citizenship. 
Chinese citizenship was granted by the ROC (Taiwan) rather than the PRC (China) due 
to Cold War geopolitics. Compared to the Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries, 
who lost Chinese citizenship as early as the 1950s, Philippine-Chinese were legally 
Huaqiao until the 1970s. Still in charge of Chinese school affairs, a number of the old-
generation Chinese are painfully aware of the rapid decline of Chinese education in the 
aftermath of the ‘Filipinization’ of the 1970s. They are thus particularly eager to revive 
Chinese education by inviting educational aids from China and Taiwan. Given that 
Taiwan formed such a close bond with Philippine-Chinese schools in the context of the 
Cold War, since the 1990s China has been committed to replacing Taiwan’s influence 
to ensure its status as the sole representative of China. The struggle between China and 
Taiwan for hegemony in the Chinese community thus not only accelerates the revival 
of Huaqiao Chineseness but also prolongs Philippine-Chinese people’s sense of being 
Huaqiao, and therefore to be taken care of by the two fatherlands. As a result, Huaqiao 
Chineseness has been revitalised in Chinese schools and has become an essential 
feature. Yet the dominance of Huaqiao Chineseness over Chinese education does not 
necessarily preclude the spontaneous development of other forms of Chineseness in 
Chinese schools. From the perspective of different geographic levels, alternative 
versions of Chineseness are likely to exist if we adopt varying viewpoints, such as that 
of the destination country and of the immigrant community, rather than merely of the 
fatherland. The diverse, wider geopolitical context that affects the production of 
Chineseness in Chinese schools, therefore, is worth an extensive analysis.     
Beyond the monopoly of Huaqiao Chineseness in shaping identity for Chinese overseas, 
the thesis aims to rethink the meaning of being Chinese by investigating and 
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juxtaposing different versions of Chineseness in the context of Chinese schools: 
Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren5 Chineseness and communal Chineseness. When we 
talk about the loss of Chinese identity, we need to take all versions of Chineseness into 
account. The waning of one version of Chineseness, then, does not imply the overall 
decline of Chineseness, but may entail the waxing of another version of Chineseness. 
Considering variations in Chineseness can yield a more robust and accurate perspective 
on the development of Chineseness.  
 
1.2 From National Culture of the Fatherland to Minority Ethnicity in   
   Destination Country  
Huaqiao Chineseness refers to an ideal that all Chinese have to be part of the Chinese 
nation, behave as genuine Chinese people, learn Chinese culture, and speak Mandarin. 
In fact, this ideal presupposes the existence of a nation-state in that it imagines a 
synthesis of nation, people, culture and language. This is, however, an ideal type 
because there is no ‘pure’ nation-state, and each state contains ethnic minorities within 
its national territory (Connor, 1993; 2004). Nonetheless, a nation-state government can 
exercise nation-building policies to turn the people residing in its territory into a nation. 
To achieve this goal, national or citizenship education is the most common and effective 
means to encourage or demand loyalty to the nation and to modify a national identity 
and a common national language by stressing national homogeneity and ignoring ethnic 
and linguistic diversity (Osler, 2012: 354).  
International migration, however, casts considerable doubt on the ideal. As Wimmer 
                                                     
5 Huaren refers to those of Chinese descent who have settled somewhere outside China and have also 
obtained foreign citizenship. 
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and Schiller (2002) discuss, migrants bring into question the notion of isomorphism in 
several ways: politically, including legally, between people, sovereign and citizenry; 
culturally, between people and nation; and socially, between people and solidarity 
groups. Expanding international migration in an age of globalisation fundamentally 
challenges the essentialist ideology of the nation-state. In the same vein, the focus of 
citizenship education in light of the principle of the nation-state also faces challenges 
from ‘increased cross-border movements and networks’ promoted by ‘the forces of 
globalization, new and intensifying international migration, and the activities of 
transnational communities and corporations (Osler, 2012: 354).  
When it comes to the challenges immigrants pose to nation-states, scholarship tends to 
assume that these are mostly faced by receiving states (e.g. Castles, 1995; Joppke, 1999; 
Koopmans and Statham, 1999). As immigrants join the state where they settle and often 
cause cultural plurality and political dissonance, they represent a challenge to 
prerequisite isomorphism between nation and people. This is particularly so for Chinese 
emigrants in Southeast Asia, who were purported to be associated with communist 
China and had been regarded as unassimilated.  
The challenges faced by sending states, however, are widely ignored. While crossing 
national borders, the national culture and language promoted through the nation-
building policies of the sending state will inevitably be transformed as emigrants adapt 
them to the local settings of the receiving state. This reveals that so-called national 
culture and language, which are seen as the essence of a nation, are actually variable 
and flexible, depending on the orientation of the emigrants as well as on local 
circumstances.  
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Some emigrants are eager to preserve aspects of their old national identity by 
transplanting the cultural and linguistic practices of their homeland into the receiving 
state, even forming immigrant enclaves (Wilson and Portes, 1980). Others are 
committed to integration within their new nation in the context of multicultural policies 
and ‘hyphenated identity’, in the process turning their homeland national culture into a 
minority group ethnicity in the host society (Bélanger and Verkuyten, 2010; Giampapa, 
2001). Still others are principally concerned with community politics and pursue 
politics based on their communal identity inside the host society (Wang, 1988; Wang 
1991b). Some migrants even freely flow across national borders, exploit the flexibility 
of global market, and embrace a transnational identity (Ong, 1999). Therefore, 
emigrants can translate a seemingly fixed national culture into a range of flexible 
cultural and linguistic practices, deconstructing isomorphism between nation, people, 
culture, and language in respect of sending states, too. Sending states can therefore no 
longer monopolise interpretations of culture and language that confine it to a single 
nation-state. In other words, the monolith of nationality can be loosened by various 
identity practices of emigrants. 
Chinese emigrants offer a particularly fruitful case for understanding the processes 
involved in the transformation of national cultures. It is often argued that Confucian 
values, a common written language, similar social customs, and festivities form the core 
of the so-called ‘Chineseness’ that grants a sense of what it is to be, or cease to be, 
Chinese (Wang, 1988: 1). The ‘Chinese nation-state’ that emerged by the end of the 
19th century helped build a strong notion of Chineseness around characteristics of 
nationalism, such as national territory, national pride, national language, and national 
education. This resulted in a rather essentialist view of ‘authentic Chineseness’: being 
Chinese meant recognition that one was part of the Chinese nation, had a certain degree 
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of historical identity (culturally) and nationalist identity (politically) towards China, 
had received Chinese education, and spoke good Mandarin. These criteria, criticised by 
Ien Ang (1998) as ‘Chinese essentialism’, demarcate ‘an absolutist oppositioning of 
authentic and inauthentic, pure and impure, real and fake’ (Ang, 1998: 225). In other 
words, those who cannot fulfil these essentialist criteria would be dismissed as ‘not 
Chinese enough’.  
Moreover, there are two sentiments involved in the essentialist view of Chineseness 
(Wu, 1991). One is a culturalist sentiment that obliges Chinese people to hand down 
the cultural heritage from ancestors to descendants, to connect themselves to the fate of 
China as a nation, and to be separate from non-Chinese. Another is a racist sentiment 
that makes Chinese people see themselves as members of ‘the Chinese race’, sharing a 
feeling of what Rey Chow (1993: 24) refers to as the ‘myth of consanguinity’, as in the 
old saying: ‘all Chinese people are children of the Yellow Emperor’. As a result, those 
who have Chinese blood are expected to satisfy the essentialist criteria of being Chinese.  
Chinese emigrants on the other hand by no means follow such criteria, having shown 
much more varied cultural and political orientations. As Wang indicates, even at the 
peak of overseas Chinese nationalism, around the time of World War II, there existed 
three groups of Chinese overseas: the China-oriented, the local Chinese community-
oriented, and the receiving state-oriented (Wang, 1981: 147). In the age of globalisation, 
in which national borders are crossed more frequently, such orientations diversify even 
further. For example, facilitated by ‘internetworking’, a ‘global Chinese community’ 
consisting of transnational Chinese business networks has emerged, producing 
‘globalized Chineseness’ which does not necessarily have interest in, or loyalty to, a 
certain territorial polity (Kwok, 1999). 
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Notwithstanding, China has still been a significant focus of identity, fuelled by the 
persisting policies of Chinese government(s) to preserve and revive Chinese identity, 
belonging, and cultural and linguistic literacy through Chinese education. There seems 
to be a tug of war for the orientation of Chinese overseas between the centrifugal force 
of the global market and the centripetal force of sending and receiving nation-state 
governments.  
Hence, the issues of Chinese education raised by educationalists in the Philippines and 
Chinese-education researchers are deeply problematic. The Chineseness, Mandarin 
ability, and Chinese identity that they pursue are defined and produced by China, and 
are based on an overseas Chinese nationalism that stresses the nationalistic ideology of 
one nation, one people, one culture, and one language. Yet various forms of Chineseness 
may have been unfolding, facilitated by the local, national, and transnational practices 
of the Philippine-Chinese. Focusing on the original form of Chineseness would be to 
ignore other possibilities nurtured by the diverse environments in which Philippine-
Chinese have settled. Masked by Chinese nationalism, the function of the Chinese 
school system, besides Mandarin teaching, would be neglected, too. These educational 
practices in the local circumstance are likely to gradually drive Chineseness way from 
a China-centredness, thus leading to a paradigm shift of Chineseness toward openness 
to others. 
 
1.3 Setting the Framework for the Study of Chineseness Production  
   in Chinese Schools 
Despite great complexity, a study of the Chineseness of Chinese overseas could easily 
focus solely on Chinese nationalism. However, the focus of this thesis is the multiplicity 
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within, and the interaction between, different forms of Chineseness. Therefore, I derive 
a framework for the study of how Chineseness is produced from reviewing the literature. 
The following discussion interrogates and analyses the origin of Huaqiao, criticises the 
essentialist view, and expands all aspects of Chineseness generated at different levels. 
The process consists of three stages. The first is to trace how Chinese overseas became 
a single group with the obligation to follow the ideal of one nation, one people, one 
culture, and one language. The second is to explore the possibilities of multiple 
Chineseness(es) by employing some critics of single Chineseness. Finally, I introduce 
an illuminating methodological approach to challenge the myth of nationalism and to 
expand the scope of the study of Chineseness.   
 
1.3.1 Huaqiao and Chinese Diaspora  
The discussion necessarily involves a Chinese term referring to Chinese overseas as a 
single group: ‘Huaqiao’. The pioneering researcher in the area of overseas Chinese 
studies, Gungwu Wang (1981), rightfully notes that the term Huaqiao implies that all 
Chinese overseas, regardless of how many generations they have settled in a receiving 
state, will eventually return back to their hometown in China. The term thus has political, 
patriotic connotations: it suggests that all Chinese overseas ought to have loyalty to 
China rather than to colonial administrations or receiving states (Wang, 1981: 123; 
Wang, 1991a). The notion of Huaqiao makes Chinese overseas who have scattered 
around the world an integral part of the Chinese nation, turning those with a variety of 
cultural and historical backgrounds into a single group. The core point in Wang’s works 
is, however, that the term Huaqiao is overgeneralised and should be used carefully: it 
not only fuels suspicion about Chinese overseas’ loyalty to receiving states, but also 
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simplifies and neglects the local contexts and life experiences pertaining to the diverse 
locations in which Chinese overseas settle and live (Wang, 1981; Wang, 1991a; Wang, 
1991b; Wang, 2001b; Wang, 2001c). Hence, although the term Huaqiao is commonly 
used of Chinese emigrants, we should keep in mind that it only represents one aspect 
of Chineseness and fails to exhaust all possibilities of their cultural and political 
orientations.  
Another general term used to refer to Chinese overseas, ‘Chinese diaspora’, has a 
similar problem. Diaspora is a term originating from the Jewish community’s historical 
experiences of exile and dispersion. Now, diaspora has been univeralised to refer to a 
variety of transnational communities, such as the Bangladeshi diaspora, the Filipino 
diaspora, the Haitian diaspora, etc. It also implies a transnational community’s 
continuing entanglement with homeland politics (Brubaker, 2005). In his work ‘A 
Single Chinese Diaspora?’, Wang (2004) suggests the term be used with reservation. 
Similar to the notion of Huaqiao, ‘diaspora’ is associated with the notion of ‘sojourner’ 
(Wang, 2004: 158) which implies Chinese emigrants’ ‘rootlessness’ — something likely 
to cause suspicion about the Chinese minorities’ lack of commitment to, and of sense 
of belonging with, receiving states. The term, in fact, overstates ethnic, if not nationalist 
or racist, connections between all Chinese, at home and abroad (Wang, 2004: 158). 
Wang also urges us to study overseas Chinese communities in the context of their 
respective national environment and to ‘avoid projecting the image of a single Chinese 
diaspora’ (Wang, 2004: 169). 
While Wang reminds us that the association between Chinese overseas and the 
homeland should not be overemphasised, Mckeown (1999) refutes studies that confine 
their focus to the nationalist viewpoint. Mckeown points out that studies of the Chinese 
diaspora could easily get bogged down in discussing competing nation-based claims of 
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respective nation-states, such as the dilemma between China-centred and America-
centred stances for Chinese Americans. Instead, Mckeown advances that studies should 
‘complement and expand upon nation-based perspectives by drawing attention to global 
connections, networks, activities, and consciousnesses that bridge these more localized 
anchors of reference’ (McKeown, 1999: 307). In other words, studies should stress the 
mobility and dispersion of migration experiences, rather than fixed situations, such as 
nationality. 
Gungwu Wang also notes that researchers with various stances could draw different 
conclusions from the same group of Chinese overseas. In his work ‘the Future of 
Overseas Chinese Studies’, Wang (2001) reviews the major studies of Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia. He categorises the studies into four approaches, each 
representing four paradigms. The first is policy reports by colonial officials, white 
settlers, and indigenous leaders. These reports aim to understand the economic position 
and the social and cultural dynamics of each Chinese community for safer governance 
of respective colonies. The reports, of course, serve the interests of European empires 
and tend to problematise Huaqiao as an issue to tackle. The second type of study is 
written by officials and scholars in China with a China-centred point of view. For the 
purpose of promoting Chinese identity, they tend to politicise the issue of Chinese 
overseas, stress their association with China, and see them as complete Huaqiao. The 
third type is writings by local Chinese who have trained as scholars in the West, and 
have identified themselves with the nation in which they live. These studies concentrate 
on overseas Chinese communities’ political loyalties to, and cultural integration with, 
respective nation-states. The fourth is led by two anthropologists, Maurice Freedman 
of the London School of Economics and G. William Skinner of Cornell University. 
Their work has been influential on generations of scholars, including some Chinese 
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overseas. Compared to the last three, this approach is relatively free from a nation-
centred viewpoint, and is out of academic interest. As shown above, Wang’s review 
serves as a reminder that the stance of researchers, including their orientation toward 
colonisers, China, or receiving states, can affect the tendency of the studies and 
consequently their results. Therefore, while reviewing the literature about Chinese 
education in the Philippines, we need to pay attention to the standpoint of researchers.  
From the discussions above, we can see that the viewpoints of researchers 
understanding Chinese overseas, as well as of Chinese overseas understanding 
themselves, can vary. Thus, the study of Chinese overseas necessitates a discussion 
about what being Chinese means – a question about ‘Chineseness’ that, among scholars 
in this area, inevitably becomes heated. 
 
1.3.2 Chineseness as an Open Signifier 
The discourse on Chineseness has faced a shift from uniformity to multiplicity, from 
centre to periphery. In imperial China, power was highly centralised to the emperors, 
and being Chinese meant acknowledging the authority of the geopolitical centre and 
accepting and learning the only civilised way of living (Shi, 2009). Since the second 
half of the 19th century, a series of droughts, famines and wars in China served as push 
factors causing waves of Chinese migration, mainly to Southeast Asia and North 
America. In the meantime, while China turned itself into a modern nation-state, Chinese 
people within and without the Chinese territory began to share a uniform and strong 
notion of Chineseness as a consequence of actions taken by the Chinese state. Yet the 
migration that followed historical events, such as the establishment of the PRC in 1949, 
the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989, and the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong 
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from the UK to the PRC in 1997, all witnessed a continuing process of de-centring from 
China to respective receiving countries. In the aftermath of a series of calamities, 
Chineseness has therefore become a controversial issue. 
In the post-1949 era, interactions between Chinese people overseas and China were 
interrupted. While residing abroad, Chinese overseas have been free to review the given 
ties with China and their inherited Chineseness, and how these affect their actual lives 
in respective countries. From the perspective of Chinese overseas, the meaning of being 
Chinese continues to change along the lines of historical developments and actual 
situations. Writing in the context of Singapore, for example, Eugene Tan (2003) 
indicates a series of changes in views about Chineseness. The Cultural Revolution in 
China and the communist threat from 1965 to 1979 prompted ‘de-Chineseness’ among 
Chinese Singaporeans, who to keep a distance from being Chinese; the advent of the 
Reform and Opening of China from 1979 to 1990 led to a ‘tentative high-profile for 
Chineseness’; 1990 to the present marks an ‘assertion of Chineseness’ rekindled by the 
economic achievements of East Asian capitalism of not only Mainland China, but the 
Chinese in the periphery such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, and overseas Chinese 
communities. As these developments indicate, the image of Chineseness hinges on the 
situation of ‘Greater China’. 
In terms of the discourse on Chineseness, the stage of ‘de-Chineseness’ has entailed a 
shift from uniformity, hegemony and conformity (peaking at the Maoist period) to 
multiplicity, autonomy and diversity occurring at the periphery. After the 1970s, the 
Chinese periphery also played the role of bridging Mainland China and the West in 
terms of the former's pursuit of modernity, and that internationally dominated the 
production of discourse on Chineseness (Wu, 2015). China’s rise may have empowered 
it to manipulate the official discourse on Chineseness, but the ‘reassertion of 
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Chineseness’ by Chinese overseas does not necessarily mean the resurrection of the 
China-centred view. As China as a state is fixed in one location, with the increase of 
migratory flows of Chinese people around the world has also come a rise in discourses 
on ‘global Chineseness’ that show detachment from the Chinese state (Reid, 2009). The 
discourse of ‘global China’ and ‘transnational Chinese’ adds a new dimension to 
Chineseness, namely, ‘fluidity’, one of the features of global capitalist modernity (Chu, 
2008). Consequently, China’s status as the hegemonic centre of ancestral origin and 
rootedness, and its monopoly of the definition of Chineseness, encounter challenges 
and deconstructions. In the circle of scholars in the Chinese periphery there even 
appears a voice to ‘rescue Chineseness from China’ (Wu, 2015). 
Tu Wei-ming, a remarkable ‘New Confucian’ scholar who grew up in Taiwan, advances 
as part of his mega-concept of ‘cultural China’ that China as the centre no longer has 
the ability, insight, or legitimate authority to dictate the agenda. Appalled by the 
brutality of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Tu stresses the element of culture, rather 
than political central power, among features of Chineseness (Tu, 1991). The proposal 
of ‘cultural China’ focuses on the cultural aspects of Chineseness to facilitate the de-
centering of the legitimate authority of the Chinese central government and to seek an 
alternative to the political and geographic centre. For Tu, cultural China consists of 
three symbolic universes. The first comprises the societies predominantly populated by 
cultural and ethnic Chinese, such as mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. The second is overseas Chinese communities throughout the world existing 
as ethnic minorities in respective countries. The third is those who have intellectual 
understanding of and interest in China, such as scholars, teachers, journalists, 
industrials, traders, entrepreneurs and writers. China’s hegemonic monopoly of 
Chineseness has been challenged not only by ‘residual China’, termed by Freedman 
23 
 
(1979), like Taiwan and Hong Kong, but also by those who live in the second and third 
universes. The Chineseness contributed by the latter two even has a more profound 
significance in shaping the intellectual discourse of cultural China. In other words, the 
traditional centre-periphery dichotomy can be reversed and the Chinese periphery also 
has great transformative potential. 
Some diasporic scholars voice fierce criticism in light of poststructuralism and cultural 
studies. Allen Chun (1996), who is a Chinese American of Cantonese ancestry, for 
example, suggests that the dominant discourse on Chineseness is greatly influenced by 
the modern conception of the nation-state predicated on cultural boundaries. The 
homogeneous notions of Chinese civilisation and of China as an unambiguous political 
entity tend to erase the possibility of multiple identities and negate difference (Chun, 
1996: 135). Rey Chow, an ethnic Chinese scholar in America originating from Hong 
Kong, thus suggests that it requires ‘a great deal of work to do to decouple ethnicity ... 
from its equivalence with nationalism’ (Chow, 1998: 8). 
Ing Ang (1998), an Indonesia-born ethnic Chinese who grew up in the Netherlands, 
criticises the ‘centrist and organist’ conception of Chineseness as an ‘externally 
imposed identity…by practice of discrimination’ (Ang, 1998: 224). From the 
perspective of poststructuralism, she also indicates the authenticity of Chineseness is 
stereotypically and rigidly constituted by ‘Chinese essentialism’. ‘Authentic’ 
Chineseness is thus defined by one single standard of being authentic, pure and real, 
such as ‘belonging to the Han race, being born in China proper, speaking Mandarin, 
and observing the “patriotic” code of ethics’ (Ang, 1998: 228). Having often been 
criticised for being ‘not Chinese enough’, Ang also criticises the conception of 
Chineseness for ‘truncat[ing] and suppress[ing] complex realities and experiences that 
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cannot possibly be fully and meaningfully contained within the singular category of 
“Chinese” (Ang, 1998: 233)’.  
Though they level fierce criticism against the traditional idea of Chineseness, the above 
scholars seem to have no intention of completely abandoning Chineseness, or of ruling 
out its possible function as a way of self-expression. Instead, they are commonly open 
to the possibility of alternative versions of Chineseness. Chun takes the Peranakan 
Chinese6 of Malaysia and Indonesia as an example to indicate that those who do not 
meet the one single standard of Chinese identity are still essentially Chinese, ‘as long 
as we can reject our modern, essentially nationalistic notions of identity based on 
definitions of ethnicity authorized by a cultural mainstream’ (Chun, 1996: 123). Ang 
(2001: 35) advances Chineseness as ‘an open signifier’ for constructing syncretic 
identities in accordance with local specifities. Even more boldly, Chow points out that 
there can be a multiplicity of Chineseness as well as ‘many Chinese identities’ (Chow, 
1998: 24). Many kinds of Chineseness, each open to interpretation, thus appear 
desirable for those who cannot content themselves with the given ‘authentic’ 
Chineseness. 
 
1.3.3 Methodological Nationalism versus Methodological Cosmopolitanism in 
Studies of Overseas Chinese Education 
As discussed above, studies of Chinese overseas should be open to multiple 
perspectives in interpreting the production of Chineseness; they should also be attentive 
                                                     
6 Peranakan Chinese refers to people of mixed Chinese and Malay/Indonesian heritage. In terms of 
culture and language they are predominantly Malay-influenced, but preserve a certain degree of 
Chinese identity by practicing Chinese traditional rituals, like the wedding ceremony. 
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to nationalist bias. I suggest that studies demand an awareness of so-called 
‘methodological nationalism’, which ignores the significance of nationalism in modern 
social science, naturalises the boundary of the nation-state as the unit of analysis, and 
confines the scope of study of transnational social processes to the political and 
geographic boundaries of a certain nation-state (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002; 2003). 
In light of these critics, there are three reflections on methodological nationalism to 
which I intend to give a closer look when it comes to overseas Chinese studies. First, 
the existing approach towards Chinese-education research by Chinese and Taiwanese 
scholars tends to be ‘nation-blind’, and takes Mandarin learning as merely a neutral 
technical and pedagogical issue. Methodological nationalist agendas thus have been 
concealed under technical discussions of Mandarin teaching that simply address the 
decline as a technical issue. The advice that they give is thus nation-blind, such as 
editing better textbooks to fit students’ standard, sending Mandarin teachers from China 
or Taiwan to Chinese schools, updating teaching methods, and so on. They hardly 
consider that the problem may be with the national framing of Chinese education. Take, 
for example, the biggest annual conference held by the Overseas Community Affairs 
Council of Taiwan in Taipei, ‘the International Conference on Internet Chinese 
Education (ICICE)’. The aim of the ICICE is to ‘exploit Taiwan’s advantages of digital 
technology and to promote quality internet Chinese education based on Taiwanese 
culture’ (OCAC, 2017). The entire conference in 2017 centred on the application of e-
learning to Mandarin teaching. The largest and most high-profile academic event 
dealing with overseas Chinese education in Taiwan thus implies that problems with 
Mandarin teaching can be solved by technology developed by the Republic of China, 
which is, from the perspective of some Philippine-Chinese, the fatherland. The national 
agenda of Taiwan is thus hidden from academic discussions.   
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Second, the approach also assumes a ‘deterritorialized nation’ in which the Chinese 
national government, whether this refers to the PRC or the ROC, tends to trans-
territorially incorporate the loyalty, wealth and influence of Chinese emigrants into its 
nation-building. Overseas Chinese education thus becomes part of the national project. 
This approach adopts a fatherland-centred viewpoint from which historical events that 
threaten the isomorphism between nation and the people of the sending country would 
be negatively narrated. For example, Chinese and Taiwanese scholars have generally 
regarded the Filipinization policy, which aims to turn the Chinese into Filipinos, as 
detrimental to the development of the Chinese school system. However, these scholars 
simply attribute the decline of Chinese education to the Philippine government’s 
actions, rather than the natural process of Chinese integration into the mainstream; they 
also fail to recognise the benefits that access to Filipino citizenship gives to the Chinese 
(see Chou, 1994; Hsia, 1994).  
Third, the unit of analysis in Chinese-education studies is confined by the boundaries 
of the nation-state. When it comes to the research topic of Chinese education in the 
Philippines, article or book titles usually mention one or two nation-states as the unit of 
analysis, such as ‘Taiwan Policy and Influence on Overseas Chinese Education in the 
Philippines’ (Jiang, 2011), indicating the influence of one nation-state over another. 
‘Chinese Schools and the Assimilation Problem in the Philippines’ (Sussman, 1976), 
meanwhile, addresses the issue of Chinese schools as a domestic problem for the 
Philippine nation. The nation-state thus appears to be the most significant unit of 
analysis. Further, academic analysis of education policy, whether the policy was made 
by Taiwan, China, or the Philippine government, tends to serve either as part of the 
nation-building projects funded by national governments or as a persuasion tactic used 
by the Philippine Chinese themselves to be accepted in the Filipino mainstream (Chen, 
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1958; Pao, 1964; Ragodon, 1964; See, 1997a).  
The most problematic issue is that these studies seldom engage a viewpoint bigger or 
smaller than national framing, such as communal or global ones. In fact, as I will show, 
the formation of the Philippine-Chinese community and of this education system 
involves an array of transnational social processes over time, including: the 
transnational Philippine-Chinese community; the legacy of the Spanish and American 
colonial regimes; postcolonial Philippine nation-building and ethnic relations; Chinese-
Philippine diplomatic relations; cross-strait politics between China and Taiwan; the rise 
of China and the ‘Greater China’ region; globalisation, cosmopolitanisation and the 
Chinese diaspora. Accordingly, methodological nationalism alongside any single 
national standpoint are too narrow to analyse the intricate transnational education 
system in which Chineseness is produced.    
Therefore, the research approach that I adopt in the study to cope with the transnational 
education system draws mainly upon ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’, proposed by 
Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider in 2006 as a new reference point for transnational 
studies. Whereas methodological nationalism or the ‘nationalised methodology’ 
follows the ‘either/or’ logic of nationality—every issue is either a national one within a 
national boundary, or an international affair between nations—aiming at advancing 
respective national interests, this ‘cosmopolitanized methodology’ is an attempt to shift 
the ‘either/or’ logic to one of ‘both/and’, which concerns the dissolution and mergence 
of ‘the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and 
them’ (Beck and Sznaider, 2006). 
Beck and Sznaider also suggest an empirical approach with multi-perspectival foci—
local, national, transnational, and global—to investigate the cosmopolitanisation of 
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contemporary society. Indeed, the Chinese education system involves a variety of 
communities on different geographic scales—the local Chinese community, the 
Philippine national government, and two kin states (Taiwan and China). So, 
methodologically, it is to some extent essentially cosmopolitan. In this view, I would 
look at how the Chinese education and Chineseness have been ‘cosmopolitanising’, 
attempting to encompass all these perspectives geographically, as follows. 
On the spatial dimension, a national focus must be a central point in this thesis, since 
nationalism is still a critical part of cosmopolitan analysis. Critics of methodological 
nationalism do not imply the end of the nation, but its transformation (Beck and 
Sznaider, 2006:22). Because the Chinese school system used to be an extension of 
national-language education in China, it is necessary to discuss the primordial type of 
Chineseness based on Chinese nationalism serving to incorporate Chinese overseas into 
Chinese nationality.      
Further, from the perspective of the Philippine nation as the receiving state, it is 
noteworthy that all the Chinese schools in Philippine territory have become an 
institutionalised part of the Philippine national education system. When mentioning 
‘national’ in this context, I will discuss the interactions between the Chinese schools, 
the Philippine government and any authorities, as well as how these interactions affect 
the status of the Chinese as a minority group and any ethnic relations.  
Second, with a local focus, I bring a communal perspective into the analysis of the 
education system. This focus will be on the Philippine-Chinese community itself rather 
than only the nation-states concerned. I will argue that the Chinese education system is 
not merely an overseas extension of the education service, rolled out on behalf of the 
people of the modern Chinese nation-state resident in the host Philippine state. Instead, 
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the Chinese also have their specific aims and ambitions, seeking a living space among 
these greater powers, particularly in larger Philippine society.  
Third, with a transnational focus, I look at how, in an education system, national borders 
can be transcended back and forth by flows and networks of human beings (teachers, 
students, experts, officials etc.), materials (textbooks, money, facilities etc.), and 
services (teacher training, summer camps, visiting groups etc.). These transnational 
flows can potentially shape and reshape the understanding of participants’ ethnicity, 
nationality, identity, and citizenship. By Bauböck’s definition (2003), at a national level, 
transnational relations are manifest in overlapping polities between independent states; 
at a personal level, transnational political phenomena can be observed in external and 
dual citizenship for migrants. Therefore, the interaction of the Chinese education 
system between Taiwan and China and the Philippines may best exemplify it. Although 
Portes (2001b) suggests that the subject of transnational activities are mainly non-
governmental and civic associations or grassroots activists, I maintain that in this 
context the education-related activities and resources listed above can in fact be 
political and governmental (whether implicitly or explicitly), under the guise of cultural 
and economic affairs. Nevertheless, I still indicate that there exists a certain degree of 
agency or relative autonomy for the Philippine-Chinese, coming from their personal 
experiences and daily lives. Whereas before, at the heyday of nationalism, the nation-
state's conduct could be politically taken for granted, nowadays its meaning is being 
reinterpreted among this increasingly ‘cosmopolitanised’ Chinese community and is 
deviating from the original agenda of any nation-states involved.  
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1.3.4 Exploring the Extent of Cosmopolitanisation of Chinese Education 
As Beck and Grande (2010) suggest, the entanglement and interconnectedness 
facilitated by human mobility through the globalising process have initiated ‘an age of 
cosmopolitanization’ in which ‘the “global other” is in our midst’ (Beck and Grande, 
2010: 417). At the empirical level, cultural difference has become routinely 
incorporated into daily life, leading to ‘really existing cosmopolitanism’ or ‘the 
cosmopolitanization of reality’ (Beck, 2006). Casual encounters with different cultural 
forms are often experienced unintentionally : scholars refer to this in a variety of terms, 
such as the ‘banal form of cosmopolitanism’ (Skey, 2012), ‘vernacular 
cosmopolitanism’ (Werbner, 2006) and ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah, 1997). Such 
terms emphasise cosmopolitanism at the ground level, rather than at the normative level, 
which implies a moral imperative.  
Defined by Szerszynski and Urry (2002),‘cosmopolitan’ means a general ‘openness to 
other people and cultures’. It is worth an investigation into what extent 
‘cosmopolitanisation’ really happens when different groups encounter each other. 
While analysing people’s everyday engagements with otherness, Skey (2012) reminds 
us that cosmopolitan studies should not treat identities as the exclusive possession of 
cultural traits, but as processes of identification. He thus advocates that researchers need 
to pay attention to the dynamic of openness to others by exploring people’s ‘motivations, 
values and wider structural constraints’ (Skey, 2012: 240) in respective contexts.  
Skey further points out the utility value of cosmopolitan practices, terming this 
‘strategic cosmopolitanism’ (Skey, 2012: 240). In Weenink’s case study into the reason 
why parents in the Netherlands send their children to international schools, some 
parents regard a more open attitude toward others (who are, in this case, generally rich 
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and westernised foreigners) as a means of ‘ensuring future success in their children’s 
career or study’ (quoted in Skey, 2012: 240). In another study quoted by Skey (2012: 
24), Kothari shows that the vulnerability and economic insecurity of some 
disadvantaged groups, such as illegal migrants, prompt them to possess better cultural 
skills to engage with others for their livelihood, such as selling their wares to tourists. 
These practices of openness to others are practical and utilitarian in that, through them, 
the individual pursues future development rather than progress in terms of aims or 
values.  
As this thesis will show, the Chinese schools in the Philippines are likely to undergo 
the process of cosmopolitanisation while encountering a variety of communal, national 
and transnational factors. In projecting and constructing Chineseness, Chinese schools 
thus appear to gradually depart from the isomorphism between the nation, people, 
culture, and language of China. Shifting from being part of the national education 
system of China, Chinese schools increasingly unfold their openness to others, whether 
it is for progressive values or utilitarian ones. Therefore, this thesis aims to present a 
general picture of the extent to which Chinese schools cosmopolitanise Chinese 
education as well as Chineseness in the Philippines via a range of education practices. 
As cosmopolitanism becomes not only a progressive value, but also an everyday 
practice, education which is used to presuppose the primacy of a national identity and 
to make individuals into national citizens faces challenges too. Educational researchers 
thus suggest a new teaching approach of ‘education for cosmopolitanisation’ which 
celebrates diversity, recognises difference, promotes social justice, and tackle the 
problem of racism (Osler and Starkey, 2015). Particularly, language education which 
inevitably contends cultural, ethnic, and international issues is also regarded as an 
‘important site of citizenship education (Starkey, 2010)’. In a globalising and 
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multilingual world, language education based on nationalism and monolingualism can 
no longer fit into people’s increasingly complex identities, loyalties, and language 
varieties due to transnational migration (Shohamy, 2006). Therefore, a proposal for 
‘language education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ emerges (Osler & Starkey, 2010; 
Starkey, 2007; Starkey, 2010).  
I sum up this proposal in three points. First, it suggests that language education should 
de-couple language teaching from a single national culture (Starkey, 2007). Both the 
British Council, for instance, are established to promote the cultural values of the UK 
by language teaching (Starkey, 2010: 2). Instead, by admitting the reality of complex 
and multiple identities in its content, language teaching could be multicultural and open 
to multiple identities and wider loyalties.   
Second, in contrast to nationalised language teaching which upholds the notion of 
nationality with a fixed, settled view about individual’s status, language education for 
cosmopolitan citizenship can instead instil students the notion of citizenship which 
emphases individual citizen’s autonomy, agency and rights to act collectively (Starkey, 
2010: 11).  
Third, language education should help students to be citizens of world. Skills for 
intercultural communication and knowledge about global issues that lift barriers 
between people can be foci in language classes in which learners might not only learn 
their rights as a human being but also foster a sense of responsibility for others’ 
sufferings and human rights abuse in the world. Thus a cosmopolitan perspective based 
on human rights as universal principles might help language education go beyond 
national agenda and move toward world citizenship.      
In the context of this thesis, the idealistic values of language education for cosmopolitan 
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citizenship can help pose challenging questions about the Chinese education in the 
Philippines: whether this Chinese education promotes a single national culture or 
accepts cultural diversity? Whether it stresses a certain kind of national identity or 
recognises students’ potential multiple identities? Whether it pursues the political 
agenda of a certain nation or tackles some universal issues faced by all human beings? 
The gap between the ideal of language education for cosmopolitan citizenship and the 
reality of the case of the Philippine-Chinese schools is also a focus of this thesis. 
      
1.4 Research Method 
The research method that I use in the thesis consists of three parts. The first part is 
participant observation, informed by an anthropological approach. As mentioned above, 
some scholarly works about the Chinese school in the Philippines assume 
methodological nationalism because they are inspired, supported or even funded by 
national governments. Consequently, these studies are likely to maintain official stances 
towards the fatherland, exaggerating the contribution of respective national 
governments’ overseas Chinese policies to Chinese schools, rather than reflecting the 
real situation. It is thus pivotal to gain insight from insider perspectives in order to 
expose the interaction between the policy implementation and actual teaching 
effectiveness and to present the response of local people, including students, parents, 
teachers, school administrators, to the educational policies. Playing the role of a teacher 
gave me access to become an ‘insider participant observer’ and to obtain detailed insight 
into the everyday teaching practices at school level and real teacher-student interaction 
in a classroom.  
My participant observation lasted one year, from May 2010 to April 2011. I was sent 
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by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (the OCAC) in Taiwan to a Chinese 
school, which I have given the pseudonym ‘St. Joseph High School’ (SJHS). The SJHS 
is located in the Santa Cruz district. Part of the so-called ‘Chinatown area’, it contains 
a cluster of Chinese schools around the northern part of Manila’s city centre. The SJHS 
is a large school, attended by approximately 2,000 students in its preschool, elementary 
school and high school.    
In this one-year teaching placement, I had two duties, both of which helped me in the 
data collection. One duty was to be the Chinese secretary for the principal in the 
mornings. As part of this role I wrote school news to be advertised in Chinese 
newspapers, drafted Chinese speeches for the principal, and dealt with a range of 
administrative works in Chinese. Some first-hand information was thus available to me 
in tackling these tasks.  
Another duty was Mandarin teaching in the elementary school in the afternoons. I was 
in charge of ‘Mandarin-language learning’ and ‘common knowledge about Chinese 
history, geography, and culture’ for two six-grade classes. I was also the ‘form teacher’ 
of a class of 43 students and was responsible for maintaining in-class discipline, 
organising teaching activities, and preparing the students to participate in a variety of 
events in the elementary schools, such as fieldtrips, flag-raising ceremonies, Chinese 
singing, recitation, and choir contests. Close contact and interaction with the students 
thus availed me of their first-hand experiences in learning Mandarin. 
The central question of the thesis emerged mainly as a result of this one-year participant 
observation. The frustration that arose from trying so hard to keep my class in order and 
from teaching these reluctant students compelled me to probe the reason behind their 
resistance to Mandarin learning. The whole thesis is an effort to answer the enquiry.  
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For this part of the data collection, I mainly relied on fieldwork notes. From the day I 
arrived in Manila, I started writing notes to record the words, behaviours, activities, 
events, and other features during the one-year participant observation. As much as I 
could, I took advantage of every opportunity to talk to strangers, ask questions and 
make observations to expand the width and depth of the fieldwork. At the end of the 
year, my completed field notes, numbering 18,447 words, became an important data 
resources for the thesis. Following this whole year of stay, I also revisited Manila in 
February and July of 2012 for further data collection.  
The second part of my data collection consisted of on-site interviews conducted from 
October 2013 to January 2014. For this stage, I purposively sampled interviewees 
ranging from school administrators, teachers, students, graduates and parents affiliated 
with a variety of schools. There are around 50 Chinese schools in Metro Manila. I 
reached 11 schools of different sizes, which are fairly representative of Chinese schools 
in Manila. The schools that I reached consisted of 5 large schools (>3,000 students), 3 
medium schools (1,000~2,000 students), and 3 small schools (<1,000 students). With 
respect to the social and economic background of students, most of the Chinese families 
were middle class; the tuition fee rate of the respective schools that the children’s 
families could afford was a useful indicator of the families’ social and economic 
background. According to the tuition fee rate, I have divided these schools roughly into 
three classes: 1 school is for the upper class (>100,000 pesos per year); 9 schools are 
for the upper-middle class (approximately 40,000~70,000 pesos per year); 1 schools for 
the lower-upper class (<40,000 per year). The interviewees whom I approached and the 
schools to which these interviewees belonged are shown as the table below. 
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School Location Population Size 
(Large: >3000; 
Medium: 1000~2000; 
 Small: <1000) 
Interviewees General social and 
economic background 
of students 
Xavier Schools Greenhill, 
Manila 
Large 1 student  Upper class 
1 parent 
Chiang Kai-shek 
College 
Tondo, 
Manila 
Large The Chinese 
director 
Upper-middle class  
1 teacher 
4 graduates 
1 parent 
Philippine 
Cultural College 
Tondo, 
Manila 
Large The vice 
president 
Upper-middle class  
1 teacher 
Saint Jude 
Catholic School 
San Miguel Large 1 graduate Upper-middle class  
Grace Christian 
College 
Quezon 
City 
Large The president Upper-middle class  
2 teachers 
2 graduates 
St. Joseph High 
School 
Sta. Cruz Medium The principal Upper-middle class  
The Chinese 
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director 
4 teachers 
3 students 
2 graduates 
4 parents 
Uno High School Tondo Medium The Chinese 
director 
Upper-middle class  
1 teacher 
1 graduate 
Hope Christian 
High School 
Sta. Cruz Medium The Chinese 
director 
Upper-middle class  
2 teachers 
(from China)  
Philippine 
Institute of 
Quezon 
Quezon city Small The principal Upper-middle class 
Philippine Chen 
Kuang High 
School 
San Juan Small The principal Upper-middle class  
Sun Yat Sen High 
School 
Sta. Cruz Small 2 teachers 
(from Taiwan) 
Lower-middle class 
Table 1 Interviewees and Schools during my Fieldwork 
All the interviewees can be roughly divided into two groups: first, educationalists, 
consisting of school administrators and teachers. Second, students, graduates, and 
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parents. Based on my research questions, I produced two versions of an interview guide 
for the two groups. 
To investigate teaching practices at school level, I interviewed 9 administrators and 13 
teachers from 9 schools. Based on an interview guide (Appendix 1), I asked them 
questions about their ideas for Chinese education, the textbooks that they use, and their 
general thoughts about the overseas Chinese policies of China and Taiwan. During these 
visits, I also arranged informal sessions with students to assess their standard of 
Mandarin.  
To explore the students’ experience of learning Mandarin and how it affects their career 
prospects, I also interviewed 4 students, 10 graduates and 6 parents from 6 different 
schools. I used ‘snowball sampling’ to contact them, having been introduced by people 
I knew during my year of teaching there. Because I kept in touch with them, I was able 
to have follow-up sessions via Skype and Facebook after the fieldwork. The interview 
also followed a question guide, consisting of six sections (see Appendix 2): generation 
introduction, context and background, life in and after school, tutoring experience, 
career development, and experience about transnational education. 
I visited four institutes for Chinese-education research and services during the 
fieldwork. They are the Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran (Kaisa), the Association of Chinese 
Filipino Schools in the Philippines (ACFSP), and the Philippine Chinese Education 
Research Center (PCERC). 
The Kaisa is significant in promoting the idea of Chinese-Filipino identity for 
Philippine-Chinese. The founder of the Kaisa, Teresita Ang See, is also a leading 
researcher for Philippine-Chinese affairs. Interviewing her gave me insight into the 
complicated problem of the Chinese school system being haunted by the sense of being 
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Huaqiao: this inspired me to focus on Huaqiao Chineseness in schools. The ACFSP is 
the largest and most influential school association in charge of coordination between 
schools and general educational affairs. It was established with the support from the 
OCAC in Taiwan. In recent years, it also has asked for educational resources from 
China. I interviewed the administrative officer of the ACFSP about the cooperation 
between Chinese schools, China, and Taiwan in terms of teacher training programs, 
teachers, and textbook supplies. The PCERC is an institution for educational research 
with a strong and ongoing commitment to education reform based on ‘teaching 
Mandarin as a second language’. Interviews with the vice chairman, Duanming Huang, 
and the director, Meimei Yang, helped me to fathom ‘Huaren education’ based on 
Huaren Chineseness.  
Additionally, I conducted interviews with Philippine-Chinese who visited Taiwan to 
take part in education activities held by the OCAC, such as the Chinese Teacher 
Training Program in Taiwan in 2012, the Language Study Program for Expatriate Youth 
in 2012, and the School Principal and Administrators Visiting Tour in 2013. In doing 
so, I was able to receive their immediate feedback on these implementations by Taiwan. 
In 2012, I also interviewed the Chief Secretary of the OCAC of Taiwan, Liang-ming 
Chang, who was in charge of the policy formulation of overseas Chinese education, to 
enquire about Taiwan’s overseas Chinese policy. 
I recorded my interviews, with consent, and transcribed most of them. I also organised 
and analysed the interview data by using qualitative data analysis software (MAXQDA 
10). In the software, there is a section of code system by which I could identify themes 
emerging in the texts. According to the framework indicated earlier, themes about 
Chinese education are included in four categories that I created: Huaqiao Chineseness, 
Huaren Chineseness, communal Chineseness, and global Chineseness.       
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The third part of my data collection efforts consisted of archival and documentary 
research. I attended libraries in Manila and Taiwan, consulting the relevant collections 
of archives, documents, theses, and books. The collection of the Chinbin See Memorial 
Library concentrates on Philippine-Chinese studies; it holds extensive academic 
publications and doctoral and master theses about the Philippine-Chinese community 
in general, and about Chinese education in the Philippines in particular. Particularly 
significant in the collection of theses are works by graduates of some Philippine 
universities that which are unique to this library. Tan Yan Kee Library holds the largest 
collection of Philippine-Chinese writings in Chinese; through these, I was able to gain 
awareness of the general Philippine-Chinese view on Chinese education. The Rizal 
Library of Ateneo de Manila University and the Library of Institute of Modern History 
in Academia Sinica in Taiwan have huge collections of Philippine studies; these are 
helpful in understanding the historical, social, and political background to the Chinese 
school system. These secondary resources helped me to illustrate the context and the 
historical development of the education system, and are particularly beneficial for 
chapter 2, the background chapter.  
The whole research journey lasted around eight years. It started from the day I realised 
I was going to teach in the Philippines and ended with the submission of this thesis. To 
clearly outline the journey, I provide a timeline below. 
Date Events Research Progress 
April 2009 Receiving the application result of 
the substitute service 
Beginning to figure out the possibility of doing 
study in the Philippines 
September Enrolling in PhD program of drafting a research proposal about the Chinese 
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2009 National Chung Cheng University 
(CCU), Taiwan 
education in the Philippines  
March and 
April 2010 
Suspending the PhD program of 
CCU and beginning basic and 
special training for the substitute 
service  
 
May 2010 Arriving Manila and beginning the 
teaching duty in SJHS 
Beginning to observe and write field notes 
May 2011 Leaving Manila and finishing my 
duty 
 
February 
2012 
Visiting Manila Collecting data 
July 2012 Visiting Manila Collecting data 
April 2012  Receiving the offer of the PhD 
program of University of 
Essex(UoE) 
Further drafting a research proposal for the 
application 
September 
2012 
Arriving UK Starting the PhD in UoE and working with Prof. 
Yasemin Soysal to revise the research proposal 
October 
2013 
 Starting fieldwork 
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January 
2014 
Leaving Manila for UK Finishing fieldwork 
September 
2015 
 Writing-up 
October 
2016 
 Submitting the draft thesis 
Table 1 Timeline of the Whole Research Journey 
1.5 Some Ethnical Considerations 
My dual role as teacher and researcher may arouse ethical concern. Despite the fact that 
I came to the Philippines with the purpose of doing a study, I was aware that my primary 
duty is teaching for students. In SJHS, apart from the principal and a few teachers, 
students normally did not know my status as a PhD student. Yet I did not intentionally 
prevent students from knowing this. As a Taiwanese unfamiliar with Philippine 
language and culture, my work of being a Mandarin teacher itself was difficult enough. 
At work, I just focused on my teaching responsibility, forgot my role as researcher, and 
had no intention to be distracted by my PhD study. I carefully observed students’ 
response to my teaching and their everyday interactions, as what other dutiful teachers 
did for reflecting on their teaching. Given that, it would appear awkward and 
unnecessary to deliberately tell students I was doing a PhD study. Meanwhile, I only 
did my research-related work during off-working hours, such as remembering 
everything happened in school relevant to my research and writing field notes. Also, I 
never employed a certain teaching method for academic purpose and asked students a 
question irrelevant to teaching. In other words, I managed to be scrupulous in separating 
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PhD study from my teaching responsibility. 
After I left SJHS and continued my PhD study in Taiwan and later in UK, I visited 
Manila three times subsequently for fieldwork and conducted online interviews with 
students and teachers. I therefore exposed my role as a researcher. In general, the 
interviewees hold supportive attitudes towards my study and my interest in the Chinese 
education in the Philippines.    
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
After the introduction, in chapter 2 I discover how the Chineseness of the Philippine-
Chinese has been shaped and reshaped through a sequence of conceptions, 
corresponding with different governance stages and momentous historical events, 
specifically the Spanish and American colonisations, the independence of the 
Philippines, Cold War geopolitics, and the Reform and Opening of China. By reviewing 
the historical development of the Philippine-Chinese community, I particularly 
highlight the citizenship status of the Chinese, which has been essential in terms of 
adjusting the Chineseness produced in Chinese schools to suit their complex situation.  
Chapter 3 then focuses on Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao education. By illustrating 
the origin of Huaqiao Chineseness, overseas Chinese policies of China and Taiwan, and 
Mandarin teaching in the Chinese schools, I show that the primordial type of 
Chineseness motivated the building of the Chinese schools from the very beginning. 
Huaqiao Chineseness adheres to the expectations of Chinese overseas to acquire 
Chinese citizenship, learn Chinese culture, and speak Mandarin. Despite the younger 
generation’s loss of the legal status of being Huaqiao, Huaqiao Chineseness still has a 
great influence on current Chinese education in the schools, embodied by the pedagogy 
of ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’. Considering to students’ low academic 
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performance and poor Mandarin ability, however, I conclude that the pedagogy cannot 
be compatible with students’ identity. 
Chapter 4 furthers the discussion of a second type of Chineseness, ‘Huaren 
Chineseness’. This is a proposal to localise Chineseness, including Mandarin learning, 
to accommodate the younger generations’ identification with local Philippine society 
and Filipino citizenship. Huaren Chineseness breaks the prerequisite of the 
isomorphism between nation and people, demonstrating overseas Chinese people’s 
transformative potential to produce Chineseness without Chinese nationality or Chinese 
national identity. Because Mandarin ability plays a central role in Huaren identity, a 
group of Chinese educationalists have proposed Chinese-education reform on the basis 
of Huaren Chineseness to balance Mandarin learning and Filipino national identity. I 
analyse and present the educational content of ‘Huaren education’ by illustrating the 
pedagogy and the presumption behind it. I also show how the idea and prospect of 
Huaren education face resistance from those who adhere to Huaqiao education. 
Chapter 5 analyses a community-based Chineseness which is beyond Mandarin 
teaching and is substantially beneficial to people’s lives in the Philippines. ‘Communal 
Chineseness’ is the form that really occurs in the Chinese schools, and functions to help 
students integrate into the mainstream; for this reason it is contrary to the original 
intentions behind the establishment of Chinese schools. Given that Chinese schools in 
the Philippines fail to foster practical Mandarin ability, Mandarin learning in these 
schools serves rather as a symbol of being Chinese. This communal Chineseness is free 
from Huaqiao Chineseness, the Chinese national culture, and even Mandarin teaching, 
having further broken the isomorphism between people, nation, national culture and 
language. Through observing everyday interactions between students, teachers, 
administrators, and the school surroundings, I find that Chinese schools play a central 
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role in formulating community-based Chinese identity by symbolically distinguishing 
ethnic Chinese from the mainstream, by generating and distributing social capital for 
students, by facilitating class reproduction and social mobility, and by preparing a 
friendly ground for the cultural adaptation and national socialisation of students to 
nurture Filipino national identity. Communal Chineseness thus helps students to adapt 
to social life, build careers, and secure socioeconomic status in Philippine society.  
The concluding chapter gives a comprehensive analysis of Chineseness produced in 
Philippine-Chinese schools. Although Chinese overseas have the potential for 
cosmopolitanisation in liberating Chineseness from Chinese nationalism, the extent to 
which cosmopolitanisation really occurs – indeed, whether it happens at all – depend 
on the context of respective overseas Chinese communities. In the case of the Chinese 
schools in the Philippines, the high level of entanglement with Huaqiao Chineseness 
impedes Chinese education from being further cosmopolitanised. By contrast, it is those 
education practices apart from Mandarin teaching that are commonly neglected by 
China-oriented educationalists that have substantially initiated the cosmopolitanisation 
of Chineseness in an unintended way.       
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Chapter 2 
The Citizenship for the Philippine-Chinese and the Chinese-Filipino 
School System in Historical Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Ang See’s discussion (1997: 96), the Chinese migrants’ presence in the 
Philippine Islands can be roughly divided into three stages with respect to the degree 
of their attachment to the land: the immigrant sojourner stage, the permanent settlement 
stage, and the Chinese-Filipino stage. The three stages correspond with the pre-war 
period (prior to 1946), the Cold War period (1946 to 1975), and the post-Cold War 
period (1975 until now) respectively. The development of the Chinese school system 
also follows this staging. As the Chinese acquired different citizenship status at these 
stages, the characteristics of Chinese education also varied with the times.  
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the historical development of 
the Chinese school system in the Philippines. I pay particular attention to the interaction 
between the development of the school system, the citizenship status of the Chinese, 
and the larger political and social contexts surrounding the Chinese community. After 
introducing the general conditions under Spanish colonisation, I then divide the 
unfolding of the Chinese school system into four periods: the Spanish, the American, 
the Cold War, and the Post-Cold War periods7. 
 
                                                     
7 For the detained timeline of the development of the Chinese school system in the Philippines, please 
see Appendix 3 
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2.2 General Conditions and Education in the Spanish Period 
The earliest Chinese arrivals in the Philippine Archipelago date back to approximately 
the 10th century. However, evidence shows that there existed the earliest small 
settlement of about 150 Chinese in the Manila area in 1570 (Wickberg, 1965: 4). Most 
of them were shipping merchants sailing across the South China Sea to the Philippines. 
Ang See (1997: 96) names the period 'sojourners or Huaqiao stage' due to the temporary 
nature of the merchants’ stay in the Philippines. The Chinese were just sojourners or 
so-called ‘commuting migrants’ going back and forth between Fukien Province of 
South China and the Philippine islands (Wilson, 2004: 69). Since the 1560s, the arrival 
of Spanish conquerors drew the Philippines into Western economy. made the 
Philippines involved in the Western economy, attracting more Chinese merchants to 
Manila where the trading centre between China and Mexico that exchanged Mexican 
silver for Chinese goods was located.  
In addition to Chinese merchants, artisans, fishermen, and farmers, who would provide 
necessary services and goods not available from the natives, were also attracted by the 
sophisticated economy newly established at Manila and other centres of Spanish 
residence (Wickberg, 1965: 4). Yet most of them were oriented toward their places of 
origin in China. The popular idiom among the Chinese overseas, ‘fallen leaves return 
to their roots’ (Luo ye gui gen), meaning that the sojourners will eventually go back 
their homes, is an embodiment of their strong attachment to their Chinese origins. Thus 
seldom did Chinese men bring their families from China to settle in the Philippines and 
produce new generations. 
Outnumbered by the Chinese, the Spaniards felt insecure about their presence. For the 
sake of the stability of the colonial rule, Spanish authorities imposed severe restrictions 
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on the number of the Chinese, controlling numbers by means of segregation, massacres, 
and expulsions. The Spanish authorities were also intent on Catholicising the Chinese. 
The Chinese who did not convert to Catholicism were forced to be segregated in a 
Chinese ghetto called 'Parian' outside of the Manila city walls.  From the 1580s until 
1790, they also underwent overt discrimination, such as limits on residence, extortion, 
higher taxation, restraints on mingling with the natives, and restricted movement. In 
addition, they suffered six massacres and several expulsions in the 17th and 18th 
centuries when the Spanish felt threatened. Sometimes eliminating the Chinese was 
merely for the purpose of controlling the population to within the 4,000 who were 
‘necessary’ for the colony (Wickberg, 1965: 24). Throughout the Spanish colonisation, 
the Chinese population was usually fewer than 10,000, until the 19th century (Wickberg, 
1965). 
In order to cement their own status, the Spaniards created a social classification 
composed of ‘Spaniard,’ ‘indio’, and ‘Chinese’ on the basis of different levels of 
hispanisation and Catholicisation. The Spaniards saw the Chinese, whom they called 
‘sangleyes’, unassimilable despised. Consequently, the mandates that the Spanish 
imposed on the Chinese such as segregation, discrimination, and social classification 
were to prevent them exerting pernicious influences, like ‘social malfunction, helter-
skelter living, and perversion of customs’ (Wickberg, 1965: 7), on the newly converted 
natives. They were second-class Spanish subjects deprived of full membership.  
Catholicisation was a major element of the colonial government’s Chinese policy. 
Spanish Catholicism was not only Spain's imperial philosophy, but also a means of 
governance on the assumption that ‘a good Catholic was also a good—and law-
abiding—subject’ (Wilson, 2004: 32). The Spanish authority recognised cultural 
difference between ethnic groups under the premise that all people should accept 'the 
49 
 
universal propagation of a culturally unifying religious doctrine’ (Wickberg, 2000: 8). 
Only the converted were entitled to free movement and intermarriage with the native 
women. Due to the absence of Chinese women, a high rate of intermarriage led to the 
assimilation and settlement of a number of the Chinese in the local society, giving rise, 
in the 17th century, to a Catholicised Chinese-Filipino mestizo community in Binondo, 
a settlement near ‘Intramuros’ (Today, Binondo remains the centre of the Chinese 
district’.). However, the offspring of Chinese mestizos were distant from non-Catholic 
Chinese and closer to Catholic natives, thus generating a hispanised, Catholic and pro-
Spanish group of Chinese mestizos who were by no means simply Chinese in identity.  
The Chinese, however, were unwilling to accept Catholic education. In 1675, there were 
more than one thousand parochial primary schools and a limited number of secondary 
schools, Sunday schools and night schools, run by the parishes (Lu, 2001). These 
Catholic missionary schools could neither completely meet the natives’ demand for 
basic education (due to huge population in the islands), nor could they target the 
unconverted Chinese residents. By and large, the Chinese were not that interested in 
Catholic education – one reason for this lack of interest being that it was unaffordable 
to some less wealthy Chinese. In 1855, according to the record enrolment in the 
University of Santo Tomas, the first university in the Philippines, none of the Chinese 
was enrolled in there (Lu, 2001: 13). The other reason might be that Chinese believed 
that in general China was the only true civilisation and Confucian education was the 
only true education, as discussed in chapter 3. Hence, the Chinese were considered by 
the Spanish as an ‘unassimilable national minority’ (Wickberg, 1965: 190). Moreover, 
given the sojourning nature of the Chinese as a whole, they rarely brought their family 
members to the Philippines, so the need for education was not of significance. Even 
when they had needs for education in the Philippines, wealthier families preferred to 
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either send their children back to China to receive Confucian education or hire tutors 
from China. Others taught the Chinese youths the rudiments of bookkeeping and 
commercial correspondence under the auspices of family and trade associations in 
traditional tutorial classes (See, 1985: 32).  
Between 1750 and 1850, the control of the Chinese population was largely lifted to 
reinvigorate the declining galleon trade. The segregation of non-Catholic Chinese from 
Catholic Chinese, the natives, and Spaniards was abandoned, and ‘Parian’ was torn 
down in 1790. Despite the greater freedom that came with the removing of these 
external pressures, the Chinese in the early 19th century were less of a community than 
a group (Wickberg, 1965: 41). 
 
2.3 Citizenship for the Chinese and the Origins of the Chinese School 
System under American Rule 
The sense of a Chinese community began to emerge in the second half of the 19th 
century in response to the flaring up of anti-Chinese sentiment. This flaring up was 
a result of increasingly fierce market competition between Chinese and Filipinos 
throughout the Philippines (Wickberg, 1965: 152). The last three decades of the 19th 
century saw a series of Filipino nationalist movements against the Spanish colonial 
government; sometimes this evolved into anti-Chinese campaigns. These campaigns 
posed a threat to the properties and lives of the Chinese.  
With a flickering concept of citizenship, the Chinese became more conscious of 
taking collective action to protect themselves when anti-Chinese campaigns 
happened. They were capable of employing the legal system by hiring Spanish 
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lawyers and engaging officials to defend their interests (Chu, 2011; Wickberg, 1965: 
166).  
Therefore, the upholding of the modern idea of the rule of law in the 19th century 
made the Chinese less vulnerable in preventing further massacres and revolts. In the 
mid-19th century, the push factors like wars in China and the pull factors like the 
new economic policies in the Philippines made more Chinese arrive (Zhuang, 2012: 
672). The number reached 30,797 in 1876 and 100,000 in 1896 (Census of the 
Philippine Islands: 1902, Vol. 1, cited in Zhuang, 2012: 672). 
Remarkably, the Chinese even began to appeal to the home government and imagine 
themselves and the Chinese in China as the one national entity to fight for their rights 
(Chu, 2011: 97). The Chinese longed for the protection from the Chinese government 
led by the Qing emperor. They envied the protection that expatriates of other countries 
enjoyed from their consulates in the Philippines. The approaching Philippine revolution 
made the Chinese feel even more threatened, and the demand for a Chinese consul 
became urgent. Although there was a ‘captain’ to lead the Chinese community, the 
captain was not strong enough to deal with the relations outside the community 
(Wickberg, 1965: 210). 
As the same time, the Qing imperial state was eager to expand its power by 
incorporating the external resources of overseas Chinese. In the eyes of the Qing 
officials, the overseas Chinese communities were an alternative to China’s dependence 
on foreign capital and the providers of particular skills, such as making machines, 
steering steamships, and handling foreign firearms (Godley, 1981). In honour of 
overseas Chinese people’s substantial financial and technological contributions to the 
homeland, and in contrast to a previous attitude of indifference, the term ‘Huaqiao’ 
52 
 
became an officially recognised and popular identity for overseas Chinese during this 
period (Kuhn, 2008: 243). In return, ‘Huaqiao citizenship’ was granted to overseas 
Chinese that could confirm the membership of being Chinese, though in a pre-modern 
way. Huaqiao citizenship differs from modern varieties in that the Qing government 
took overseas Chinese as ‘imperial subjects’ who were an inalienable part of, if not 
possessions of, China. The intention was revealed by the first Chinese nationality law 
in 1909 that unilaterally defined the natural possession of nationality for overseas 
Chinese on the basis of jus sanguinis regardless of the attitudes of the colonial 
authorities and of overseas Chinese themselves (Dan, 2009).   
In fact, imperial China’s interests in overseas China might be a completely new 
phenomenon. In pre-modern imperial China, it was firmly believed that China was the 
centre of the universe and that Chinese culture was the only true universal culture. 
Those places beyond Chinese civilisation were all wildernesses and those 
unenlightened aliens from Chinese culture were all savages unworthy of the attention 
of the Chinese emperors. Since the core values of Confucianism, which stressed both 
filial piety' and sedentary agricultural values, inclined to attach to homelands (Yen, C. 
H., 1981: 264), emigration from China seemed to be a violation of Chinese cultural 
tradition. What is more, for security reasons, there was a sea ban on emigration and 
foreign trade and those Chinese who resided in the barbarian lands were 'undesirable 
subjects' (Zhuang, 2006: 98). This may explain the Chinese emperor’s indifferent 
response to the apology he received from the Spanish following a wanton massacre of 
Chinese settlers in the Philippines in 1603.The Chinese emperor considered the Chinese 
emigrants unworthy of any protection from the homeland; he replied that: ‘…those 
whom the Castillians have killed were wicked people, ungrateful to China, their native 
country, their elders, and their parents as they have not returned to China for many years’ 
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(Tan, 1972: 67). This event reveals that overseas Chinese used to have no protection 
from China.  
Since the 1880s things have changed greatly. Qing officials initiated plans to establish 
a Chinese consulate in Manila and then conducted investigations in the Philippines. The 
Philippine-Chinese also petitioned Chinese officials for the establishment of the 
consulate and expressed their grievance. Despite these diplomatic initiatives, the 
Spanish administration again and again refuted the proposal. The Spanish were 
reluctant to give up their control of the Chinese to a Chinese consul and to accord them 
equal taxation and fair treatment (Wickberg, 1965: 221).  
Finally, on the eve of the defeat of the Spanish by America and their cession from the 
islands after the American-Spanish War, the establishment of the Chinese consulate was 
approved in 1898. The fund for the Chinese consulate came from the registration fee 
that every Philippine-Chinese had to pay in the process of registering in the consulate, 
as well as from a donation from the Chinese Charitable Association (Shan-ju Gong-
suo). The fund was voluntarily generated by the Philippine-Chinese themselves because 
they realised that, as an immigrant group, however rich they are, state protection is 
doubtless stronger. On the suggestion of the consul, Chen Gan, after deduction of the 
consulate expenses, the rest of the fund would be applied to construct gunboats and to 
build a Chinese school inside the consulate (Tan, 1972: 160).  
At the same time, overseas Chinese possession of Chinese citizenship was prescribed 
and confirmed by the legislation of the Law of Nationality by the ROC government in 
1912. The Nationality Law followed mainly the jus sanguinis principle, upon which 
those of Chinese descent could acquire Chinese nationality regardless of their place of 
birth and residence. Nevertheless, their citizenship rights were poorly enforced due to 
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long-lasting political unrest in China. 
As for their citizenship status in the Philippines, the Chinese were classified as ‘aliens’ 
in a two-way classificatory system of ‘Filipinos’ and ‘alien’ in which ‘alien’ to a large 
extent equated to Chinese.  The classification was actually a racial divide by denying 
Chinese citizenship rights (Chu, 2010: 304). The nationalisation law passed by the 
Philippine Commonwealth Government in 1935 prevented most Chinese from 
naturalisation due to extremely high standards of property and of language qualification 
(Jensen, 1956: 292). Moreover, the Americans followed former colonisers' civil and 
criminal codes to restrict the freedom of Chinese in the name of respecting Spanish 
colonial law (Chu, 2010: 304). The Chinese Exclusion Act, which was extended to the 
Philippine archipelago in 1902, was a gesture by the American authority that they 
sought to keep the Philippines for the Filipinos rather than exploit the land and people’ 
It also prohibited the entrance of Chinese immigrants, with the exception of merchants 
capable of selling American goods to the Philippines (Go, 1996: 76).   
Nevertheless, the Chinese immigrants had steadily arrived because of the political 
stability and growth of business opportunities during the American administration. The 
relatively higher level of freedom protected the rule of law, however, still attracted more 
Chinese migrants to come from mainland China, contributing to the growth of the 
Chinese population between 1899 and 1939 from approximately 40,000 to 117,487 and 
the actual number could be higher than that due to illegal immigration (Jensen, 1956: 
149). Accordingly, the demand for Chinese education increased.  
Also, benefiting from the Americans’ laissez-faire approach in their dealings with the 
Chinese community, the Chinese enjoyed the freedom to establish a series of 
institutions to form their national identity. Traditional organisations in the Chinese 
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community, like the family and hometown associations as well as chambers of 
commerce, were established in large number; the first Chinese school in the Philippines, 
the Anglo-Chinese School, was founded in 1899; and the first Chinese newspaper was 
published in 1888. On the basis of these ethnic institutions, the Chinese community 
thus took shape from this point on.  
The establishment of the first Chinese school, the Anglo-Chinese School, was to cater 
to the growing birth rate of the local-born Chinese and rising Chinese nationalism in 
the second half of the 19th century. It was modelled on the literacy college that was 
prevalent in China which was based on Confucian teachings. Within 5 to 6 years of its 
establishment, it began an English curriculum. Those designing the initial curriculum 
of Chinese schools encountered a dilemma between modelling after the American 
public school or after the Confucian system (Tan, 1972: 160). The latter took as its 
educational content the Four Books and Five Classics, which were taught in private 
literacy colleges functioning to prepare students for the imperial examination. Despite 
being outdated, Chinese traditionalists believed that the Confucian system, instead of 
the American public school system, was the only way to preserve Chinese cultural 
heritage. However, some western-oriented Chinese preferred the westernised modern 
education which could cultivate skills relating to, for example, western business 
organisation and technique. A compromise was proposed: a dual system in which the 
Chinese section adopted the Confucian system and the English section followed the 
public education system. This moment marks the beginning of the ‘dual system’ by 
which Philippine-Chinese students acquired Chinese language to preserve Chinese 
identity and English to make a living in the local society. 
The curricula of English and Chinese departments were respectively prescribed by the 
Philippine Department of Public Instruction and by the Chinese government in Beijing. 
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The dual system with both Chinese and English sections was, therefore, officially 
formed. While the curriculum of the English department used American textbooks, and 
was taught mostly by Filipino teachers, both the Chinese textbooks and most of the 
Chinese teachers were from China. Some subjects overlapped in two systems, such as 
maths and science, while using different mediums of instruction. 
The building of the Chinese school system was stimulated by the emerging overseas 
Chinese nationalism. By the end of the 19th century Chinese modernists like the 
Reformists and Revolutionaries were active in overseas Chinese communities 
throughout the world. They were committed to disseminating national consciousness 
among the Chinese in the Philippines. Under the banner of Chinese nationalism, the 
Chinese community in the Philippines felt a greater degree of solidarity. The 
establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the KMT’s promotion in 1926 and 
1927, and the propaganda of Sun Yat-sen’s the ‘Principle of Three People’ since 1928 
all boosted the demand for overseas Chinese education (Tan, 1972: 165). Beginning 
with the construction of the first Chinese school in 1899, Chinese schools saw 
phenomenal growth, with 7,214 students in 58 schools throughout the islands until 1935 
(Tan, 1972: 157). In the six years following the establishment of the Commonwealth of 
the Philippines in 1935, the number of Chinese schools reached more than 120, 
including about 21,000 students: this was because wartime chaos stimulated more 
Chinese to move to the Philippines (Huang, 2012b: 4). 
 
2.4 Citizenship and Education during the Cold War 
After the Pacific War, the permanent settlement stage came: in 1949 the government of 
the People’s Public of China (PRC) shut its gates to the outside world and to sojourners 
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wanting to return their hometowns. Second and third generations of immigrants, who 
lacked first-hand experience of China, began to grow up in the host country, while the 
first generation finally realised that, their returning to China being impossible, the 
Philippines was their only homeland. Thereafter, integration began in earnest, despite 
the lack of institutional support at that time. 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) defeated the KMT in the Chinese Civil War and 
had, from 1949, begun to control mainland China, forcing the latter group to flee to 
Taiwan. The exceptional conditions of the Cold War resulted in the situation of ‘Two 
Chinas’: the PRC government led by the CPC in Beijing and the ROC government led 
by the KMT in Taipei. The menace presented by communism to the stability of the 
Asian-Pacific region brought Taiwan, the Philippines, and the U.S. together as part of 
the Western Bloc against the Eastern Bloc. This military deployment also turned 
mainland China, as the motherland of the Philippine-Chinese, into the regional 
opposing force. 
Philippine anti-communism and belligerence towards the PRC had a great impact on 
the citizenship status and political standing of the Chinese. While the U.S. objected to 
the recognition of the PRC, especially after the breakout of the Korean War in 1950, 
the Quirino-led government followed the China policy of the U.S. in suspending any 
commercial and economic relations with the PRC. Instead, recognised by the 
Philippines as well as the United Nations as the sole representative of the whole of 
China, the ROC in Taiwan still claimed rule over the Chinese and granted them ROC 
citizenship because of the unique anti-communist strategic alliance between the ROC 
and the Philippines during the Cold War. 
The recognition originated from the established relationships between the Philippines 
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and the ROC. On the eve of the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, 
President Chiang Kai-shek and President Quirino met in Baguio City in the Philippines, 
which was the only the Southeast Asia country he visited (See, 2004), to discuss the 
general Chinese-Philippine relations. The national security issues centred on the 
menace of communism were at the top of the agenda. After the discussions, Chiang and 
Quirino issued the Joint Communique to warn the ‘free Asian nations’ against the threat 
of Communism and propose the formation of an Asiatic alliance to combat the threat 
(Hsiao, 1975: 43). The Quirino’s successor President Magsaysay maintained an 
uncompromising stance against any official relations with the PRC. Therefore, allied 
with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the ROC became an important part of the 
‘containment’ strategy to stop the expansion of communists in Asia. In fact, the attitude 
towards the PRC had direct relevance to the Chinese in the Philippines, as Magsaysay 
stated in 1954: 
We also have a sizable Chinese community in the Philippines, largely loyal to 
the cause and ideals of the free world. There is danger that they may be shaken 
in this loyalty if we should open diplomatic relations with Communist China, 
and may become fatally susceptible to propaganda inducing them to shift their 
allegiance, thus creating a serious problem for our Government and people 
(Philippine Embassy in Taipei, 1957: 73, cited in Hsiao, 1975). 
In other words, the recognition of the ROC was part of the grand strategy of the US as 
well as the Philippines in terms of regional security. This was because the ROC, led by 
the KMT as a so-called ‘right-wing’ political party, was not only an ideologically 
accepted ally, but a more politically appropriate ‘homeland’ to impose controls on the 
Chinese community.  
On the other hand, given that it was the KMT rather than the CPC which had long and 
close connections with, and extensive local branches in, the Chinese communities all 
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over the Philippines, assigning KMT to tackle overseas Chinese affairs became a 
natural and reasonable choice. Moreover, to prevent the infiltration of communists, the 
Philippine Bureau of Immigration in 1950 also issued an executive order to prohibit the 
Chinese from migrating to the Philippines and returning to the mainland. As a result, 
the Philippines reopened the Philippine embassy in Taipei and supported the ROC’s 
representation in the United Nations. The ROC-Philippine-US triangular relationship 
thus confirmed the trans-border ties between the ROC and the Philippine-Chinese. 
Hence, the ROC could continue to enforce the Chinese Nationality Law based on jus 
sanguinis principle, exercising its jurisdiction over the Philippine-Chinese.  
However, the situation of Chinese people in the Philippines during this period was 
particularly vulnerable, due to their inaccessibility to Filipino citizenship, the lack of 
substantial protection from their ROC citizenship, and their rumoured connections to 
communism.   
In spite of speaking on behalf of all China, the ROC’s overall strength, including the 
population, size, and the political and economic power of Taiwan islands, was unlikely 
to take care of and protect the citizenship rights of all the Chinese citizens abroad – the 
of number which was, in fact, even greater than the population of Taiwan. For example, 
when the Philippine government in 1952 carried out Filipinization policies against the 
Chinese and ordered mass roundup of them (Miyabara, 1997),the ROC embassy failed 
to offer diplomatic intervention. President Carlos P. Garcia for the first time introduced 
the ‘Filipino First policy’, which from 1958 on aimed to expand Filipino-owned 
business over their foreign counterparts. It was followed by a series of Filipinization 
policies targeting mainly the Chinese that had negative impacts on their livelihoods, 
including nationalisation of public market, the retail trade, banking service, import, rice 
and corn industry, and the regulations of profession, land ownership. Seldom did the 
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ROC heighten the tension to a level that could be at the expense of the ROC-Philippine 
relationships, as the Philippines was an important ally and the ROC tended to give more 
priority to national security and the international relationships (Zhuang, 2012: 431). In 
reality, the enforcement of ROC citizenship was ineffective. 
After achieving independence in 1946, the Philippines began to turn itself into a nation-
state with full autonomy in light of Filipino nationalism. The conflict of interests 
between the Chinese and the Filipinos thus inevitably became fierce due to the fact that 
the former had a significant share of the business area in the Philippines.  
Aside from business, the ‘Filipinization education policy’ also threatened to close all 
Chinese schools, as shown below. The Filipinization of the Chinese schools was not 
only part of the enforcement of the national assimilation policy, but also a response to 
the growing communist menace as there was an alleged association between the 
Chinese and communism during the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s.  
In the beginning of the Post War era in the late 1940s, the Chinese school system 
continued to develop. Chinese people’s freedom to operate schools was further 
confirmed by the 1947 ‘Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity’ between the ROC government 
in Nanjing and the newly independent Philippine government, which formed a general 
framework of ground rules for negotiation and cooperation. Of the 10 articles, article 6 
in particular stipulated that:  
The nationals of each of the high contracting parties shall be accorded, in the 
territories of the other, the liberty to establish schools for the education of their 
children, and shall enjoy freedom of peaceful assembly and association, of 
publication, of worship and religion, of burial and building cemeteries, upon the 
same terms as the nationals of any third country in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the other.  
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The basic rights of the Philippine-Chinese, including the rights to operate Chinese 
schools, were insured in that the Philippine government recognised the ROC’s claim 
on the jurisdiction over the Chinese on the basis of their ROC citizenship. As a result, 
there was further growth in schools, with 1956 seeing up to 150 schools with 1,649 
teachers and approximately 48,000 students (Huang, 2012b: 6). 
Subsequent to the escalation of the communist menace since the 1950s, the Philippine 
government began to intervene in Chinese education affairs. When rumours spread of 
communists infiltrating Chinese schools, the government attempted to retake the 
authority to supervise Chinese schools on the grounds of national security.  
A memorandum signed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese 
Ambassador in 1955 required all curricula under the supervision of the Filipino 
government’s Bureau of Private Schools as well as the ROC’s Ministry of Education to 
follow the curricular standards of both countries (Liu, 1969). The issues of whether to 
close down Chinese schools and end the Chinese teaching were frequently raised in the 
1960s (Batnag, 1964; Pao, 1964; Hsiao: 1998). In Chinese schools in the 1950s and 
1960s there existed a growing tension of ‘double sovereignty’ (Pacho, 1981: 132).   
To prevent the Chinese community from communist infiltration, the U.S. also 
politically and financially buttressed the ROC’s overseas Chinese education, as part of 
American foreign aid policy. After 1949, the PRC revealed its ambition to exercise 
influence over the education of Chinese overseas by recruiting them to study in the 
mainland, selling textbooks to Chinese schools at a low price, and alienating the support 
of Chinese schools from the ROC and the KMT. The US aid project sought to use 
education to shield overseas Chinese students from the negative influence of 
communism. After Vice President Richard Nixon visited Taiwan in 1953, he urged the 
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ROC government to attract more overseas Chinese students to study in Taiwan and 
promised financial support. Accordingly, American aid for the project between 1954 
and 1965 totalled over US$1 million and NTC300 million (Li, X. and Li, H., 1998). 
Taiwan thus followed the US plan to  become not only ‘a bastion of military and 
economic strength for free China’, but also ‘a bastion of cultural strength, of spiritual 
strength, and a sample for all free peoples to see…’ (Nixon’s speech, cited in Li, X. and 
Li, H., 1998: 159).   
Consequently, as the Chinese school system was ideologically supervised and 
controlled by ROC authorities, the political standing of the Chinese had been greatly 
shaped by the anti-communist system formed by both the ROC and the Philippines. All 
Chinese schools were thus under the inspection of the ROC government in Taipei. In 
accordance with ‘The Accreditation Regulations for Overseas Chinese Schools’ in 
Taiwan, all Chinese schools were required to register in the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Council (OCAC) through the ROC embassy in the Philippines. The whole school 
system, such as administration system, school managements, and curriculums, 
generally copied those in Taiwan (Wang, Y. Y., 1998). It is noteworthy that Chinese 
schools raised and lowered the ROC and Philippine flags on a daily basis and sang two 
national anthems in the respective native languages (McBeath, 1970: 44). Up to the 
1960s, the ROC flag and national anthem were even presented before the Philippine 
ones (See, 2004: 44). 
The ROC government assisted to set up Overseas Chinese Teacher College in Manila 
merged with Chiang Kai Shek High School in 1955 and upgraded as Chiang Kai Shek 
College in 1965. The Chinese school system in the Philippines thus has become a 
complete one which includes primary, secondary, and higher education. To unite and 
control the Chinese schools, the ‘General Association of Chinese Schools in the 
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Philippines’ was established, assisted by the expatriate staff of the ROC following the 
‘First Congress of Chinese Schools in the Philippines’ held in the Chinese Embassy in 
1955.   
Notwithstanding all these interventions, Chinese schools continued to expand. The 
growth of Chinese schools was steady, catering to an increasing Chinese population of 
about 500,000 in 1973, as estimated by the OCAC in Taiwan (Zhuang, 2012: 673). As 
a result, there were 154 schools with 68,000 students in 1973 (Huang, 2012b: 8).    
 
2.5 Post-Cold War Citizenship and Education 
The Chinese situation had been bettered as the tension of the Cold War eased in the 
1970s, as a result of the rapprochement between the PRC and the Philippines. After the 
Philippines followed the U.S. to change its diplomatic recognition of China from the 
ROC to the PRC and normalised its relations with the latter in 1975, President Marcos, 
fearing that the Chinese in the Philippines would be manipulated by the PRC as a 
political convenience, was committed to the assimilation of the Chinese by granting 
them citizenship. In 1975 Marcos issued the Letter of Instructions No. 270, which gave 
all qualified Chinese the opportunity to apply for Philippine citizenship. According to 
it, the approval of the naturalisation application would be legally transparent, 
financially affordable, practical in term of qualifications, and simplified through 
presidential decree, replacing previous tedious judicial process (Pacho, 1981). It led to 
a ‘mass naturalization’ of the Chinese. Hence, the removal of institutional restrictions 
has greatly facilitated integration and allowed the Chinese to move to the Chinese-
Filipino stage. 
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In the Chinese-Filipino stage, most of the Chinese descendants have successfully 
integrated into Philippine society. The tremendous difference in number between 
Chinese and Filipino inevitably leads to the former’s mingling with the latter in 
everyday life contributing to the integration of the two peoples. Unlike their 
counterparts in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Burma, who still suffer institutional 
discriminations, the Chinese enjoy the full citizenship to enter all professions, to go to 
all kinds of business, to have equal educational opportunities, and to exercise political 
rights. In short, they have gradually identified themselves as ‘Filipinos’, regardless of 
Chinese heritage and education in Chinese schools.  
As a result of their being Chinese Filipinos, there are a number of the younger-
generation Chinese who have successfully integrated into the Philippine society by 
having close native-Filipino friends, joining Filipino organisations, speaking Tagalog 
as a first language, attending Philippine universities, and working with Filipino 
colleagues. According to the surveys by Ang See (1997: 43), 93.9% of the Chinese are 
Philippine citizens; approximately 97% (96.8% in Metro Manila and 97.3% in 
provinces) said the Philippines is their home; 85% are fluent in Tagalog; more than 80% 
agree that the Chinese should actively take part in Philippine politics; and 75.9% would 
support the Philippine team against the Chinese team in sports.  
More than 90% of the Chinese are Philippine born, consisting of the second, third, and 
fourth generations (Zhuang, 2012:674). 90% of them have origins in southern Fukien 
province, which accounts for the fact that 47% of them have the language ability of 
Hokkien (the dialect of southern Fukien) (See, 1997: 50), and 10% of Guangdong 
province and a few others (Zhuang, 2012:673). With respect to racial origins, pure 
Chinese account for 55.9% and Chinese Mestizos 32%; 9.8% are ‘other’ and 2.3% are 
reluctant to answer. The significant number of Chinese Mestizos is a result not only of 
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the previous imbalance of sex ratio8, but also the increasing acceptance of intermarriage 
with native Filipinos.  
Nowadays, according to the population projection conducted by OCAC (2011) in 2010, 
the Chinese population is approximately 1,459,083, accounting for about 1.55% of the 
total population in the Philippines. Despite the lack of statistical information, roughly 
more than half of the Chinese population reside in ‘Metro Manila’ and the rest live 
scattered in provinces.    
In terms of socio-economic status in the Philippines, it is assumed that the Chinese have, 
on average, an economic advantage. Despite the lack of substantial statistics, Ang See 
(1990) admits that ‘most of the Chinese belong to the middle class and are 
comparatively better-off than the average Filipinos’, despite the fact that there are, 
indeed, few Chinese living in extreme poverty (1990: 39). Huang’s survey of Chinese 
students’ family economic status shows that 4% of them are upper-class, 8% are upper-
middle-class, 82% are middle-class, 1% are lower-middle-class, 4% are unknown and 
none of them is lower-class (Huang, 2012b: 17-18).  The same survey also shows that 
a large proportion (78%) of students’ fathers engage in industrial or commercial 
operation, and 54% of students themselves hope to get into business (Huang, 2012: 16, 
20). The special occupational structure results from the long-established business 
tradition of the Chinese since colonial times (Go, 1996: 68). This particular interest in 
business might contribute to the Chinese families’ relatively higher economic status.  
It is also widely believed that the Chinese as a whole have an enormous commercial 
significance in the Philippines. Accounting for less than 2% of the entire Philippine 
population, the Chinese share of market capital is between 50% and 55%. The Chinese 
                                                     
8 The ratio of males to females: 1:13 in 1918; 1:5 in 1933; 43: 57 in 1960 (Wickberg, 1965: 174). 
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take an especially major share in areas such as textiles, banking, retailing, and 
wholesaling (Hodder, 2007: 89). In a country like the Philippines, where more than a 
quarter (26.3%) of the population was living below the poverty line in 2015 (Bersales, 
2016), the economic advantage that the majority of the Chinese have, as an ethnic 
minority middle-class, is quite significant.     
With respect to Chinese education, the Filipinization of Chinese schools since the 1970s 
is a turning point not only for Chinese schools but the Chinese as a whole. The aim of 
the Filipinization policy was to facilitate assimilation and integration by fundamentally 
transforming Chinese schools from being Chinese to being Filipino. According to the 
1972 Constitution of the Philippines provided for the Filipinization of schools under 
Section 8 (7) of Article XV, regulations prescribe Chinese schools to be owned, 
controlled, and enrolled by mainly Filipino citizens. At first, it would be difficult to 
comply with these regulations; the Letter of Instructions No. 270, by which Filipino 
citizenship became accessible, would later provide the solution in 1975. As a result, 
Chinese schools have become ‘former Chinese schools’ and institutions for fostering 
Filipino citizens rather than Huaqiao.  
As to the curriculum, Chinese schools are required not only to teach courses prescribed 
by the Philippine Department of Education, but also to make Chinese courses optional 
and reduce these to 120 minutes per day. Chinese schools then followed the Philippine 
education system, which takes 4 years in high-school level, rather than 6 years, as the 
ROC system does. The incompatibility between the Philippine and the ROC education 
systems makes graduates of Chinese schools less likely to attend universities in Taiwan. 
Also, all Chinese textbooks are required to be edited and published in the Philippines 
and inspected by Philippine authorities. 
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Moreover, Philippine symbols have been added and ROC ones have been removed in 
Chinese schools. A number of Chinese schools had to alter their names which implied 
their Chinese background. For example, the Philippine ‘Chinese’ High School was 
forced to amend its name to the Philippine ‘Cultural’ High School. Furthermore, where 
before both the ROC and Philippine flags were flown in schools, now only the 
Philippine one may be displayed. Additionally, speaking the Filipino language (Tagalog) 
is encouraged, the teaching of the New Constitution and the life of Philippine founding 
father (Jose Rizal) are included, and the education for citizenship is emphasised. After 
Filipinization, Chinese schools have become an integral part of the Philippine 
educational system for Filipino citizens rather than the extension of that of the ROC. 
While the Chinese have access to Philippine citizenship, Chinese schools thus have 
been mostly owned, managed, and attained by Filipino citizens, and become Filipino 
schools.  
As of 2013, there were 119 Chinese schools with 68,856 students and 2,660 Chinese 
teachers throughout the Philippine Islands. Of all the Chinese schools, 42 schools (35%) 
and 37,557 students (55%) were based in the Greater Manila Area (Zhuang, 2012: 777). 
In terms of number, the whole Chinese school system seems to be stagnating due to the 
growing extent of the younger generation’s integration and assimilation into the 
Philippine mainstream. Consequently the Chinese school system has been in a steady 
decline in terms of student enrolment and Chinese language ability (Huang, 2012).  
Therefore, two educational organisations were established in the 1990s to rectify the 
difficult situations. The Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools (ACFS) was 
established in 1993, and consists of 126 Chinese schools. The association plays an 
active role in general educational affairs and the coordination between Chinese schools. 
Another is the Philippine Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC), which aims to 
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launch education reforms by introducing ‘Teaching Mandarin as a Second Language’ 
to Chinese schools. 
Unlike their counterparts in North America, Chinese schools in the Philippines are full-
day rather than weekend-only language learning centres. Like other Philippine private 
schools, Chinese schools comply with the curriculum standards mandated by the 
Department of Education and have become part of the formal education system. Their 
English curriculum is the same as that of public schools. Although the Chinese 
curriculum has been made optional, it still occupies a certain proportion of teaching 
time. In the school in which I served, for example, there were 6 English classes in the 
morning and 4 Chinese classes in the afternoon. To a degree, then, the dual system 
remains. 
From the beginning, all Chinese schools have been private, receiving no public funding 
from the Philippine government yet under the latter’s supervision. In terms of 
foundation, there are three general types of Chinese schools: ‘the chamber or 
community school’ founded by prominent figures and organisations within the Chinese 
community and managed by a board of directors; the ‘sectarian schools’, managed by 
religious groups; and the ‘Jesuit elite academy’ (McBeath, 1970). Despite differences 
in sponsorship, all three types must meet the standards for a Filipino curriculum, as 
established by the Philippine government. The last two types add religious education to 
their curricula.  
Until 2011, the Philippine education system comprised 6-year elementary school (age 
6~12) and 4-year high school (age 12~16). Since 2011, the Department of Education 
started to implement the new ‘K-12 education system’ which adds a 2-year ‘senior high 
school’ following 4-year ‘junior high school’. From 2011 on the Chinese school system 
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has followed the K-12 system.  
In fact, the private school system is an indispensable part of the Philippine education 
system. Expenditure on public education is insufficient to meet the demands of a 
growing and huge Filipino population. In fact, the ‘public expenditure per pupil as a % 
of GDP per capita’ in the Philippines is 9.3% on average from 2008 to 2013, which is 
the lowest in six ASEAN countries (UNESCO, 2015)9. The per child spending in the 
Philippines is around $150 USD per child per year, which is one-sixth of that in 
Thailand and one-tenth of that in Malaysia (Luz, 2011: 32).   
What is more, the public school system suffers a growing classroom shortage. The class 
sizes have ballooned to about 65 students on average – and, in some extreme cases, 90 
(Luz, 2011: 81). Some of the most overcrowded urban schools are forced to adopt 
‘double-shifts’ in which classrooms are used twice for two groups of pupils in a day.   
Private schools can thus function to lighten the government’s financial burden. This is 
the reason why Chinese schools were not abolished despite suspicions about their 
loyalty in the 1960s (Pao, 1964). The formal education that Chinese schools offered for 
the Philippine citizens with Chinese backgrounds is a valuable supplement to 
deficiencies in the public school system and contributes in a significant way to the 
country’s talent development.    
 
  
                                                     
9 The ‘public expenditure per pupil as a % of GDP per capita, 2008-2013’ of the six ASEAN countries 
is as follows: Indonesia (15.6%); Malaysia (32.6%); Philippines (9.3%); Singapore (17.2%); Thailand 
(31.7%); Vietnam (32.6%).  
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Chapter 3  
Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao Education 
3.1 Introduction 
‘In my dreams the sceneries so divine  
So many years far from homeland 
But nothing can ever change it 
The Chinese heart of mine 
 
Western outfits dress me 
my heart will always be Chinese 
My ancestors branded my heart  
with a Chinese mark 
 
The Yangtze River, the Great Wall, Huangshan, the Yellow River 
They are irreplaceable in my heart  
No matter when, or no matter where 
My heart'll never leave 
 
The blood that flows through my veins  
Roaring -- “China”-- that's the name 
Even I was born in a foreign land 
It can't change my Chinese heart’—‘My Chinese Heart (我的中國心)’ 
 
This is a popular Chinese ‘patriotic song’ among Chinese Filipinos. At a karaoke party 
held by alumni of the St. Joseph High School, I was impressed by the clang and majestic 
melody of the song as it was sung, with an expressive face, by a senior Chinese teacher 
in her seventies. I also discovered this song in ‘Chinese talent contests’ participated in 
by Chinese students whose comprehension of the lyrics is doubtful. What surprised me 
more is that the lyrics imply a taken-for-granted tie between China and Chinese 
overseas. No matter where they are born, where they settle, and whether they are mixed-
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blood, they are destined to be Chinese, because ‘my ancestors branded my heart with a 
Chinese mark’, and ‘the blood that flows through my veins roaring -- “China”’.      
This song was staged in the 1984 CCTV New Year’s Gala (Chunwan), selected in the 
textbook of reading for Chinese elementary schools in 2005, and even brought into 
space by the ‘Chang’e 1’, a Chinese lunar-orbiting spacecraft, as a national symbol in 
2007. It is a song with strong nationalist connotations. Thus, having a ‘Chinese Heart’ 
(Zhongguo Xin) is not merely a cultural identity expressed by an ethnic minority group, 
but, to a certain degree, an eternal commitment to a political entity, ‘China’ (Zhongguo).  
The fixation with China might also result from the overseas Chinese policies 
implemented by the ‘two Chinas’. Both the PRC and ROC governments are dedicated 
to supporting overseas Chinese education in order to fulfil the symbolic role as the 
fatherland.  
The teaching job that I did for Chinese school in the Philippine, for example, is an 
extension of this nationalist project. The Substitute Military Service in Taiwan normally 
consists of public safety and community service related works to serve our fellow-
countrymen. Therefore, the service for Philippine Chinese gives a sign that they are 
also part of ‘us’. This experience in fact confused. Lacking of contact with Philippine 
Chinese in daily life, normally a Taiwanese teacher hardly feels Philippine Chinese are 
his compatriot. My actual interaction with them also proved we are the ‘Other’ to each 
other. Yet this ‘Huaqiao’ policy serves to make a symbolic gesture that Philippine 
Chinese are our ‘fellow-countrymen’, which is particularly meaningful to the old 
generation. As these overseas Chinese policies tend to conflate those Chinese overseas 
who have Chinese citizenship and those who haven’t, the relationships between the two 
Chinas and the Chinese who have been Philippine citizens thus appears ambiguous 
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(Wang, 1985). As a result, the old generation who used to have Chinese (ROC) 
citizenship still feel a special attachment to China, and retain a certain degree of the 
sense of being Huaqiao. It is astonishing that the trans-border ties between the Chinese 
and the fatherland have lasted longer than a century. The fact that we are now in the 
‘post-Huaqiao period’, and that Philippine-Chinese lost Huaqiao citizenship (in a legal 
sense) in the aftermath of the Filipinization of the 1970s, seem by no means to have 
changed their nationalistic attachment. 
Osler and Starkey (2005) offer an illuminating analysis about three elements of 
citizenships that might help account for the old generation’s mismatch between their 
citizenship status in legal sense and Huaqiao identity deep in the mind by three 
dimensions of citizenship: Citizenship as feeling, status, and practice. First, citizenship 
is based on a feeling of belonging to a community, such as a nation. Second, citizenship 
is a legal status derived from the laws that prescribe rights and duties of a person when 
acquiring a certain citizenship, such as nationality law. Third, citizenship is also 
everyday practice that makes a difference to, shapes and reshapes the community by 
political, social, cultural activities. Osler (2010) particularly indicates that ‘[t]he degree 
to which a person feels they belong is not necessarily related to formal status, although 
legal entitlements obtained through citizenship status may be among those goods which 
enable a person to feel they belong (Osler, 2010: 4)’. Therefore, despite their legal status 
of being Philippine citizens, the old generation may still have a strong feeling of 
Huaqiao identity and practice rights and duties derived from their Hauqiao status in 
Chinese schools, thus explaining the long duration of informal Huaqiao citizenship 
while losing Chinese citizenship in legal sense.  
Because the Chinese schools in the Philippines are organised by the older generation, 
it is inevitable that this attachment to the fatherland is expected to be transmitted to the 
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younger generations by Chinese education. However, how the younger generations who 
are born to be Filipino citizens respond to the national sentiment embodied in Chinese 
education, and the degree to which Mandarin teaching entails this national sentiment, 
however, remain unclear.  
Where does the notion of Huaqiao originate, and why does Huaqiao Chineseness still 
predominate in Chinese schools in the post-Huaqiao period? How does it affect the 
constitution of citizenship for Philippine-Chinese? How does Huaqiao Chineseness 
shape the characteristics of Chinese education in the Philippines? How do students 
respond to Chinese education that has the characteristics of Huaqiao education? 
The aim of the chapter is to investigate how the notion of Huaqiao affects the 
understanding of Chineseness, the citizenship of Philippine-Chinese, the constitution 
of their Chinese education and its outcome.  I refer to the Chineseness that is together 
shaped by the long-lasting trans-territorial ties between both Chinese governments and 
Philippine-Chinese as ‘Huaqiao Chineseness’; the tailor-made citizenship status for 
Philippine-Chinese with a China-centred view as ‘Huaqiao citizenship’; and the 
Chinese education to cement not only cultural, but political ties as ‘Huaqiao education’. 
I argue that current Chinese education in Philippine-Chinese schools is a legacy of the 
Huaqiao education of the past. It is not merely a language education, but an education 
allowing students to belong to a Chinese nation. Therefore, while Chinese education 
may have been a ‘citizenship education’ that instilled a sense of being Huaqiao when 
the Chinese were indeed Chinese citizens, in the post-Huaqiao period it has become a 
means through which the idea of ‘informal Huaqiao citizenship10’ is ‘smuggled’ into 
                                                     
10 I refer the practice that brings Huaqiao identity into class as ‘citizenship smuggling’, rather than 
‘nationality smuggling’, because it not only instils a sense of national identity in its teaching content, 
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class. This ‘citizenship-smuggling’ makes Chinese education, to a certain degree, 
remain Huaqiao education. 
Part One investigates the origin of Huaqiao citizenship from historical and cultural 
perspectives, and then further analyses the essential components of Huaqiao citizenship. 
Part Two discusses the connection between Huaqiao citizenship and Chinese education. 
Part Three examines the legacy of Huaqiao education in current Chinese education. Part 
Four appraises how current Chinese education with the characteristics of Huaqiao 
education affects the outcome of Mandarin learning.   
For investigating the historical and cultural origins of the notion of Huaqiao, I look at 
academic studies on how China forms its unique understanding of nationality and 
citizenship. Also I analyse Huaqiao policies of both PRC and ROC governments, 
including nationality laws and overseas educational practices, to further discover the 
meaning of Huaqiao citizenship. For the analysis of Huaqiao education, I mainly use 
my personal experience in Chinese schools to reveal how the notion of Huaqiao affects 
the Chinese teaching up to now.   
I draw on the data for discussion about Huaqiao Chineseness from two parts. For 
providing a whole picture of Huaqiao Chineseness, I mainly use secondary resources, 
such as interviews and studies on Philippine-Chinese community in general. I also 
personally contact some of the old generation, the leaders of the Chinese community 
and officials from Taiwan and China who insists on the instilling the sense of being 
Huaqiao for the younger generations. For Huaqiao education, the data mainly come 
from my teaching experience in which I clearly felt I was transmitting a sense of being 
                                                     
but also offers education services similar to citizenship rights that are normally exclusively accessible 
to citizens.  
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Huaqiao to students. My interviews with other teachers in the Philippines, Taiwanese 
officials, and teachers from China and my observations of teaching in Chinese schools 
also support the analysis of Huaqiao Chineseness.       
3.2 Huaqiao Citizenship as Transnational Mobilisation System 
When we talk about national citizenship, it usually refers to the membership of a 
national community with clear relationships of rights and obligations between its 
government and people under a certain ‘social contract’ (Stoer and Magalhães, 2002). 
From the perspective of the ‘two Chinas’ and some overseas Chinese of the old 
generation, however, the commitment to the fatherland can bypass the ‘contractual 
relationship’ derived from the newly granted citizenship. Like the old Chinese saying, 
‘born to be Chinese person (中國人), dead as Chinese ghosts (中國鬼)’, informal, 
destined membership seems more influential than citizenship in overseas Chinese 
people’s sense of belonging.  
A number of scholars are convinced that the long-lasting ties between China and 
overseas Chinese are an embodiment of so-called ‘overseas Chinese nationalism’ (Yen, 
2008; William, 1960; Liu, 2005) meaning ‘an ideology and a movement which 
expressed a deep concern for China's welfare and survival as nation-state’ (Yen, 2008: 
339). The adjective ‘overseas’ implies the transnational nature of the Chinese 
nationalism through which nationalists conduct campaigns across multiple national 
borders. It is a nationalism that transgresses the principle of territorial sovereignty on 
which the Westphalian state system is based. Therefore, overseas Chinese nationalism 
is in fact beyond national borders and is essentially a ‘Chinese transnationalism’. 
In contrast to transnationalism from below, as practiced by migrant social networks in 
a bottom-up manner, it is actually a ‘transnationalism from above’ initiated by a nation-
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state to mobilise support from its expatriates (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Portes, 2001). 
The reason for which a nation state exploits transnationalism is, of course, to increase 
its national strength. Duara (1998) refers to the paradoxical phenomenon that, from the 
beginning of its nation building, China tended to employ transnational forces to expand 
its internal power as ‘transnationalism in the era of nation-state’. Thus ‘Chinese 
transnationalism’ simultaneously cements and bypasses the conception of territorial 
sovereignty. Salient is that Basch and Schiller (1994) refers to states that manage to 
exercise control over 'transmigrants' as a means of intensifying rather than attenuating 
the power of the sending state as a 'de-territorialised nation state’. 
That China is ‘de-territorialised’ reveals that it, in fact, does not properly adhere to the 
rule of being a territorial nation-state even as it constitutes its citizenry. Instead, China 
tends to take the outreaching to the Chinese abroad for granted, even incorporating them 
into its citizenry. Also, the special understanding of belonginess among Chinese in the 
Philippines challenges the assumption of a presumed congruence between state territory, 
a people (nation) and state authority (Benhabib, 2008; Faist, 2004).  
As mentioned in chapter 1, Huaqiao Chineseness is the primordial type of Chineseness. 
It is an official version of Chineseness produced and promoted by the central Chinese 
government, in a top-down manner, to shape a uniform Chinese national identity. 
Huaqiao Chineseness thus represents the nationalist ideology of one nation, one people, 
and one language. Chinese education which seeks to instil Huaqiao Chineseness in 
Chinese overseas is so-called Huaqiao education. The aim of Huaqiao education is to 
raise their awareness of Chinese national identity and their holding of Huaqiao 
citizenship.  
Huaqiao citizenship is an identity granted by China to confirm the relationship between 
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the Chinese government and Chinese overseas. In the context of the Philippines, it had 
been accessible for Philippine-Chinese from the establishment of the first Chinese 
consulate in Manila in 1899 until the implementation of mass naturalisation in 1975. 
Nowadays, despite the fact that most of the Chinese in the Philippines have acquired 
Filipino citizenship, a number of them still call themselves Huaqiao. Further, both the 
PRC and ROC governments call the Chinese ‘Huaqiao’ and thus implement so-called 
‘Huaqiao policies’ for them, regardless of their citizenship status.  
I consider this ‘de-territorialisedness’ is for the purpose of building a ‘transnational 
mobilisation system’ jointly formed by Chinese government and the overseas Chinese. 
Chinese government and overseas Chinese could benefit from the reciprocal 
relationships in which the former acquired political, financial, and educational supports 
from the latter and, in return, the latter obtained the formal or informal citizenship from 
the former.  
I now turn to discussion of these concepts and policies in their historical and cultural 
context. 
 
3.3 The Attributes of Huaqiao Citizenship 
In the main, Huaqiao citizenship contradicts common historical understanding of 
citizenship. In discussing the historical and cultural context of Huaqiao citizenship in 
the Philippines, I would like to highlight three of its attributes that differ from the 
common understanding of citizenship. 
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3.3.1 Citizenship beyond Consent 
Confucianism laid the foundation of the political system of the Imperial China Period 
in general, and of the ruler/subject relationship specifically. Confucian patriarchy 
placed the father at the centre of family and society. A father is loving to his son, and 
the son demonstrates reverence to his father. In terms of the political system, the state 
as a whole was seen as an enlarged family. The emperor, of course, was the father of 
the state, assuming absolute authority as the father of all Chinese people (Zhou, 2010: 
138). Accordingly, China’s state/subject relationship was similar to traditional 
father/son relationships which enforced the patriarchal value of loyalty and obedience. 
Zhou (2010: 138) points out that while the Chinese patriarchal political system vanished, 
the Chinese patriarchal culture has remained. It still exists in China’s state/citizen 
relationships.   
Modern citizenship theory presumes that the state/citizen relationship is based on the 
consent of citizens who are individual and autonomous. Citizens have rights to 
determine their belonging. As just discussed, there is an analogy between father/son 
and state/citizen relationships. Yet a citizen is free to join or resign the membership of 
a community, whereas a son is unlikely to choose his father. Thus there existed a 
hierarchy in the father/son-like state/citizen relationships which seemed to give China 
arbitrary power to claim the allegiance of those of Chinese descent. Once overseas 
Chinese were found to be valuable assets, China took outreaching to potential citizens 
in her favour for granted. China’s reaching out was as if a father found his long-lost 
sons to have returned, and subsequently provided them opportunities to repay his 
paternal love. Thus overseas Chinese were expected to be part of the transnational 
mobilisation system, financially, technically, and politically supporting their fatherland.  
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On the other hand, the wave of overseas Chinese nationalism made overseas Chinese 
tie their destiny to China. They believed all the suffering and discrimination of overseas 
Chinese in fact came resulted from China’s inferior and despised international status in 
light of it having been invaded and colonised China by Western powers. An independent 
and strong China, on the other hand, could protect them and improve their situation 
abroad (Tan, 1972).  
The status of Huaqiao citizenship was initially confirmed by the earliest nationality law 
of the Qing Court in 1909. Based on an imagining of the whole nation as an enlarged 
family, the law made use of the jus sanguinis principle to relate those with Chinese 
blood to the nation, supplemented with the jus solis principle. The law automatically 
made overseas Chinese acquire Chinese nationality, thus rapidly expanding the number 
of Huaqiao citizens. The implementation of the law began the ceaseless relationship 
between China and overseas Chinese. 
The definition of ‘who Huaqiao are’ was essentially controlled by Chinese central 
government. As Mak (1985) indicates, the term ‘Huaqiao’ was merely the Chinese 
government’s attitude toward overseas Chinese, and was not necessarily accepted by 
overseas Chinese themselves or the government of the destination country. 
The arbitrary power of the Chinese government is shown in the National Law of 1929, 
which prescribes the ‘leniency to naturalisation, severity to renouncement’ policy (Lee, 
1997b). Those Chinese citizens who intended to renounce their Chinese nationality 
were required to obtain permissions from the Ministry of Interior in China, which 
increased the difficulty of giving it up. This policy could also prevent the country of 
residence from arbitrarily forcing the overseas Chinese to renounce their Chinese 
citizenship. Hence, all Chinese are Chinese citizens regardless of their subjective will; 
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the citizen/son has no power to refute the granting of Huaqiao citizenship from China, 
much as a son should always obey his father. The renunciation of his citizenship of the 
‘fatherland’ by a Chinese person appeared as unforgivable as a son’s breaking off of his 
father/son relationship. 
The Chinese government’s arbitrary power can also be shown by the dramatic case of 
the Yuyitung Brothers in 1970. Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung were well-known publishers 
of a Chinese-language daily in the Philippines, the Chinese Commercial News. In their 
print, they actively promoted the idea of integration into Philippine society and 
questioned the legitimacy of the rule of the ROC regime over the Philippine-Chinese 
community. Both opinions fundamentally cast doubt on the enforcing of Huaqiao 
citizenship. Consequently, they were condemned by many Philippine-Chinese for 
abandoning their ancestors (Shudian wangzu) and being traitors to China (Hanjian).  
Further, the Yuyitung brothers’ questioning of Huaqiao citizenship was also a 
significant challenge to the authority of the ROC regime in Taiwan. At that time, both 
were ROC citizens, so their doubt was seen as treason. Consequently, having been 
alleged in the spreading of Communist propaganda through print, the Yuyitung brothers 
were abducted by Philippine authorities in 1970 and deported to Taiwan for further 
interrogations by KMT authorities  (Yuyitung, 1996: 326) . 
According to Chinese Nationality Law, the jurisdiction of the ROC regime over the 
Yuyitung brothers came from their Huaqiao (ROC) citizenship. Therefore, they 
attempted to avoid the consequence of deportation to Taiwan by publicly denouncing 
their ROC citizenship in advance. The attempt was in vain, because the granting of 
permission to denounce Huaqiao citizenship was subject to the subjective will of 
government rather than of citizens themselves.  
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The Yuyitung case demonstrates how the traditional authority of the Chinese patriarchal 
political system enabled the government to override citizens’ individual will on the 
issue of citizenship. Even now, both governments still take outreaching to those ‘non-
citizens’ by ‘overseas Chinese policies’ and identifying them as ‘Huaqiao’ for granted. 
 
3.3.2 Sinocentric Culturalism 
What underlines Huaqiao citizenship is not only the father/son-like state/citizen 
relationship, but a ‘sinocentric’ cultural pride. Traditionally, Chinese people tended to 
disparage those who identified with non-Chinese culture as barbarians. Since ancient 
China, being Chinese meant being situated in a geopolitical centre, namely ‘the central 
plain’ (Zhong Yuan) of the Yellow River basin of North China where Chinese 
civilisation originated (Shi, 2009). China, which is ‘Zhongguo’ in Chinese, can be 
translated as ‘Middle Kingdom’; China was commonly acknowledged among Chinese 
as the centre of universe. The ancient Chinese believed they were the only civilised 
group (Xia) in a centre who were surrounded by uncivilised barbarians (Yi) at the 
peripheral areas. Thereafter, the concept of Chineseness had been gradually expanded 
so as to include inhabitants of peripheral regions – when these inhabitants were to be 
civilised. In other words, there was a conceptual boundary, defined by Chinese culture, 
between the civilised and the barbarians. This Sinocentrism can be seen as a sense of 
cultural pride at best, or cultural chauvinism and even racism at worst, in its tendency 
to look down on other civilisations and cultural groups. 
The legitimacy of a ruler and government is not only a political issue, but also a cultural 
one. In ancient China, the emperor is the Son of Heaven (Tianzi), having received the 
mandate of Heaven as the ruler of the universe or ‘all under heaven’ (Tianxia) and the 
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whole civilisation. Those ethnic minority and foreign people on the fringe had to accept 
the mandate of the Chinese emperor and follow the Confucian moral order to be 
included into Tianxia – otherwise they remained barbarians, beyond civilisation. Since 
the central government represented both the political and cultural centre of Chinese 
civilisation, being Chinese, to an extent, needed official recognition. Therefore, 
acquiring Huaqiao citizenship was regarded as the recognition confirming that overseas 
Chinese people were part of Chinese civilisation.   
Remarkably, Chinese cultural values were widely believed by Chinese to be the only 
true universal culture. Accordingly, being Chinese meant being part of the universal 
culture, accepting and learning the civilised ways of living and thinking (Shi, 2009); 
those who were outside Chinese civilisation were regarded as barbarians. Therefore, 
conversion from Chinese civilisation to others would be seen as self-disgrace. This 
civilizational way of thinking, which was common to many empires, has continued in 
the modern Chinese state and has had impact on some older generations of Chinese 
overseas as well.   
Up to the present, some older generations of the Chinese in the Philippines call Filipino 
‘hoan-á’ which means ‘foreign barbarian’. It is a derogatory term that evokes the 
ideology of Han racialism and cultural chauvinism. Richard Chu, a well-known 
Chinese-Filipino historian, remembered the dialect in Hokkien heard from his parents 
and family, ‘Di tio kong lán-lâng ōe. Di bian hoan-á gōng ki’ (你該說咱人話. 你變番
仔戆去) (Chu, 2010). In English, this means to ‘act like our own people, or go with the 
stupid foreign barbarians’. If a Chinese speaks Filipino language and acts like Filipinos, 
he may be seen as becoming a foreign barbarian. In contrast, being Chinese meant being 
a civilised person and being part of the only true universal culture. Hence, despite living 
abroad, holding Huaqiao citizenship represented not only citizenship rights enforced by 
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Chinese government, but an official recognition of being part of Chinese culture.         
 
3.3.3 Borderlessness 
China as a civilisation lacked definite notions of boundary. As Pye (1990) points out, 
‘China is a civilization pretending to be a state’. Since there was a lack of specific 
geographical limits to the Chinese civilization, the Chinese government might justify 
the outreaching to overseas Chinese communities as an expansion of Chinese 
civilisation rather than an intentional crossing of national borders. 
Ge (2011) indicates that, in ancient Chinese documents, China’s centre and its fringe 
were not altogether spatial and geographical notions. Instead, China is a cultural idea 
rather than a political and territorial entity with a clear border. While there existed a 
notion of Sinocentrism, whereby China took itself as the centre of universe, ‘the 
position of centre is clear, but the border is quite blurred’ (Ge, 2011: 45). What 
distinguished ‘Yi’ (civilised Chinese people) from ‘Xia’ (uncivilised barbarians) was 
not a geographical barrier, but whether Chinese culture was accepted. Boundaries are a 
result of military conquest, but ancient Chinese believed the attractiveness of their 
civilisation was based on Confucian culturalism, which could overcome barbarians 
with virtues. The ‘borderlessness’ of Chineseness endows China with flexibility in 
respect of defining who the Chinese are, and what China means. Those on the fringe or 
even in foreign lands can be Chinese by converting to Chinese civilisation. The 
acquisition, by a person of Chinese descent, of a certain amount of Chineseness could 
make him a potential Chinese citizen. 
Therefore, extending Chineseness to those who reside abroad can be seen as an 
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expansion of Chinese civilisation. In other words, exporting Chineseness to overseas 
Chinese could be a means for China to expand its power without militarily invading 
foreign lands. The notion of national borders could only limit its power expansion, so 
China tended to emphasise non-territorial factors, like consanguinity and cultural ties, 
to maximise the uptake of Huaqiao citizenship.   
    
3.4 The Connection between Huaqiao Citizenship and Huaqiao Education 
The widespread nature of Huaqiao citizenship in the Philippines has little to do with its 
bringing of substantial citizenship rights to these overseas Chinese. In fact, the 
enforcement of Huaqiao citizenship was far from effective, whether it was exerted by 
Chinese governments in Beijing or Nanjing, due to political turbulence in China. In the 
absence of substantial citizenship rights to make them Chinese citizens, it was Huaqiao 
education that made Philippine-Chinese aware of their Huaqiao citizenship. As Tan 
(1972: 168) indicates, the Chinese schools became the centre of nationalist propaganda 
in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1911. Thus one of the ultimate goals of the Chinese 
schools was clear: turning students into Chinese (Huaqiao) citizens.  
By the end of the 19th century the extension of Huaqiao citizenship and the promotion 
of Huaqiao education in the Philippines happened simultaneously. It was not a 
coincidence that the first Chinese school (the Anglo-Chinese School) and the first 
Chinese consulate in the Philippines were built in the same building and at the same 
time in 1898. The Qing government was aware of the necessity to make the Philippine-
Chinese Huaqiao by means of Chinese education.  
Before overseas Chinese nationalism landed, overseas Chinese people’s literacy in 
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Chinese language and knowledge of modern states were too low to lead to a meaningful 
Chinese identity (Wang, 1981: 154). A famous revolutionary who had visited Manila in 
1911, Hu Han-min, was shocked by the loss of Chineseness among overseas Chinese 
except some shallow and superficial imperial Confucian culture (Hu, 1931). Hu reports 
that many overseas Chinese from Fujian found it strange that he asked them their 
Chinese names (Hu, 1931: 6). Chinese schools were to play a pivotal role in 
transmitting Chineseness and avoiding the undesirable possibility of assimilation of 
children into the local Philippine society. Therefore, the Anglo-Chinese School aimed 
to instil in Chinese youths ‘[t]he doctrines of our national sage, the ethics, etc. (Jensen, 
1956, 52)’. The establishment of Chinese schools complied with 'the School Regulation 
on Imperial Permission' (Qin-ding Xue-tang Zhang-cheng) in 1902, which aimed to 
shape an identical sense of citizenship among all Chinese people by encouraging the 
establishment of modern schools not only in mainland China, but also in Chinese 
communities all over the world (Zhuang, 2012: 332). From then on, there was a basic 
principle in framing the policies of overseas Chinese education by all successive 
Chinese governments: make it identical – at least in appearance – to the education 
system in China.  
The connection between Huaqiao education and Huaqiao citizenship was also endorsed 
by a well-known slogan of the ROC government in the 1950s: as said by Zheng Yan-
fen (1955), the minister of the OCAC at that time: ‘where there is no overseas Chinese 
education, there is no overseas Chinese affairs’. Without Huaqiao education to instil 
Huaqiao Chineseness, students of Chinese descent were unlikely to identify themselves 
as Chinese citizens, become part of the reservoir of Huaqiao and participate in the 
transnational mobilisation system.     
Unity, as manifest in Huaqiao Chineseness, was centred on three aspects, as I will detail 
86 
 
below.  
 
3.4.1 Unity of National Language 
Attempts to unify overseas Chinese began prior to KMT rule, immediately following 
the establishment of the ROC government in Beijing in 1912. It firstly worked on the 
unification of a national language, Mandarin. This was a crucial step not only in 
diminishing provincialism within and without the Chinese territory, but in providing a 
mutually intelligible language to make communication between mainland and overseas 
Chinese possible.  
The ROC government, therefore, launched the Standardising National Language 
Movement step by step. The Ministry of Education established the Commission on the 
Unification of Pronunciation in 1912, attended by delegates from all provinces – 
including, remarkably, a delegate on behalf of overseas Chinese. The movement later 
saw Mandarin specialists being sent to overseas Chinese schools in order to replace 
dialects as the medium of instruction (Lee, 1997b: 484). In 1926, the leader of the 
Chinese school in the Philippines declared that all Chinese schools should comply with 
a directive of the National Board of Education of China to adopt Mandarin as the 
medium of instruction (Tan, 1972:172). Seminars, radio programs, Mandarin speaking 
contests and special Mandarin classes for adults were organised to promote Mandarin 
for the Chinese throughout the Philippines. The two Chinese dialect groups among 
Philippine-Chinese, Hokkien (Fujianese) and Cantonese, were replaced by one national 
language. The ability to speak Mandarin thus has become a clearly defined target for 
the overseas Chinese to pursue, and a simple indication of whether or not they are 
‘genuine’ Chinese. 
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From then on, Mandarin ability became the key civic competence of Huaqiao 
citizenship, the very core of Huaqiao Chineseness to instil into students, and thus the 
goal with highest priority in terms of Huaqiao education.  
 
3.4.2 Unity of Educational Pedagogy 
World War II marked a watershed moment in Huaqiao education. Before the war, the 
Chinese government established educational goals but failed to achieve them. It, in fact, 
relied on individual Chinese schools to pursue the goal. During the anti-communist 
campaign after the war, the newly established ROC government in Taiwan began not 
only to exercise closer control over Chinese schools in the Philippines, but also to 
arbitrarily shape Huaqiao education in its favour. The ROC government developed a 
unified pedagogy and exercised it in the Philippines in the 1950 and 1960s: this 
included a standardised education system, curriculum, textbooks, and methods of 
language teaching necessary to uniformly transmit the official ‘package of knowledge’.  
In terms of education system, the Chinese schools had to follow the guidance in the 
ROC’s ‘the Accreditation Regulations for Overseas Chinese Schools’, which strictly 
prescribed educational objectives, administrative organisation, teaching management, 
and curriculum (Wang, 1998). Under the ‘Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity’ signed 
between the ROC and the Philippines in 1947, the Philippines would not intervene in 
the Chinese curriculum. Instead, all Chinese schools were required to register in the 
OCAC through the Chinese embassy in the Philippines, which was in charge of school 
inspection. 
In terms of language learning, since the Philippine-Chinese community at the time was 
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ruled by the ROC, Chinese schools also followed the ROC version of Chineseness, 
teaching ‘Zhuyin’ (the Mandarin Phonetic Symbols) and traditional Chinese characters. 
In the aftermath of the separation in 1949, the PRC also developed its own version of 
Chineseness that adopts ‘Pinyin’ (the Romanisation system of Mandarin) and simplified 
Chinese characters. However, due to its monopoly in pedagogy until the 1990s, the 
ROC version has been seen as the preconceived orthodox Chinese culture among 
Philippine-Chinese.  
The ROC’s supply of textbooks was another policy focus as it was a means defining 
the scope of Chinese teaching. From 1952, the OCAC in Taiwan edited and provided 
the ‘Textbooks for Schools in Southeast Asia’ (南洋華僑學校教科書). The Chinese 
school in the Philippines was the first among other schools in Southeast Asia to adopt 
it (Jiang, 2011: 67), demonstrating the special relationship between Taiwan and 
Philippine-Chinese schools. Of course both Zhuyin and traditional Chinese characters 
were taught in the textbook. It was later revised as the ‘Philippine edition’ to 
accommodate the local context environment in the Philippines (Yanyan Wang, 1998). 
In 1969, the ‘General Association of Chinese Schools in the Philippines’ even decided 
to directly adopt the same textbooks for Taiwanese students in the teaching of the 
Philippine-Chinese elementary schools (Jiang, 2011: 66). As Benedict Anderson (1983) 
argues, the circulation of books in a certain ‘national-print language’ can make readers 
speaking various dialects able to understand each other, thus forming a unified 
nationalist awareness among them. The use of unified textbooks facilitated a de-
territorialised ‘imagined community’ among the Philippine-Chinese.  
While working in a Chinese school, I was quite fascinated by some older generations 
of Philippine-Chinese who excitedly told me that ‘we studied the same textbooks as 
yours in Taiwan’. The common memory of textbooks not only immediately created a 
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sense of intimacy between those who come from Taiwan and them, but also enabled 
them to declare their former Huaqiao citizenship.       
Teacher training was another policy priority. As part of the project of U.S. aid for 
overseas Chinese education following the visit to Taiwan of Vice President Richard 
Nixon in 1935, 485 Philippine-Chinese students graduated from Taiwanese colleges 
and universities between 1952 to 1993 (Y. Chen, 2004). The ROC also built the 
Overseas Chinese Teacher College in Manila, which operated between 1957 and 1967, 
producing 269 graduates (Yanyan Wang, 1998). The OCAC also provided 50 teachers 
from Taiwan between 1952 and 1968, and sent 57 educationalists to hold teacher 
training programs with more than 4,000 trainees in Manila between 1954 and 1968 
(Yanyan Wang, 1998). Those who took part in these teacher training programs in the 
two decades tended to be more aware of, have a deeper understanding of, and feel 
connected to, the ROC version of Chineseness. Many of them, including the lady who 
was singing the song, later became the backbone of the Chinese school; some, now in 
their sixties or seventies, still are. 
A head of the Chinese department of a school who studied in National Taiwan Normal 
University thanks to a ROC scholarship expressed her affection for Taiwan: ‘The ROC 
government treated me so well, so I cannot retire too early. I must serve and repay “my 
country” as much as I could (Personal communication with Miss Lim, 9/10/2010)’.  
As this case shows, the ROC has cultivated a group of the Philippine-Chinese who have 
familiarised themselves with the pedagogy of the ROC and worked in Chinese schools 
as teachers, directors of Chinese departments, school principals, and educational 
researchers. Some of them still do at present. These core elites of the Chinese schools 
have had a profound influence on the developing direction and pedagogy of Chinese 
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schools, having made them, to a certain degree, Huaqiao-oriented.  
All in all, the huge impact that the ROC government left on the pedagogy of the Chinese 
schools has brought about an effect of ‘path dependence’. Even in the ‘post-Huaqiao 
period’, the pedagogy adopted in the Chinese schools still shows Huaqiao Chineseness 
with ROC characteristics. 
 
3.4.3 Unity of National Identity 
From the beginning, Chinese schools were integral to Chinese nationalism in terms of 
disseminating propaganda. By the late 1910s, Chinese schools began to serve as centres 
of overseas Chinese nationalism, incited by the ROC government in Beijing (Tan, 1972: 
168). Chinese students thus became political activists who organised a series of patriotic 
movements and fundraising campaigns in response to almost all major political events 
in China and foreign imperialism against China, such as Yuan Shikai’s revival of 
monarchy, the Northern Expedition and invasions of China by the United Kingdom, 
Russia and Japan, and subsequently the Second Sino-Japan War (Tan, 1972).  
The local branches of the KMT established in 1911 in Manila played a pivotal role in 
the overseas Chinese nationalist movement. A high-ranking KMT official from China, 
Lin Sen, arrived in Manila to supervise the setting up of the city’s general branch, 
arrange the publication of the ‘Kong Li Newspaper’ (the mouthpiece of the party), and 
establish two schools directed by the party, the Chinese National School in the 1920s 
and the Chiang Kai-shek High School in 1939 (Jensen, 1956: 279). The general branch 
was later joined by many devoted and capable followers, who in turn developed other 
local branches all over the islands (Jensen, 1956: 279). Further, a number of 
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intellectuals from China with KMT background came to the Philippines and worked as 
teachers in almost all Chinese schools, thus adding Huaqiao Chineseness with KMT 
ideology to Chinese teaching.  
After the KMT came to power in China in 1928, its influence in the Philippine-Chinese 
community rapidly grew. To a certain degree, the Chinese school system had become 
the KMT’s propaganda machine. The KMT was also devoted to making the Three 
Principles of the People the foundation of Huaqiao education at all levels of Chinese 
schools (Lee, 1997b: 501; Tan, 1972: 247). The Chinese schools were thus a central 
part of the transnational mobilisation system in serving the KMT’s political agenda, 
especially after the eruption of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.     
After 1949, the centre of the transnational mobilisation system moved to Taiwan to 
continue the KMT’s political struggle against the CPC. Thereafter, the focal point of 
Huaqiao education shifted to ‘Anti-Communism and National Salvation’ in the 1950s 
and 1960s (Lee, 1997a), in order to denigrate the legitimacy of the CPC not only for its 
usurping of the mainland, but its destruction of Chinese traditional culture. To assure 
ideological unity, the KMT reconstructed organisations of the Chinese community – 
including Chinese schools – to align with its party organisation. It assigned party 
members to positions of influence on school boards in order to exercise control over 
schools (McBeath, 1970: 64). Against the background of the Cold War, the KMT’s 
control over the Chinese schools and the Chinese community as a whole was quite 
severe and overwhelming until the 1970s. The KMT’s coercive measures, enacted via 
Huaqiao education in order to command absolute loyalty among the Philippine-Chinese 
towards the ROC, did not necessarily produce loyal party supporters; nevertheless, they 
successfully created a sense that they are, and always will be, part of the Chinese nation.    
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Hence, the rule of the KMT in this period had significantly turned the Philippine-
Chinese into Huaqiao with strong Chinese national identity. Despite the fading away of 
KMT ideology, such as anti-communism, after the 1970s overseas Chinese nationalism 
and Huaqiao Chineseness, as disseminated by the party, remained influential. 
    
3.5 Underground Huaqiao Education in the Current Post-Huaqiao Period 
The breaking off of diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1975 ended the legal basis of 
Huaqiao citizenship, and of the ROC’s rule over the Chinese. Since most of the 
Philippine-Chinese have legally lost Huaqiao citizenship and acquired Filipino 
citizenship, this began the post-Huaqiao Period, which continues up to present. To 
nullify the notion of Huaqiao citizenship, the Philippine government granted 
Philippine-Chinese access to Filipino citizenship and enforced the Filipinization of the 
Chinese schools. These policies aimed to erase the marks of Huaqiao education in 
Chinese schools.  
The denial of the validity of Huaqiao education, however, could only make it go 
underground rather than eliminate it. Tan (1988: 185) argues that acquiring Filipino 
citizenship merely amounted to a ‘change of label’ on their citizenship status. Many of 
the ‘former ROC citizens’ who work in schools only pay lip service to legal 
requirements, changing educational content only in form (See, 1997: 98). Despite no 
direct ROC involvement, Chinese teaching in general still followed old Huaqiao 
Chineseness. As a result, regardless of Filipinization, the teaching of Chinese schools, 
to a degree, remains ‘Huaqiao’ in the post-Huaqiao time.  
Despite their insistence of those who teach in the Chinese schools, in the absence of 
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institutional support, normally the sense of being Huaqiao would have continued to 
decline under the influence of Filipinization. China’s rise since the ‘Opening and 
Reform’ of the 1980s, however, has allowed overseas Chinese to contact their 
hometowns in China and rekindled their passion for the fatherland.  The rapid 
economic growth of China as well as of ethnic Chinese business networks in the so-
called ‘Greater China’ region has given rise to a ‘Chinese triumphalism’ among 
overseas Chinese that celebrates ‘Asian value’ by and large based on Confucianism 
(Ong, 1999). Chinese learning thus has become not only a symbol of cultural ties to the 
fatherland, but of access to Greater China. 
Meanwhile, the PRC started to reach out to overseas Chinese after its the Reform and 
Opening policy. The PRC has been devoted to replacing the ROC as the true fatherland 
for overseas Chinese and the rightful heir of Chinese cultural heritage. To remedy the 
destruction of the cultural traditions of China in the Cultural Revolution, from the 1990s 
the PRC began to reassess Confucianism and started ‘the fever of traditional scholarship’ 
that emphasised Confucian studies (Peng, 2011). In terms of overseas Chinese policies, 
the PRC started to stress the great importance of overseas Chinese to ‘the great 
renaissance of the Chinese nation and people’ in 2001 (Liu, 2005). Qian Qishen, Vice 
Premier of the State Council, emphasised particularly the crucial role of overseas 
Chinese education for the younger generation Chinese (Liu, 2005: 303). Naturally, 
mainland China appears promising as a new and massive resource of Chineseness that 
can help remedy the awkward situation of Huaqiao education.    
Due to the lessening of hostility against China, Philippine authorities have gradually 
loosened their control over the Chinese schools. Since China has gained growing 
economic significance, there has been a resurgence of Huaqiao education that involves 
the ongoing commitments of the PRC as well as the ROC. Unlike the previous mode 
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of Huaqiao education that was monopolised by the Chineseness of the ROC, Huaqiao 
education in the post-Huaqiao time is constituted by both the PRC and the ROC. As 
there are two versions of Chineseness to compete for the hegemony of Huaqiao 
education, the confrontation between pro-mainland and pro-Taiwan groups largely 
determines current Huaqiao education in the Philippines.  
In the PRC’s view, support from overseas Chinese is not only an asset, in the era of the 
Reform and Opening up, to the ‘socialist modernisation project’, but also a symbolic 
resource to affirm its political legitimacy, to extend China’s political standing, and to 
reassert Chineseness. Hence, one of the PRC’s paramount concerns is to inhibit ROC 
influence among Philippine-Chinese whose allegiance the ROC claimed as evidence of 
its legitimacy (Barabantseva, 2011; Fitzgerald, 1972). Replacing the ROC version of 
Chineseness in overseas Chinese education with the PRC one is therefore the policy 
priority.  
On the part of the ROC, without wide international recognition and the membership of 
the United Nations, those overseas Chinese who are ROC-oriented have become crucial 
strategic resources in the competition for legitimacy, foreign policy, and external trade 
(J. Chen, 2002). To avoid being taken over by the PRC, the ROC thus gives its priority 
to consolidating its existing network of Chinese schools.  
The arms race for educational aids between the two governments, indeed, boosts the 
production of Huaqiao Chineseness and the spreading of Huaqiao education. Therefore, 
the loss of Huaqiao citizenship by no means put an end to the dissemination of Huaqiao 
Chineseness. To the contrary, with the agenda of both governments, Huaqiao 
Chineseness has extended, doubled, and gone underground through two versions of 
Huaqiao education. In the following, I will identify  four forms of Huaqiao 
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Chineseness existing beneath the surface of educational aids.  
 
3.5.1 Quasi-state/citizen Relationships through Education   
The paramount concern in overseas Chinese education policies is to maintain the sense 
of being Huaqiao. As discussed earlier, China tends to bypass the notion of national 
citizenship in defining the citizenry. Therefore, it is natural for both regimes to continue 
to treat the Chinese as ‘quasi-citizens’ through educational aids. This shows that China 
(whether referring to the ROC or PRC) takes for granted its claim to the allegiance of 
overseas Chinese, regardless of the latter’s citizenship status. This policy orientation 
can be exemplified by the fact that China intentionally expands the definition of 
‘Huaqiao’ to increase the recipients of quasi-Huaqiao citizenship and Huaqiao 
education. 
Indeed, the ROC government has never discontinued the usage of Huaqiao in reference 
to overseas Chinese, whether they are, in fact, ROC citizens or not. It considers those 
Chinese with the memory of having been Huaqiao as potential compatriots, and does 
not take their true citizenship status into account at all (Wang, 1981: 126). The ROC’s 
unilateral entitlement to Huaqiao status is based on common, pre-1970s historical 
memory, imagining that the ROC is still the nominal and symbolic homeland of the 
Philippine-Chinese.  
In fact, the ROC’s definition of Huaqiao is highly ambiguous. According to Yan (1991: 
6), Huaqiao could refer to any person, regardless of his legal status of citizenship, who 
has Chinese blood, understands Chinese history, customs, culture, habits, language (to 
a certain degree), and has links with China. Another term for overseas Chinese as a 
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whole, Qiaobao (compatriots), which is commonly used by officials when calling 
overseas Chinese, can simultaneously refer to Huaqiao, Huaren (foreign nationals of 
Chinese descent), and Huayi (non-Chinese citizens of Chinese blood). When asked why 
the ROC offers educational services to non-citizens, an official of OCAC said:  
To a degree, if he realises his ancestors were from Mainland China or Taiwan, 
if he also realises his mother tongue or his ancestors’ language is Mandarin 
Chinese, and if he realises he has the background of Chinese culture and feels 
admiration for it, I think the ROC government has the responsibility to satisfy 
the admiration and yearning for Chinese learning and the cultural inheritance. 
If the descendants of Huaqiao, whatever they are of first, second or third 
generation, despite the fact that they have acquired Filipino citizenship and 
enrol in the schools as part of the Philippine education system yet with only 
couple of hours of Chinese courses, I think the OCAC of the ROC government 
has the responsibility to meet the needs (Interview with the Chief Secretary of 
OCAC, Liang-ming Chang, the OCAC, Taipei, 24/8/2012).  
The statement implies that it is self-evident that the ROC, as the orthodox inheritor, is 
responsible for any person, whether of more or less amount of Chinese background and 
of interests in learning Chinese. The flexibility in defining the relationships between 
the ROC and those of Chinese background, in a sense, coincides with the jus sanguinis 
principle of the Nationality Law of the ROC, which holds that those of Chinese descent 
could automatically acquire a certain status derived from the ROC. As long as the ROC 
is willing to offer services, and as long as the Philippine-Chinese are willing to receive 
the services of the ROC, the relationships can be of no problem and beyond any 
statutory restriction on the definition of national citizenship.  
With respect to the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy, despite the statement in the 
Nationality Law in 1955 that disapproves of dual citizenship and advocates single 
citizenship of the host country, the law cannot, in the wake of the Opening and Reform, 
in fact prevent the PRC, from forming new relationships with the overseas Chinese 
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(Barabantseva, 2005). Wang (1991) notices that attitudes about whether to include 
ethnic Chinese who are foreign nationals in the PRC’s new policy on overseas Chinese 
are ‘blurred and undefined’ in a manner that can invite suspicion in the countries of 
residence. By creating a compound noun, ‘Huaqiao-Huaren’, which refers to all 
overseas Chinese regardless of their citizenship status, the PRC targets non-citizens 
alongside real Huaqiao. For example, in the official website, the Guoqiaoban (the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China) 
states that one of its major responsibilities is taking charge of ‘the guidance and 
development of the interaction of and the services for Huaqiao-Huaren and their 
organisations’. ("General Introduction,") ("General Introduction,") ("General 
Introduction,")  
When asked at a conference in Manila in 1991 by an overseas Chinese scholar why 
there are so many administrative offices in China with ‘Huaqiao’ in the name, a 
professor from Beijing answered ‘it is because there are still real Huaqiao residing 
abroad’ (Chang, T, 2009: 134). This is obviously an excuse to avoid questions about its 
ambivalent policy orientation; the truth is that, despite the fact that the majority of 
Philippine-Chinese have no Chinese citizenship, the Guoqiaoban nonetheless offers 
education services for the Chinese students to expand the PRC’s influence over the 
Chinese. 
From the viewpoint of the ROC and PRC, the Philippine-Chinese still have privileged 
status. Receiving Huaqiao education can no longer be exclusive to Chinese citizens 
because most students, teachers, and administrators are now Filipino citizens. The only 
feasible way to increase the recipients of Huaqiao education is to make educational aids 
open to all of those who work for, or enrol in, Chinese schools.  
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Both the ROC and PRC have developed respective educational-aid supply systems in 
order to provide teachers, teacher training, textbooks, and educational activities. As the 
ROC and PRC governments can no longer directly reach out to ‘former’ Chinese 
schools, they instead have to rely on some intermediary bodies to provide the aids. The 
table shows a variety of educational aids provided by both governments. 
 PRC ROC 
Intermediary 
Bodies 
 The Philippine Chinese 
Education Research Center 
 the Philippine Jinjiang 
General Association  
 the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry 
 The Association of Chinese-Filipino 
Schools in the Philippines  
 The Filipino Chinese Cultural and 
Economic Association 
Teacher Supply 
Programs 
 Overseas Chinese Teacher 
Volunteer Programs 
 Teaching Adviser Programs 
 Blood Transfusion Programs 
 
 Substitute Military Service Teachers  
 Cultural Seed Teachers  
 Student Teachers program  
 Teacher-Hiring Subsidy for Chinese 
Schools 
Teacher 
Training 
 Correspondence Courses for 
Bachelor of Chinese Teaching 
 Overseas Teacher Training Programs 
 Overseas Teacher Training Conferences 
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Programs (Sponsored by Guoqiaoban) 
 Localisation of Chinese 
Teacher Program (2+2)  
 Chinese Education Workshop 
(Sponsored by Philippine Jin 
Jiang General Association, 
INC.) 
  
 School Administration and 
Management Programs 
 Correspondence Courses 
Textbooks  Zhongwen 
 Hanyu 
 The Philippines version of Chinese 
Reading 
 Living Mandarin (Shenhuo Huayu) 
Educational 
Activities 
 Summer Study Tour in China 
 Chinese Cultural Talent 
Contest 
 The HSK Test (The Chinese 
Proficiency Test) 
 Language Study Program for Expatriate 
Youth (sponsored by OCAC) 
 Expatriate Youth Taiwan Study Tour 
(sponsored by OCAC)  
 E-learning Teaching Demo Center 
Table 3 The educational aids provided by the PRC and ROC 
Following the ROC’s breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, a new 
organisation was set up in Manila’s Chinatown in 1986: the Filipino-Chinese Culture 
and Education Service Center, which works directly under the OCAC and is in charge 
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of education affairs. It has a close partnership with the Association of Chinese-Filipino 
Schools in the Philippines (ACFSP), which was established in 1993 with the assistance 
of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines (TECO), formerly the 
ROC embassy11. The association, which consists of 126 Chinese schools, is in charge 
of coordination between Chinese schools and general educational affairs. It tends to 
give more cooperation on the events and activities organised by the OCAC, such as 
teacher training programs, administrator programs, and summer youth camps. These 
events are largely sponsored by the OCAC. Further, the OCAC provides free textbooks 
only to Chinese schools registering in the association. Therefore, via the association, 
the ROC can exploit the offering of educational aids to indirectly extend its influence 
to Chinese schools.    
As for the PRC, it has launched a series of ambitious projects on overseas Chinese 
education – which it has, however, kept low-key. As the legitimate representative of 
China, the regional power, and the possessor of the mainland with the hometowns that 
emotionally resonate with the Philippine-Chinese, PRC influence is significant. It has, 
moreover, seen community growth as the PRC has formed relationships with the big 
Philippine-Chinese organisations, such as the Philippine Jinjiang General Association 
and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FFCCCII). PRC authorities closely cooperate with them in conducting educational 
affairs, such as the teacher training program with the former and the teacher supply 
program with the latter. 
The Philippine Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC), established in 1993, is 
also closely affiliated with some PRC authorities in charge of overseas Chinese affairs, 
                                                     
11 It is the representative office alternative to the ROC embassy in the Philippines since the ROC has 
broken off the diplomatic relations with the Philippines under One China Policy since 1975. 
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such as the Guoqiaoban and the Hanban (the Chinese National Office for Teaching 
Chinese as a Foreign Language, NOTCFL). The local organisations thus have become 
the PRC authorities’ intermediary bodies in providing educational resources to the 
Chinese schools. 
In short, both governments use the membership of Chinese schools as a replacement 
for Huaqiao citizenship in terms of qualifications for obtaining benefits. Those who 
enrol in the Chinese schools can still enjoy a variety of educational services by both 
governments. In a way, Chinese students’ educational opportunities for studying 
Chinese have not been compromised after acquiring Filipino citizenship. Without true 
Huaqiao citizenship, they can still make use of their studentship in the Chinese schools 
to enjoy educational resources.  
On the other hand, some Philippine-Chinese appear to still see themselves as citizens, 
if not subjects, of China, taking educational aids from the fatherland for granted. When 
the need for Chinese education teaching materials emerges, Chinese schools tend to 
seek help from both governments. Former ROC citizens generally insist that the 
authenticity of Chineseness taught in schools has to be officially produced and 
recognised by the central power. They also believe the fatherland is obligated to provide 
educational aids for Chinese people to follow in a top-down manner. This dependence 
implies that, from the viewpoint of these Philippine-Chinese, Chinese nationals, despite 
naturalisation, always have the right to enjoy the services of Chinese government. In 
fact, it is educational aids from both governments that support the sustainability of 
Huaqiao Chineseness in the Chinese schools.  
For example, while planning to start a new coordinating body, ‘the Association of 
Chinese-Filipino Schools’, in 1993, Chinese schools requested the OCAC’s backup 
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rather than establishing it on their own. This is comparable to inviting to the ROC to 
influence the association.  
Another example is that, in 1989, when the Chinese schools found the textbook edited 
in 1975 too outdated, they did not attempt to revise it on their own. Instead, they 
reported the issue to the OCAC, who set language-teaching experts to work editing a 
new version of the textbook (Chu, 1995). When I asked an officer of the Association of 
Chinese-Filipino Schools about why they did not try to edit textbooks tailor-made for 
the Philippine-Chinese students themselves, she simply answered:  
No way! We do not have money, and nobody is capable to edit it. No money, 
nor is expert. It is impossible to edit our own textbooks. There is no single 
person and group with the capability. This is too troublesome and requires 
expertise. Is there anybody who is capable to do so in the Philippines? Principals? 
Heads of Chinese departments? No way! (Interview with an officer of the 
Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools, the Association of Chinese-Filipino 
Schools, Manila, 15/11/2013) 
As a matter of fact, those ‘former ROC citizens’ who work in the area of Chinese 
education are the most professional educational experts in the Chinese community. 
They are the most qualified people to conceive of a Philippine version of Chineseness 
due to their actual life experience in the Philippines as well as knowledge of teaching 
Chinese. Their dependence on the fatherland, however, precludes this possibility.     
Along the same lines, following the build-up of the relationship between the PRC and 
some Chinese, the dependence of the latter on the former is manifest in their requests 
for more resources. When plans by Rongmei Li, a wealthy Philippine-Chinese 
businessman, to direct the future development of the Association of Chinese-Filipino 
Schools in the Philippines (ACFSP) from being pro-Taiwan to being more pro-China 
failed to obtain full recognition from China, he wrote an article: ‘the ACFSP Needs the 
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Support from Parents’ (Li, 23/12/2013)12. Li called on China as follows: 
Now the ACFSP has returned back to the right way. We are all patriots whether 
we are earlier or later……the issue of the ACFSP is not just our own business, 
but the whole Chinese community’s business, the PRC’s business and the PRC 
embassy’s business. It represents our allegiance to fatherland……without the 
support from the Chinese government, we are nothing.  
In a sense, some Chinese still consider the development of Chinese education as an 
embodiment of their Chinese patriotism. As they are willing to give strong allegiance 
to China as their fatherland, it is China’s responsibility to take care of Chinese schools. 
This distinctive mentality can be also shown in the following speech by an officer of 
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, INC. 
(FFCCCII)13:  
The ambassador said what he did is for us (Philippine Chinese), but I said it is 
patriotic sentiment of Huaqiao. The promotion of Chinese culture is the 
responsibility of the state (PRC). The Chinese government should not pass the 
responsibility onto Chinese schools. The Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteer 
Program should be hosted mainly by the cultural counsellor of Chinese embassy 
and we just offer assistance as much as possible, because you are the official and 
we are people. It is you who need to promote Chinese culture, and it is you who 
should provide Chinese teachers for Chinese schools. So I can just encourage 
Chinese schools to cooperate with the cultural counsellor of Chinese embassy in 
terms of selecting textbooks (a speech by an FFCCCII administrator, FFCCCII, 
Manila, 10/10/2013).  
A number of wealthy members of the FFCCCII are dedicated to Chinese education. In 
                                                     
12 In PRC official discourse, relationships between China and overseas Chinese are often compared to 
relationships between parents and married daughters.   
13 The FFCCCII is an ‘umbrella organization’ of all Chinese business associations and the Chinese 
community as a whole. It has close cooperation with the embassy of the PRC in sponsoring Chinese 
education in the Philippines in recent years, including the implementation of the Overseas Chinese 
Teacher Volunteer Program by the Hanban since 2004.           
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recent years, with increasing business partnership with the PRC, the FFCCCII has also 
turned to seek educational aids from the PRC. It cooperates with the Guoqiaoban and 
Hanban for teacher training (The 2+2 Project) and teacher supply (the Overseas Chinese 
Teacher Volunteer Program), serving as an intermediary between the Huaqiao affairs-
related authorities of the PRC and Chinese schools. However, failing (from the local 
point of view) to accommodate the needs of the younger generation, the FFCCCII can 
only contribute financial aids to, and closely follow, the PRC’s ambitions in respect of 
overseas Chinese.    
As a result, many of the Philippine-Chinese take the educational aids from the 
homeland for granted, retaining the traditional sense of being Huaqiao. As the Chinese 
schools heavily rely on both governments, the autonomy to interpret Chineseness from 
local perspective is inevitably restricted by external influences. Under the influences, 
their Chineseness remains Huaqiao. 
 
3.5.2 Fatherland-centred Textbooks and Teacher Supplies 
In the Huaqiao period, the Chinese schools had a tradition of accepting textbooks and 
teachers from the fatherland. In the post-Huaqiao period, however, the arms race for 
educational aids between China and Taiwan has further extended the tradition. Both 
China and Taiwan regard their textbooks’ being adopted by a Chinese school as 
recognition of their status as the fatherland. Because there are many classes being taught 
by teachers from the fatherland, using textbooks from there too, the fatherland gains 
leverage in terms of instilling Huaqiao Chineseness. Chinese education thus inevitably 
involves cross-strait politics.   
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The textbook is the medium of official knowledge. Edited by both governments, 
textbooks for Philippine-Chinese students also have agendas relating to the respective 
policy objectives of overseas Chinese education. The common agenda shared by the 
two governments is preserving a minimum degree of Huaqiao Chineseness by 
deliberately building links between students and the so-called fatherland. There are two 
forms of Huaqiao Chineseness in the textbooks. 
First, the presence of a textbook from the fatherland itself is a form of Huaqiao 
Chineseness. Since the textbook is edited by the fatherland rather than a local publisher, 
students are reminded of their paradoxical situation: that, although they are Filipino 
citizens, a special link exists between them and China. This is why both China and 
Taiwan are competing to increase their textbooks’ ‘market share’ among the Chinese 
schools by providing free textbooks. The use of a textbook represents the school’s 
recognition of either the PRC’s or the ROC’s mutually exclusive versions of Huaqiao 
Chineseness. The competition between the PRC and ROC to provide textbooks 
increases the Chinese schools’ ‘textbook dependence’ on the fatherland, offering both 
governments opportunities to promote respective versions of Huaqiao Chineseness in 
the schools.   
Second, the political agendas of the fatherland, as expressed in the content of the 
textbooks, also imply that the Philippine-Chinese are still Huaqiao and that their support 
is crucial to the national interests of both governments. Through the content of 
textbooks, both governments can publicise respective policy objectives.  
The propaganda in the textbooks of the PRC can be divided into two categories. One is 
to stress its status as sole legitimate representative of China. Another is to advertise 
China’s greatness. The PRC gives priority to making overseas Chinese aware of the 
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‘One China Policy’ that claims Taiwan as part of its territory. In volume 11 of the 
Zhongwen (Mandarin Chinese Language) textbook edited by the Guoqiaoban, for 
example, there is a reading text on page 105: ‘I Love Taiwan Islands: A Note of the 
Book the Largest Island of China, Taiwan’. The text describes Taiwan’s beautiful 
scenery and of the recapturing of Taiwan from invaders by Zheng Chenggong 
(Koxinga). The author then expresses great affection for Taiwan.  
Further, the PRC government through textbooks also emphasises its status as sole 
representative of the legitimate government of China. The Guoqiaoban hosted ‘the 2nd 
Chinese Cultural Contest for Overseas Chinese Teenagers’ in 2013 (observation, 
Manila, 23/11/2013). The contest included a quiz game based on three textbooks, 
Common Knowledge about Chinese History, Common Knowledge about Chinese 
Geography, Common Knowledge about Chinese Culture, edited by the Guoqiaoban. 
The books stress the legitimacy of the PRC government by highlighting the 
achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in the Second Sino-Japan War. In the 
quiz, for example, there is a true or false question: ‘the Chinese Communist Party led 
Chinese people to defeat Japanese Imperialism in the Second Sino-Japan War’. 
Certainly, the answer is true. 
In terms of advertising the greatness of China, the Zhongwen textbook introduces many 
places of historic interest and natural beauty, such as Mount Everest (p.8, v.64), the 
Potala Palace (p. 66, v.11), the Tian Shan (p.75, v.12), and Tiananmen Square (p.60, 
v.11). The texts usually end with praise such as ‘You are the national icon of China’ 
(p.65, v.8), ‘You are the pride of the Chinese nation’ (p.83, v.12), and ‘You make 
Chinese people feel proud’ (p.78, v.12). The aim of the texts’ praise seems to be to 
arouse students’ patriotism towards China. 
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The contents of the ROC textbook, the Philippine Version of Chinese Reading, show 
no intention to get involved in the battle for legitimacy. Instead, this textbook focuses 
on promoting a positive image of Taiwan. The ROC textbook also introduces some 
Taiwan sceneries and customs, such as Yangmingshan National Park (p.50, v.11) and 
Taiwanese toys (p.14, v.12). There is also a lesson called ‘My Taiwanese Friends’ (p.22, 
v.12) describing the passion, hospitality, good manners, generosity, and happiness of 
Taiwanese people and their friendship with Filipino people.    
These references to either mainland China or Taiwan can serve as a reminder for the 
Philippine-Chinese of the fatherland’s existence. No matter how removed China is for 
students, the textbooks still attempt to fill them with admiration for the fatherland and 
create a sense of familiarity. As long as students study a textbook from China or Taiwan, 
it is inevitable that the book serves as a medium to direct students’ identity to the 
fatherland, rather than the country of residence. Therefore, the impact of Huaqiao 
Chineseness remains.   
Teachers sent by the fatherland are the incarnation of Huaqiao Chineseness. They are 
on a mission to confirm ties between the Philippine-Chinese and the fatherland that are 
beyond education.  
The task for the ‘Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteers Program’, which is sponsored 
by the Hanban, is to expand the presence of the PRC version of Huaqiao Chineseness 
and replace that of the ROC. Thus schools are forced into making ‘either/or’ choices 
between the ‘Teacher Volunteers’ from the PRC or the ‘Substitute Military Service 
Teachers’ from the ROC. As the sponsor that pays the salary for the Teacher Volunteers, 
the Hanban prohibits schools which apply for the former from simultaneously taking 
on the latter in order to exclude ROC influence from schools.  
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It is worth pointing out that in 2003 Chinese schools in the Philippines were the first in 
the world to receive ‘the Chinese Teacher Volunteer Program’. This reveals how much 
emphasis the PRC places on winning the symbolic support of Chinese schools as part 
of its grand strategy. In a concluding article for the achievement of the program written 
by Qihua Fan (2005), the Teacher Volunteers are likened to ‘Norman Bethune’, who 
was a Canadian physician and a world communist serving for the Chinese Communist 
Eighth Route Army (Ba Lu Jun) during the Second Sino-Japanese War. He mentions 
that the program can function to strengthen the connection between not only overseas 
Chinese and the fatherland, but also China and the Philippines (Fan, 2005: 74). In the 
end, Fan also warns that they have to be alert to the interference and destruction of 
‘separatist forces of Taiwan independence’ (Fan, 2005: 74). Fan’s article illustrates the 
tendency of PRC authorities to refer to ROC forces as part of the Taiwan independence 
movement, thereby attempting to delegitimise the presence of ROC authorities in the 
Philippine-Chinese community. It also reveals the political agenda of the Chinese 
Teacher Volunteer Program, that is, to combat ROC forces in Chinese schools.     
Of course, the ROC government program ‘Substitute Military Service Teachers’ comes 
with its own political agenda, one which seeks to counterbalance the influence of the 
Teacher Volunteers. I myself observed such tensions between the two Chinese 
governments while teaching in Manila in 2010. In the official reception for Taiwanese 
teachers held by the OCAC and Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, 
principals of the Chinese schools were requested by the Deputy Representative not to 
ask Taiwanese teachers to attend any PRC-sponsored political events, because these 
Substitute Military Service teachers are a ‘special kind of ROC soldiers’ (observation, 
Manila, 11/5/2010). The OCAC official also required Taiwanese teachers to write 
articles and publish these in Chinese newspapers to advertise how they, and the ROC 
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as a whole, are committed to Chinese schools that they served (observation, 
Manila,12/5/2010).  
Further, in a special case the OCAC even asked Taiwanese teachers to ‘spy’ on Chinese 
schools. A Taiwanese teacher was assigned by the OCAC to work as an administrative 
assistant for the ACFSP. At that time the director of the Filipino-Chinese Culture and 
Education Service Center suspected that the ACFSP had private contact with PRC 
authorities and was likely to turn out to be pro-mainland. At a mandatory monthly 
meeting for all Substitute Military Service Teachers I witnessed him giving the 
following order: 
You have to open your eyes and ears to note every single move of the ACFSP. 
And then you are required to attend the service center on a weekly basis and 
report everything to me. Remember, your boss is not the ACFSP, but the ROC 
(observation, Manila, 7/7, 2010). 
It was the first time that I realised that, despite the name of the ‘Substitute Military 
Service’, our work was still ‘military service’ in a sense. Although we only held chalk 
instead of weapon, we also served to defend our ‘claim’ to Huaqiao against the 
‘invasion’ of the Chinese community by the mainland China.    
Moreover, Taiwanese teachers were also strictly required to teach only the ROC version 
of Huaqiao Chineseness. In an executive meeting of the ACFSP that I attended during 
my re-visit to Manila in 2012, the director of the Filipino-Chinese Culture and 
Education Service Center told the principals that,  
Taiwanese teachers only teach traditional Chinese characters and Zhuyin. 
Although Hong Kong and Macau are ruled by the PRC, they still use traditional 
Chinese characters. It is not political ideology. It is because they (Taiwanese 
teachers) receive ROC salary, so they can only promote ‘our’ Chinese culture 
(observation, Manila, 25/7/2012).  
It shows the extraordinary degree of antagonism between the two governments in 
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overseas Chinese education affairs. As long as the Chinese schools take receiving 
textbooks and teachers from the fatherland for granted, the chance that ‘Philippine-
centred’ Chinese education will develop is slim. 
 
3.5.3 Teaching Mandarin as a National Language 
By and large, current Mandarin teaching resembles Huaqiao education of the Huaqiao 
period. To a certain degree, the Chinese schools still view Mandarin as a national 
language. I refer to the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching based on the 
pedagogy of Huaqiao education as ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’. As the 
Chinese school system is still dominated by China-oriented, former Chinese citizens in 
their sixties or seventies, they tend to believe that the best way to preserve students’ 
Chinese identity and to improve their Chinese-language ability is to teach Mandarin as 
if they were still Chinese citizens. Their younger colleagues and successors, reluctant 
to break with tradition, simply follow traditional teaching practices. It brings about an 
effect of path dependence whereby the development of Chinese schools is limited by 
the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching. In other words, the residual influence of 
Huaqiao Chineseness has extended to the post-Huaqiao period up to now.  
As mentioned earlier, previously in the Standardising National Language Movement, 
the ROC employed national language teaching to build cohesion among Chinese 
nationals across all the provinces of China as well as international overseas Chinese 
communities. In the 1950s and 1960s, the whole package of knowledge about Chinese 
language teaching, such as written language, language use, pronunciation, teaching 
methods, and textbooks edited by the National Institute for Compilation and Translation 
in Taiwan, had been deeply rooted in the Chinese schools and became the immutable 
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standard shared by all ROC citizens in Taiwan as well as the Philippine-Chinese. 
Nowadays, some old-generation Philippine-Chinese in charge of the Chinese schools 
perceive the younger generation’s assimilation into the Philippine mainstream and the 
deterioration of their Mandarin language ability as unbearable deviations. They believe 
that the preservation and restoration of the traditional teaching approach is the only way 
to rectify the deviation (Ang See, 1997). 
Due to the legacy of the ROC, language teaching in Chinese schools holds some 
features in common with national language education in Taiwan. While teaching in St. 
Joseph High School, I was surprised that the scene of Chinese class looked so similar 
to that in Taiwan; it reminded me of my tedious Chinese class in elementary school in 
the 1990s, during which teachers used supreme authority to discipline the class.  
As my elementary school teachers had done, the Chinese teachers in St. Joseph High 
School stood before a timeworn, gigantic blackboard that covered the entire wall, 
monotonously delivering lessons to more than forty students, who were strictly required 
to remain absolutely silent except when asked to answer questions or read texts. The 
traditional approach towards educational practice was exercised at all times. Seemingly 
the teachers assumed that students were all native Mandarin speakers who acquired the 
ability to speak the language in everyday life, and did not need to practice speaking 
skills in class; this was not the case. An administrator of St. Joseph High School, in her 
early sixties, recalled that in the elementary school she attended in 1960s the teacher 
usually gave lectures entirely in Mandarin, regardless of the students’ ability to 
understand. The administrator persevered in trying to understand what the teacher said, 
understanding a small amount, yet finding herself unable to speak or read a Chinese 
newspaper (conversation with Miss Chu, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 9/12/2010).  
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One of the main factors contributing to the fixation with teaching Mandarin as a 
national language is the use of textbooks. For example, while I was in residence, the 
textbook adopted by the elementary school in St. Joseph High School was ‘the 
Philippine Edition of Chinese Reader’ provided by the OCAC in Taiwan, edited in 1997 
and reprinted in 2010. Despite the lower depth in terms of content compared to the 
counterpart in Taiwan, the form and structure of the textbooks are remarkably alike. 
The textbook consists of texts written vertically, new words listed at the bottom of pages, 
traditional Chinese characters, national phonetic alphabet, sentence-making practice 
and questions with workbooks, all following patterns in Taiwan and differing from 
those in the mainland China. This is not surprising given that the editors of the 
Philippine Edition of Chinese Reader, including the chief planner Xuntian Ke, the chief 
editor Bingyao Yen, the contributors Zuoqin Ke, Xizen Zhang and Sonpei Lin are all 
prominent experts in the area of national language teaching in Taiwan. They clearly 
followed the same formula of national language teaching in Taiwan to edit the textbooks 
for students in the Philippines. 
Accordingly, the textbook focuses on literacy skills, such as reading and writing 
abilities, instead of communication skills, like listening and speaking. There is no 
section in this particular textbook and associated workbooks for practicing listening and 
speaking skills. The examinations also followed the pattern of textbook and workbooks, 
asking questions about reading comprehension, close text, memorisation of specified 
texts, and pinyin and explanation of words. Listening and speaking tests accounted for 
only a negligible amount of the total grade, and was therefore naturally ignored by 
students, teachers, and parents.  
In fact, as I observed during my teaching, Chinese language education in Chinese 
schools is remarkably ‘exam-oriented’. The exam result determines the students’ 
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ranking and honour in the entire semester, something greatly valued by most students 
and their parents. Thus, many teachers and students’ tutors would rather devote time to 
enhancing grades by pushing students to memorise the content in textbooks than teach 
them listening and speaking skills. As a result, the grade that students receive in the 
report card hardly represents their true language ability. As an elementary Chinese 
teacher, the head brought pressure to bear on me if my class did not get good grades. 
When preparing lessons, I felt my primary purpose was helping students answer exam 
questions, instead of enhancing their Mandarin proficiency. 
Chinese schools also see the literacy of classical Chinese (Wenyen), a traditional style 
of written Chinese, as one of the key competences of being Chinese. At high school 
stage, St. Joseph High School places more emphasis on the learning of classical Chinese: 
accounting for twenty-two of eighty-four lessons, it includes two lessons of the ancient 
poem, twelve lessons of Tang Poetry, two lessons of Song Poetry, two lessons of Yuan 
Poetry, and four lessons of ancient literature. All classical Chinese texts selected from 
textbooks have to be memorised.  
However, former ROC citizens do not regard the teaching of Mandarin as a national 
language as problematic, but rather as necessary to preserve Chinese identity. Some 
teachers, administrators, and alumni who are influential in St. Joseph High School still 
believe that these teaching methods and materials are the most instructively beneficial 
for students. For example, Miss Zeng – an experienced, senior teacher who herself was 
an overseas Chinese student (僑生) studying in a Taiwanese university – expressed her 
dissatisfaction with the attempt to reform the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching:  
The reason that the past students can learn Mandarin well is that they behaved 
themselves more appropriately than those at the present. And Chinese education 
in the past was regulated by Taiwan government. It was authentic Taiwanese 
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education. Taiwanese education is the best. It adopted traditional teaching 
methods. But nowadays they have shifted the focus to ‘innovative’ teaching 
(conversation with Miss Zeng, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 24/9/2010). 
During my residence, a new Taiwanese textbook ‘the Living Mandarin (Shenhuo 
Huayu)’, comprised of hummable Chinese verses and dialogue, was introduced. The 
textbook emphasises learning basic listening and speaking skills instead of literacy. 
Even though the principal preferred promoting this new textbook in St. Joseph High 
School, the head of the Chinese department said, ‘I do not want to adopt it in high 
school, because it lacks profound content’ (conversation with Miss Lim, St. Joseph 
High School, Manila, 19/88/2010). An alumnus told me,  
this textbook is way too easy for students to effectively learn Mandarin. If they 
really want to acquire Mandarin proficiency, they should only adopt the 
textbook that Taiwanese students are using (conversation with Mr. Ku, St. 
Joseph High School, Manila, 6/8/2010).  
He also suggested:  
Students should learn Chinese history, but a lot of teaching materials in 
textbooks about Chinese history have been erased. Now they are learning 
Mandarin as a second language, but these materials are sterile. They can’t learn 
anything about Chinese culture by it (conversation with Mr. Ku, St. Joseph High 
School, Manila, 6/8/2010).  
These teachers and alumni tended to believe that the decline of Chinese education is 
because teaching Mandarin as a national language has not been fully realised; they did 
not consider that the teaching style, the applied pedagogy, might itself be the problem. 
The mode of teaching Mandarin as a national language may have made sense in the 
context of Huaqiao citizenship, but it emerges as outdated and inappropriate for Chinese 
students as Filipino citizens. Yet, because those who dominate Chinese schools are 
accustomed to teaching Mandarin as a national language, fundamental change  
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remains unlikely.  
To sum up, the ‘underground Huaqiao education’ that considers Philippine-Chinese as 
Huaqiao contributes to the following outcomes. First, the overseas Chinese policies 
whereby both China and Taiwan treat the Philippine-Chinese as ‘quasi-citizens’ creates 
an illusion for them that they have a fatherland government to depend on in terms of 
building a Chinese school system. It inevitably invests the Chinese education with a 
touch of Huaqiao citizenship, thus confusing students about their citizenship status. 
Second, by the same token, as the fatherland provides textbooks and teachers, it 
determines what and whom to teach. The teaching content of Chinese education is thus 
controlled by China or Taiwan – which are, in fact, foreign countries to the students – 
rather than the Philippines, from which the students acquire citizenship. As a result, 
both governments hardly take the national identity and citizenship status of the students 
into account, but continue inculcating Huaqiao Chineseness, while editing textbooks 
and sending teachers. 
Third, ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’ is, in fact, a projection of the former 
Chinese citizens’ Huaqiao identity onto the younger generation. The teaching approach 
which teaches students as genuine Huaqiao overlooks the fact that the students have 
learned Mandarin as a second, even a foreign, language, neglecting their cognitive 
ability and the linguistic context of the Philippines. In terms of teaching methodology, 
the ‘second-language teaching method’ is fit for the Philippine-Chinese students. 
Notwithstanding, there exist some irrational factors in the decision-making around 
language teaching due to the old generation’s national sentiments.  
Preserving the imagination of being a Chinese citizen through being treated as a 
Huaqiao, receiving textbooks and teachers from the fatherland, and teaching Mandarin 
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as a national language, however, come at the cost of effective teaching in Chinese 
education.   
 
3.6 Chinese Education as Undesirable Citizenship Education 
As the last section put it, current Chinese education appears to be an ‘underground 
Huaqiao education’ to preserve a special citizenship-like relationship between the 
Chinese and the fatherland. To a degree, Chinese education looks like a ‘citizenship 
education’ to foster a sense of identification with, and loyalty to, the fatherland. In 
reality, the ‘education for Huaqiao citizenship’ produces only negligible effects. 
Indeed, despite almost four decades’ effort to instil Huaqiao Chineseness in the post-
Huaqiao period, students are well aware of their Filipino citizenship and Filipino 
national identity. A survey of 2,021 Philippine-Chinese high school students’ identity 
by Zhang Shi-fang and Lu Fei-bin (2009) shows that 97.3% of the students are Filipino 
citizens and feel strongly about it, and only 2.7% are Chinese citizens. 61.6% of them 
feel obligated to serve the Philippines, 14.6% do not feel obligated to serve the 
Philippines, and 23.8% think it doesn’t matter. From the survey it is apparent that the 
Chinese students’ identity strongly remains Filipino. It seems in vain to direct their 
political identity to the fatherland through providing textbooks and teachers from the 
fatherland. 
Why has the result deviated so significantly from the expectations of the old-generation 
Chinese and both governments? I suggest the major cause is that ‘education for Huaqiao 
citizenship’ contradicts the students’ Filipino citizenship status and national identity.   
Indeed, there exists a generational gap between the old generation, who are eager to 
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develop the education for Huaqiao citizenship, and the younger generation, who are 
thoroughly Filipino citizens. As Ang See (1997) suggests, while the former tends to be 
China-oriented, the latter is quite Philippine-oriented. From the perspective of the 
former, from which party a Chinese school receives textbooks and teachers may 
demonstrate its political commitment to either China or Taiwan. From the perspective 
of the latter, however, the issue between China and Taiwan is beyond their knowledge 
and interests. As a result, the whole package of pedagogy, including textbooks, teacher 
supplies, and teaching methods, appears inappropriate to the students.   
In terms of textbook content, my fieldwork suggests that the nationalistic agendas 
within it are not only incomprehensible to the students, but also insignificant in learning 
Chinese. According to my interviews with 21 graduates of the Chinese schools, 15 of 
them were aware of the fact that the textbooks come from China or Taiwan. When I 
asked whether they know why China and Taiwan provide the textbooks, all of them 
were confused by the question and stayed silent. They could easily tell the difference 
between the traditional and simplified Chinese characters, and between the Zhuyin and 
Pinyin systems, because most Chinese schools teach both characters and systems. They 
also had their personal preferences for the traditional or simplified Chinese characters, 
and for the Zhuyin or Pinyin systems. Yet when I interviewed them it was awkward to 
broach the subject of the agenda behind the educational aids. The reason that they study 
the textbook from China or Taiwan is because it is adopted by the school that they go 
to, and teachers require them to study it hard, and they want to achieve good grades. 
Chinese politics is not their concern at all. Therefore, contrary to the expectation of the 
old-generation Chinese as well as both governments, the nationalistic agendas are 
hardly delivered to the students.  
Further, both the pedagogy and textbooks adopted seem to make it difficult for them to 
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learn Chinese. Lacking knowledge of and interest in China, students find no direct 
connection to the textbook content. It is largely irrelevant for students to refer to the 
place names of China or Taiwan and the greatness of the Chinese nation. While those 
who have Huaqiao identity consider textbook contents based on Huaqiao Chineseness 
to offer a connection to the fatherland, students who identify as Filipino might view it 
merely as material to memorise to pass exams. Whether the lesson is about the Yangtze 
River or Yangmingshan National Park, students consider it merely a place name of a 
foreign country. Along the same lines, given that the issue of China’s sovereignty is 
complicated and far removed from the local context, it appears as a foreign affair to 
them. As the educationalist Dee Fink puts it, a significant learning experience is one 
‘resulting in something that is truly significant in terms of the students’ lives’ (Fink, 
2003: 6). In the absence of a real connection to the students’ lives, textbook content 
based on Huaqiao Chineseness is unlikely to lead to this kind of experience.    
In terms of teacher supply, both the Teacher Volunteers and the Substitute Military 
Service teachers (who are in fact foreigners to students but have to act as compatriots), 
also confront enormous teaching difficulties. Looking back on my personal teaching 
experience in the Philippines, teaching difficulties such as language usage, cultural 
difference, and life adjustment all resulted from a simple fact: that I and my students 
were foreign to each other.  
Lacking common language and local knowledge, the biggest problem teachers from 
China and Taiwan share is poor class management. During my year of teaching, myself 
and fellow Taiwanese teachers often complained in our private gatherings about 
disorder in the classroom. Frustrated by my own poor classroom management, I 
requested some experienced teachers to let me observe their teaching. Miss Zeng, for 
example, who was described as a master of classroom management was quite ‘heavy-
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handed’ in class: all students were forced to follow her order and keep silent 
(observation, Manila, 22/10/2013). In my observations, I found that as a result of their 
knowledge of student culture and language use, the old-generation Philippine-Chinese 
teachers naturally have the authority and communication skills to teach students in an 
orderly manner. give teaching order to students. Yet it is a great challenge to a teacher 
from China and Taiwan. Philippine-Chinese students are accustomed to speaking with 
each other mostly in Tagalog and English; some are able to speak Hokkien. The teachers 
from China and Taiwan, however, hardly master these common languages of the 
students. Moreover, due to the insistence on ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’, 
the schools in general tend to require teachers from China and Taiwan to adopt a 
‘Mandarin only’ policy in class. There is therefore a common scene in classrooms: 
teachers give a one-man show in Mandarin on the platform, and students either appear 
indifferent to the teaching or mess around with classmates in Tagalog.  
Teacher Volunteers from the PRC faced similar difficulties. A Teacher Volunteer at the 
Hope Christian High School, Miss Huang, also pointed out that ‘it is difficult to keep 
order in her class’ (Interview with Miss Huang, Manila, 13/11/2013). An investigation 
on cross-cultural adaption of Teacher Volunteers to the Philippines from 2009 to 2012 
indicates which factors are the major causes of problems in teaching (Wang, 2014). 
58.33% of the teachers had problems in lack of teaching ability, 48.33% in 
maladaptation for the local education system, 45% in lack of educational resources, 
43.33% in poor classroom order, 36.67% in lack of local knowledge, and 20.15% in 
language barriers (Wang, 2014: 25).  
A member of the FFCCCII in charge of education affairs frankly commented on the 
teaching effectiveness of the ‘Teacher Volunteers Program’ as follows: 
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What is the outcome after the Teacher Volunteers come here? Everybody is clear 
in mind. You must know what does ‘chicken ribs14’ (雞肋) mean. The program is 
like in vegetable state. Do you still want to maintain it? (observation, the FFCCCII, 
Manila, 10/10/2013)  
The teaching effectiveness of the Substitute Military Service teachers is likewise 
limited. Taiwanese teachers share a feeling of frustration. In my class in St. Joseph High 
School, if I did not fiercely demand that students sit quietly and listen to me, they were 
often unwilling to pay attention, instead walking around and talking; on occasion these 
disturbances meant my classes could not proceed smoothly. In conjunction with 
students’ ‘learned helplessness’ 15 , almost all my fellow Taiwanese teachers felt 
hopeless and frustrated while teaching Mandarin.  
 
In general, the considerable investment in teacher supply by China and Taiwan cannot 
match limited learning effectiveness in the students. The expectation of both 
governments and the old-generation Chinese that a Mandarin native speaker could 
automatically provide the Philippine-Chinese students proper Mandarin teaching has 
proven overly optimistic. This is because they tend to deny the fact that teachers from 
China and Taiwan and the Philippine-Chinese students are different not only in terms 
of language usage, but also citizenship status and national identity. It is unlikely for a 
teacher, who comes from another country, knows not much students’ language, lack 
knowledge about local culture, and receives no training for teaching Philippine-Chinese 
students, to properly conduct Mandarin teaching in Chinese schools. 
Finally, the pedagogy of teaching Mandarin as a national language has a devastating 
                                                     
14 ‘Chicken ribs’(ji-le) is a classic Chinese slang referring to something of dubious worth that one is 
reluctant to give up.   
15 Learned helplessness is when people feel helpless to avoid negative situations because previous 
experience has shown them that they do not have control. 
121 
 
effect on teaching effectiveness. Foe a language to be a national language it must meet 
several conditions: a certain number of people using it as their mother tongue, 
institutional supports to ensure its official status, and a proper language environment in 
which to naturally acquire the ability to speak it. Mandarin in the Philippines does not 
meet these favourable conditions at all. Without these conditions in the local context, 
teaching Mandarin as a national language cannot work in the Philippine-Chinese 
schools.   
The traditional approach to teaching does not allow students to talk without the 
teacher’s permission, hence it is unlikely for students to be able to practice speaking 
skills in class. It is feasible in Taiwan because Mandarin is the national language most 
commonly used within and without classrooms; while students therefore do not have to 
practice speaking skills in class, they acquire speaking ability anyway. However, if 
asked to be silent in class, students have no chance to speak Mandarin outside classroom 
at all. Hence, the adoption of the approach is at the expense of students’ practical 
communication skills. An officer of FFCCCII in his fifties referred to Chinese education 
in Chinese schools as ‘dumb Mandarin’ (Yaba Zhongwen) which requires students to 
remain silent (interview with Mr. Li, the FFCCCII, Manila, 26/7/2012). Unable to 
practice speaking in class, students can by no means acquire Mandarin speaking ability. 
The abovementioned survey conducted by Zhang and Lu (2009) corroborates these 
observations. In their survey, 63.4% of student respondents stated that they felt diffident 
about their Mandarin ability16.  
 
                                                     
16 When asked the question ‘how would you rate your Chinese-language ability’? 27.9% of the 
respondents answered ‘very bad’, 35.5% answered ‘bad’, 22.3% ‘so-so’, and 14.3 ‘good’ (Zhang Shi-
fang and Lu Fei-bin, 2009). 
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The poor level of Mandarin speaking might be due to the lack of motivation among 
students, partly because of the traditional approach of Mandarin learning which greatly 
relies on memorisation. When I asked some students at St. Joseph High School 
personally about the reason why they did not like to learn Mandarin, almost all of them 
cited distaste for the rote memorisation of texts.  
 
When I taught in St. Joseph High School, students’ poor academic performance in 
Mandarin even needed to be covered up by a ‘floor price’ system under which the 
students were given forty points in a one hundred point exam even before they answered 
a single question, in case the marks looked too awful. The floor price system is, in fact, 
a common practice in a number of Chinese schools (Wang, 1997): This shows not only 
how reluctant students are to learn Mandarin and memorise for preparing exams, but 
also how reluctant Chinese schools are to face unpleasant truths about the decline of 
Chinese education.  
Despite all the efforts of the Chinese and Taiwanese governments to revive Huaqiao 
Chineseness in Chinese schools through Mandarin teaching, according to students’ 
academic performance in Mandarin learning as well as their real Mandarin ability, 
teaching has proven ineffective. The younger generations are able to learn neither 
Huaqiao identity nor Mandarin practical skills because of an outdated traditional 
pedagogy geared towards teaching Mandarin as a national language and because of the 
teacher and textbook supplies that correspond with this view.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The notion of ‘Huaqiao’ presumes an eternal centripetal force toward the fatherland. 
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Huaqiao education is expected to uninterruptedly bring the younger generations 
towards it. In Mandarin teaching in the Chinese schools, Huaqiao education is 
persevered with regardless of real citizenship status. Yet it is doubtful if Chinese 
students can really feel the sense of being Huaqiao.   
It was the passion for the fatherland that gave rise to the whole Chinese school system 
in the Philippines. The keystone allowing Chinese schools to uninterruptedly conduct 
Huaqiao education is also the importing of educational aids from the fatherland. 
Therefore, it is the fatherland, rather than Philippine-Chinese themselves, that 
determines the content of education for students. 
Notwithstanding, given that the Chinese ceased being Huaqiao after the 1970s, Huaqiao 
Chineseness now has the opposite effect on the effectiveness of Mandarin teaching. The 
strong attachment to the fatherland that motivated the Philippine-Chinese to learn 
Mandarin in the past, paradoxically, at present makes students resistant to it.   
In and of itself, educational aid is constructive in terms of language learning. However, 
educational aid, with Huaqiao Chineseness, can distort the essence of language learning, 
that is, enabling learners to speak it. Textbooks contain some ‘fatherland-related’ 
contents entirely irrelevant to students’ life experience. Teachers from the ‘fatherland’ 
lack the experience and communication skills to teach ‘foreigners’. Teaching methods 
do not aspire to effectiveness, but rather continuity with teaching in the fatherland. In 
fact, all these teaching practices block students from learning practical Mandarin skills 
or generating an interest in Chinese culture. 
All in all, the chapter answers the question of why Philippine-Chinese students are 
reluctant to learn Mandarin in an age reportedly experiencing ‘Mandarin fever’.  The 
answer is that the current Huaqiao education as practised in the Chinese schools still 
124 
 
pursues the idea not only of one nation, one people, and one language, but also one 
pedagogy. Yet it is a mismatch to adopt the pedagogy of Huaqiao education for non-
Huaqiao people. The next chapter discusses how a group of people have committed 
themselves to remedying the situation by proposing another version of Chineseness. 
Their efforts, however, have been still impeded by Huaqiao Chineseness.     
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Chapter 4 
Huaren Chineseness, Huaren Education, and Its Predicament 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 may have given the impression that Huaqiao Chineseness dominates in 
Chinese schools; this is not the case. Despite substantial educational aids from China 
and Taiwan, as well as the old generation’s dedication, the foundation of Huaqiao 
Chineseness has been challenged by two sources. A significant amount of scholarship 
by those of Chinese overseas background casts doubt on the one single standard of 
Chineseness authorised by the Chinese nation-state. This standard, critics assert, 
negates the multiple life experiences of overseas Chinese people within the context of 
their respective countries of residence (Chun, 1995; Ang, 1998; Chow, 1998). But more 
importantly, the changing identity of the Philippine-Chinese younger generation makes 
Huaqiao Chineseness increasingly irrelevant. This chapter therefore addresses an 
alternative form of Chineseness in the Philippines: ‘Huaren Chineseness’. 
In contrast to ‘Huaqiao’, which implies a close and enduring attachment to the 
fatherland, ‘Huaren’ as an identification simply refers to ‘foreign nationals of Chinese 
descent’. To become Huaren is to pursue a localised meaning of being Chinese without 
the outside interference of Chinese nationalism. It aims to seek a balance between being 
Chinese as an ethnic minority and being a citizen of one’s country of residence. In the 
context of the Philippines, Huaren Chineseness is represented by a new identification, 
‘Chinese-Filipino’, ‘Feilubin Huaren’ (菲律賓華人 ) in Chinese, or, in Tagalog, 
‘Tsinoy’, which is a portmanteau of ‘Tsino’ (meaning ‘Chinese’) and ‘Pinoy’ (the slang 
word for Filipino).  
Below, I present a table to illustrate these two ideal types of Chineseness in 
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contradiction to each other. 
 Huaqiao Chineseness Huaren Chineseness 
Outlook Chinese outlook Filipino outlook 
Identity Huaqiao identity Chinese-Filipino identity  
Citizenship 
supported 
Huaqiao citizenship Filipino citizenship 
Positioning Huaqiao education Huaren education 
Teaching 
Objectives 
To form attachment to China: 
facilitating contributions to the 
transnational mobilisation system 
To make Philippine citizens with 
Chinese characteristics 
Pedagogy Teaching Mandarin as a national 
language; teacher-centred 
Teaching Mandarin as a second 
language; student-centred 
Table 4 The Comparison between Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness 
Huaqiao Chineseness is Chinese in outlook, in that it used to focus on Huaqiao identity 
in accordance with Huaqiao citizenship. By contrast, Huaren Chineseness is Filipino in 
outlook, in that it has arisen in response to the younger generation’s rapid shift in 
identity (from being Huaqiao to being Chinese-Filipino) and in citizenship, from 
Chinese to Filipino citizenship. Significantly, despite differences in orientation between 
Chinese-centredness and Philippine-centredness, both versions of Chineseness regard 
Mandarin learning as the core of Chinese identity and as the common ground among 
Philippine-Chinese. Accordingly, Chinese education can also be classified into two 
types according to positioning, teaching objectives, and pedagogy. ‘Huaqiao education’ 
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based on Huaqiao Chineseness adopts ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’ to 
make learners genuine Huaqiao. ‘Huaren education’ is tailor-made for the younger 
generation, whose (presumably poor) Chinese ability can only be recovered by means 
of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language17’. Each projection has its corresponding 
aims of teaching and specific teaching methods, representing differing understandings 
of how to shape future Chineseness for the younger generation.  
How did Huaren Chineseness emerge in the Philippines? How does Huaren 
Chineseness affect the trajectory of the Chinese school system? How is Huaren 
Chineseness realised in Mandarin teaching? How do the administrators and teachers of 
the Chinese schools respond to the call for reform in accordance with Huaren 
Chineseness? How do Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness clash with one other, and how 
do these clashes affect the future of Chinese education in the Philippines?    
In this chapter, I seek to answer these questions by focusing on the discussion of Huaren 
Chineseness and Huaren education. I argue that the debate over what teaching methods 
should be employed in Chinese schools in this context is not just a neutral, technical 
issue, but has been highly politicised and is relevant to the contradiction between 
Chinese and Filipino outlooks. First, I look into the context in which Huaren 
Chineseness emerged in the first place. Second, I show how Huaren Chineseness is 
embodied in the education reform of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’. Finally, 
I demonstrate the fierce resistance that the proposal for Huaren education has 
encountered from the old generation as well as both Chinese governments.  
For clarifying the conception of Huaren Chineseness, I mainly interviewed some 
scholars, leaders of the Chinese community who support the idea of integration into the 
                                                     
17 A person’s second language is a language that is not the native (first) language of the speaker. 
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mainstream, and elaborate their ideas to construct the discourse of Huaren Chineseness. 
The analysis of Huaren education focuses on the educational practices of the PCERC. 
I interview some educationalists from the PCERC and participate their teaching 
activities to understand their practices. I also evaluate the outcome of these practices by 
interviewing the participants.   
  
 
4.2 Huaren Chineseness and Huaren Education 
The emergence of Huaren Chineseness is a result of the spontaneous development of 
the Chinese community alongside mass naturalisation. For one thing, as the Chinese 
have increasingly realised that the Philippines represents their only homeland (See, 
1997), Huaqiao Chineseness that serves to direct their allegiance to China appears 
outdated and becomes an obstacle to integration into mainstream society. For another, 
Huaqiao education, embodied by teaching Mandarin as a national language, has reached 
a dead-end as Chinese education has been deteriorating. Huaren Chineseness is thus a 
proposal that some Philippine-Chinese take into account and consider as a solution to 
both issues, as I discuss in the following.  
 
4.2.1 Emergence of Huaren Chineseness in Chinese Community 
To facilitate the community-wide trend of integration, and to prevent Chinese education 
from deterioration, some Philippine-Chinese advocate transforming Chineseness from 
Huaqiao to Huaren. I therefore refer to the proposal to shift to a Filipino outlook while 
preserving an innovative, localised Chinese identity as the building of ‘Huaren 
Chineseness’.  
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the ambivalent citizenship status of the Chinese led to a 
proposal of integration by some Philippine-born Chinese. Using the case of the 
Yuyitung brothers, chapter 3 has already shown how the Chinese government was able 
to override the brothers’ own decision-making on the issue of citizenship. This same 
case presents some valuable insights in respect of the attempted building of Huaren 
Chineseness. Due to the uncertain situation whereby Filipino citizenship was 
inaccessible and Chinese citizenship from the ROC in Taiwan was unable to provide 
security, Rizal Yuyitung suggested as early as the late 1960s that Chinese in the 
Philippines transferring loyalty to the Philippines (Yuyitung, 1996; Yuyitung, 2000). 
Growing up in the Philippines with a natural emotional attachment to the land, Rizal 
indicated that the Chinese could be a valuable asset to the Philippines, and should be 
involved in making contributions to the state. Integration would not only reduce friction 
between the Philippines, the ROC, and the PRC, but also allay the suspicion that 
Chinese were ‘the fifth column’ of the Chinese Communist Party (Yuyitung, 1996: 330). 
To serve the best interests of the Chinese, Rizal urged that their struggle towards equal 
citizenship extended to the Chinese via political integration (Hau, 2014: 93). Rather 
than assimilation through a passive and coerced process, integration for the Chinese, in 
Rizal’s viewpoint, would involve their active study of the Philippine language, culture, 
and history while retaining their own language and culture; integration would instil 
‘new blood’ and ‘new cells’ into Philippine society leading to its constant cultural 
innovation (Yuyitung, 2000).   
However, in the view of many of the old generation, integration presented a challenge 
to the foundation of Huaqiao Chineseness as a whole and its hegemony over the 
Chinese community and Chinese schools. Therefore, the proposal provoked fierce 
criticism. Rizal was sharply criticised for omitting his ancestors (Shudian wangzu) and 
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for being ‘a traitor to China’ (Hanjian) (Yuyitung, 1996: 330). The proposal for 
integration especially undermined the authority over the Chinese community of the 
ROC government in Taiwan. As previous chapters have shown, during the Cold War, 
the legitimacy of the ROC as the sole representative of China rested upon its ideological 
rule over overseas Chinese throughout the world. As Philippine-Chinese were the most 
committed and faithful supporters of the ROC among other overseas Chinese 
communities, the integration of the Chinese would mean a loosening of the ties with 
the ROC, and the alteration of the ROC’s version of Chineseness. As Huaqiao 
Chineseness in Chinese schools and in the Chinese community as a whole developed 
mainly on the basis of the ROC version of Chineseness, in the eyes of the old generation, 
the changes of integration could shake the foundations of the whole community. 
Integration could be, therefore, a threat to the interests of the old generation and of the 
ROC government.  
In additional to Rizal Yuyitung’s advocacy in the media, a civil society organisation, 
Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran (Unity for Progress), established in the mid-1980s by a group 
of middle-class, well-educated Philippine-Chinese of the second or third generation, 
was active in bridging the gap between the Philippine-Chinese and the mainstream, 
seeking, in doing so, to coexist with mutual understanding in the Philippines. Although 
they had possessed legal Filipino citizenship status since the 1970s, Philippine-Chinese 
were not fully accepted by the mainstream as part of their people. On the other hand, 
moreover, some Philippine-Chinese were reluctant to identify with the Philippines. 
Aware of this identity confusion (especially among the younger generation), Kaisa 
began to promote a new identity indicating a cultural middle-ground, ‘Chinese-
Filipino’, which refers to ‘the young, mostly native-born ethnic Chinese who identify 
themselves as Filipinos first, but still maintain their Chinese cultural identity’ (Kaisa, 
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as cited in Hau, 2014). In Wickberg’s description, Kaisa was committed to the ‘revival 
of Chinese culture with full integration of Chinese into the larger society as Filipinos 
of Chinese heritage’ (Wickberg, 1992: 55). Its credo is as follows:  
The Philippines is our country. It is the land of our birth, the home of our people. 
Our blood may be Chinese, but our roots grow deep in Philippine soil, our bonds 
are with the Filipino people. We are proud of the many cultures which have 
made us what we are, it is our desire, our hope and aspiration, that with the rest 
of our people, we shall find our rightful place in the Philippine sun (Kaisa). 
Inspired by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, Kaisa has actively participated in 
civil society activities, such as writing articles to produce discourses concerning 
Chinese-Filipino identity; conducting research on the China-Philippine relationship and 
the role of Chinese, and of policies surrounding it, in identity; building the Kaisa 
Heritage Center to document and display the historical and cultural legacy of the 
Chinese in all aspects of Philippine life; publishing periodicals to enhance mutual 
understanding between Chinese Filipinos and the mainstream; holding conferences on 
Chinese-related issues; organising charity events to show the generosity of Chinese 
Filipinos; and speaking out on behalf of the Chinese community to protect their rights. 
All these practices aim not only towards the claiming of citizenship rights as Philippine 
citizens, but also towards shaping a Chinese-Filipino version of Chineseness.  
Kaisa’s struggles in advocating integration have greatly enhanced the protection of 
Chinese citizenship rights. However, while Kaisa succeeded in cementing the 
relationship with the mainstream, it has failed to influence the conservative Chinese 
community leadership due to the latter’s disinterest in integration. Therefore, it has 
hardly had any impact on Chinese schools which are, on an institutional level, the most 
effective and influential producers and transmitters of Huaqiao Chineseness for the 
younger generation. When it comes to turning the old Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese 
schools into a new ‘Chinese-Filipino’ identity, one that is feasible and teachable in 
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Chinese school, it is unlikely that Kaisa will devise a practical scheme: most of its 
members are businessmen and professionals without a professional background in 
education or profound Chinese cultural knowledge. One of the founders of Kaisa, 
Teresita Ang See, suggests that ‘Hokkien Chinese’ – the lingua franca of the Philippine-
Chinese community, brought from Fujian Province in South China – should replace 
Mandarin Chinese as the language taught in schools (Ang See, 1997: 100). Ang See 
and her colleagues in Kaisa even attempted to create a new Chineseness, based on 
Hokkien Chinese, by producing a weekly children’s television show called ‘Pin-Pin’ 
which used Tagalog to teach Hokkien Chinese. (Due to costs, however, the show had 
to go off-the-air.)  
In absence of the support of the entire Chinese community, Kaisa’s efforts seem to have 
been ineffective. Kaisa’s greatest achievement seems to be the promotion of Chinese-
Filipino identity. When I asked my students how they identify, presenting them with 
three options (Chinese, Filipino, or Chinese-Filipino), most of them chose ‘Chinese-
Filipino’. Through the natural and spontaneous process of integration, the younger 
generation has gradually accepted the new identity. However, the ‘Chinese part’ of their 
Chinese-Filipino identity remains under the influence of Huaqiao Chineseness in 
Chinese schools, resulting in the disparity between the educational content in Chinese 
schools and the students’ Chinese-Filipino identity outside of it. 
 
4.2.2 Huaren Education and Teaching Mandarin as a Second Language 
Huaren education has emerged as a reform movement with the goal of preventing the 
decline of Chinese education. Although it is a commonly held belief that the decline of 
Chinese education is a consequence of the Filipinization of Chinese schools, in fact 
even before the 1970s a number of Philippine-Chinese educationalists had noted the 
133 
 
gradual loss of Chinese-language ability among the younger generations (See, 1997). 
From 1949 on, during the period of interrupted contact between mainland China and 
the Philippine-Chinese, a lack of first-hand experience led the post-war generation to 
find Mandarin-learning increasingly irrelevant to the reality of their local environment 
(See, 1997: 99). From this point of view, maintaining younger generations’ Chinese-
language ability seems unrealistic due to their tendency to integrate regardless of the 
enforcement of the Filipinization policy.  
Huaren education has been seen by some educationalists as the right direction to take 
to rectify the misdirected efforts of Huaqiao education. The Philippine Chinese 
Education Research Center (PCERC) is an institute committed to producing a new 
teachable Chineseness to replace Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools. The PCERC 
is mainly staffed and sponsored by the teachers and administrators of Philippine 
Cultural College (PCC), which is seen as a left-leaning Chinese school, and is 
sponsored by its alumni. The close and special relationship between the PCREC and 
PCC creates the impression that the former is owned by the latter, yet the PCERC firmly 
denies this.  
Concerned for the decline of Chinese education, a group of people who either taught in 
or graduated from PCC have, since the late 1980s, begun to seek a new pedagogy of 
Chinese education. Dissenting by nature from the ROC version of Chineseness in 
Chinese schools, they looked for an answer to another source of Chineseness, mainland 
China. After consulting a well-known expert of Chinese-language education, Bisong 
Lu (one of the founders of the International Society for Chinese Language Teaching in 
Beijing), they decided to initiate education reform in accordance with the model of 
‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’ (TMSL). They established the PCERC in 
1991, subsequently inviting Lu to the Philippines for three weeks to give nine speeches 
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about the theory and practice of teaching Mandarin as a second language.  
Under Lu’s advice, the PCERC firstly gave priority to the repositioning of Chinese 
education. They divided the development of Chinese education in the Philippines into 
two stages. Before Filipinization, given the fact that the Chinese school was an 
extension of the education system of China, Huaqiao education had naturally adopted 
‘teaching Mandarin as a first language’; after Filipinization, Huaren education might 
focus on language teaching by means of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’ 
(Huang, 2012; Shen, 2011). While Huaqiao education aims to foster Chinese citizens 
living abroad, Huaren education is committed to nurturing Philippine citizens with 
Chinese characteristics. Doubtless the PCERC considers Huaren education more 
suitable for Philippine-Chinese students as they have become Filipinos in terms of 
language ability, identity, and citizenship in general.  
The proposal for Huaren education by means of TMSL poses enormous challenges not 
only to the teaching method, but also to the foundation of the existing Chinese education 
system. It calls for changes as follows.  
First, it changes the aim of education in Chinese schools. As shown in chapter 3, the 
aim of Huaqiao education is entangled with nationalistic sentiment and cultural pride 
that are intended to instil in students a sense of Chinese nationality. Thus Huaqiao 
education stresses the inculcation of Chinese cultural knowledge and traditional values, 
taking Chinese education as a cultural and moral education (Shen, 2011: 41). By 
contrast, Huaren education sees Chinese education simply as a language education. It 
upholds a pragmatism that stresses the importance of communication skills. 
Presupposing that the younger generation are beginners of Mandarin at first, Huaren 
education aims at teaching basic language skills (Lu, 1992: 35). Lu (1992) also points 
out that Chinese education is to teach Chinese language: while cultural knowledge is 
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necessary for correctly understanding a language, the priority is still communication 
skills (Lu, 1992: 66). In other words, supporters of Huaren education aim to enable 
students to speak Mandarin, and this is believed to be the raison d’être of the Chinese 
schools.  
Second, Huaren education rebelliously redefines the status of Mandarin as the second 
language – rather than the first or national language – of the Chinese community. As 
chapter 3 indicates, national language (that is, Mandarin) education played a central 
role in spreading overseas Chinese nationalism. Therefore, Mandarin, in the perspective 
of supporters of Huaqiao education, reaches a position of unchallengeable supremacy. 
Despite the fact that Mandarin is by no means the first or national language of the 
Chinese community in general, this move has received fierce criticism. Supporters of 
Huaqiao education refute the idea of Mandarin as the second language on the grounds 
that this implies it is ‘second-class’, and its supremacy is therefore challenged (Shen, 
2011: 40); they also equate teaching Mandarin as a ‘second language’ with teaching 
Mandarin as a ‘foreign language’. Mandarin as a foreign language and teaching 
Philippine-Chinese students as if they are foreigners to China are, for sentimental 
reasons, entirely unacceptable. The members of the PCERC, however, take an 
educational and technical position on the second language, rather than a political one. 
Mandarin is a second language because most Philippine-Chinese youths learn it once 
their first language – Tagalog, English, or Hokkien Chinese – is established.  
‘Second-language acquisition’ (SLA) refers to the process through which a person 
learns a second language. The process of SLA is very different from that of first-
language acquisition (FLA) in terms of learning motivation, methods, environment, and 
process. FLA is a quintessential human instinct happening in a natural environment of 
native language when a person grows and develops his/her cognitive abilities (Lu, 2005: 
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17). FLA continues to elaborate on reading and writing skills after a person begins to 
receive schooling. Yet he/she does not have to learn the pronunciation, basic vocabulary, 
and basic grammar of his/her first language because he/she has comprehended its 
language structure  (Lu, 2005: 19). In other words, FLA is a natural process stimulated 
by human instinct. By contrast, SLA demands a systematic and well-organised 
instructional design to motivate pupils and to create opportunities for communication 
in the classroom (Lu, 2005: 19). In the case of Philippine-Chinese, SLA is for the 
purpose of preserving Chinese culture for future generations.  
Accordingly, TMSL designed by the PCERC adopts the principles of ‘listening and 
speaking is priority, reading and writing follow later’ (Tinshuo linxian duxie genshang) 
and ‘less lecture, more practices’ (Jinjiang duolian) in order to provide more 
opportunities to enhance students’ communication skills. It also employs multiple 
teaching methods other than lectures such as visual teaching, catechetical method, and 
situational language teaching, making the classroom a place for practising 
communications skills (Kotah, 2009; Wang, 2009). In a classroom where 
communication is encouraged, students would have higher learning motivation, 
spontaneously developing their communication skills. 
Third, the PCERC carries out comprehensive planning for Mandarin teaching. Unlike 
FLA, through which a person acquires first-language ability regardless of whether or 
not there is any instructional design, teaching for SLA requires systematic planning (Lu, 
2005: 38). Accordingly, the PCERC first conducted a series of studies not only on the 
nature of Chinese education in the Philippines, including teaching objectives and targets, 
but also in some local settings, such as the relationships between first language (Tagalog, 
English, or Hokkien) and target language (Mandarin) within the Philippine school 
system. Based on the results of the studies, the PCERC developed a whole new package 
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of pedagogy that met local needs and put them into practice, such as training teachers 
to familiarise them with the new pedagogy based on TMSL, completing ‘the Ten-year 
Syllabus of the Chinese Teaching in the Philippine Primary and High School’ to assure 
curriculum articulation, and editing ‘the Chinese Course Book for Filipinos’ (Feilubing 
Huayu Keben) in cooperation with the Beijing Culture and Language University. It is 
the first and most systematic teaching planning for Chinese education. 
Fourth, Huaren education shifts from a teacher-centred to a student-centred approach. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching gives teachers 
supreme authority to discipline students and to operate teaching activities in a top-down 
manner; these are not conducive to the acquisition of communication skills. Bisong Lu 
(2005: 65) instead proposes a student-centred approach in Mandarin teaching. The 
design of teaching planning, materials, and methods should take the nature of students 
into account, including age, intellectual level, relations between first language and 
target language, learning target, and practical needs. In his article, ‘Advocating the Key 
Theme of Chinese Education Reform’ (Quanmian changxiang huawen jiaoyu de 
zhuxuanlu), another leader of the PCERC, Duanming Huang (2012: 77), also introduces 
the student-centred approach that confirms ‘teacher as director, student as major 
character’, facilitates classroom interaction, gives priority to the enhancement of 
language ability, encourages students’ initiative and creativity, accommodates students’ 
physical and mental growth, adds rich content and a liveliness to teaching materials, 
utilises advanced teaching methods, and improves the language learning environment.  
While Huaqiao education confines itself to a package of the traditional approach, 
unified aim, and outdated methods of top-down Mandarin teaching, the proposal for 
Huaren education to a certain degree challenges the former’s traditional authority. From 
a local perspective, the PCERC’s pragmatic and student-centred approach towards 
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Mandarin teaching is likely to create a wider space to imagine an alternative of Chinese 
education tailor-made for the Philippine-Chinese community, diminishing the 
hegemony of Chinese essentialism in the form of Huaqiao education. 
The outcome of the PCERC’s plan can be exemplified by the practice of PCC, which 
fully implements the reform of TMSL. PCC teaches directly in the target language 
(Mandarin) instead of other inter-languages such as Hokkien Chinese, Tagalog, and 
English. The vice-president of PCC proudly told me that over 80 or even 90 percent of 
their students would be able to talk in Mandarin if I were to speak to one at random 
(interview with Sining Marcos Kotah, Manila, 21/10/2013). Apparently no one at St. 
Joseph High School has the same confidence in their own students’ Mandarin ability. 
Since 1994, PCC has evaluated the level of students’ language ability and the quality 
of teaching through the results of the HSK, the Chinese Proficiency Test for non-native 
Chinese learners, which is administrated by Hanban. Over 80 percent of sixth-grade 
elementary students have passed the Basic standard of the test since 1994 (Gan, 2009). 
In 2008, the pass rate of the fourth-grade high school students taking the 
Elementary/Intermediate test rose from 33 to 53 percent (Gan, 2009). Compared to 
those Chinese schools which only ask advanced students to take the test (in case the 
embarrassing truth comes to light), it shows remarkable progress. 
Apart from PCC, however, there is a lack of consensus regarding the building of Huaren 
education. Although the PCERC has initiated the project of Huaren education, the 
pursuit of Huaren Chineseness through education reform is hardly a community-wide 
movement. In fact, the project has not widely spread beyond PCC and a few schools 
that cooperate with the PCERC. Huaqiao Chineseness, the dominant factor in Chinese 
schools, remains the major impediment to the promotion of Huaren education. 
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4.3 The Predicament of Huaren Education  
Huaqiao Chineseness, with its tendency towards a Sino-centrism that belittles local 
experiences, however, becomes the major obstacle to the building of Huaren 
Chineseness. There are three forms of Huaqiao Chineseness that have an adverse impact 
on the growth and spread of Huaren education. The first comes from the old generation 
who stick to Huaqiao education. The second is from the ROC government which is 
devoted to making its presence felt by exporting Huaqiao education. The third is from 
the PRC government which also has its own agendas to pursue.   
 
4.3.1 Clashes between Huaqiao and Huaren Education in School 
Huaren education reform is hampered by Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao education, 
which are deeply rooted in Chinese schools and based on the ROC version of 
Chineseness. As reform aims to transform not only the usage of Zhuyin and traditional 
Chinese characters, but also the pedagogy of ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’ 
as a whole, the proposal is refuted by those who are accustomed to Huaqiao education. 
The ambivalent relationships between the PCERC and the PRC make those loyal to the 
ROC version of Huaqiao Chineseness reluctant to accept the reform, too.  
Moreover, the reform to turn Huaqiao education into Huaren education directly 
threatens the Huaqiao identity of some of the older generations. TMSL in the 
Philippines operates on the assumption that Mandarin is no longer the first and national 
language, but rather a foreign language for the Chinese. According to the assumption 
of Huaren education, the Philippine-Chinese are foreigners to China and no longer 
‘overseas Chinese’. It not only questions the aim and the pedagogy of the current 
Chinese education, but also overthrows the identity of the old-generation Chinese as a 
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whole. From the viewpoint of those who have deeply rooted Huaqiao identity, the 
reform represents a fundamental change to the Huaqiao Chineseness that is familiar to 
them, including teaching Mandarin as the national language, Zhuyin, traditional 
Chinese characters, and everything they have been accustomed to for decades. 
Therefore, they would rather stick to old Huaqiao Chineseness to guard their Huaqiao 
identity. For example, an administrator of Chiang Kai-shek College answered me 
straightforwardly when asked how she felt about TMSL:  
I don’t like the idea of teaching Mandarin as a second language at all. We are 
not foreigners. Once the publisher of ‘Living Mandarin’ promoted the textbook 
here. I told him that the book is good, but it is more suitable for foreigners to 
learn Chinese. If you adopt teaching Mandarin as a second language, it is just a 
waste of time of our students. (Interview with an officer of the Association of 
Chinese-Filipino Schools, the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools, Manila, 
15/11/2013)   
In St. Joseph High School is another example: when a young teacher was keen to 
promote TMSL based on her knowledge learnt from the Correspondence Course for 
Bachelor of Chinese Teaching, a senior and experienced teacher who had graduated 
from National Taiwan University in the 1970s vehemently objected. Given that, to an 
extent, the senior teacher’s professional authority came from her previous study 
experience in Taiwan, she considered the reform as a challenge not only to the ROC 
version of Chineseness, but also to her authority as a senior teacher. Her superior status 
among the faculty presented an obstruction to reform. She said, ‘There is no problem 
with my class at all. If you want to reform, do it in your own class. We don’t change’ 
(interview with Ms. Liao, Manila, 2/10/2013).  
In defence of their Huaqiao identity, the old generation would rather preserve the 
ambiguous status quo, namely, that the students are factually Huaren but are taught as 
if they are Huaqiao. Therefore, the proposal of Huaren education is by no means a 
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necessary reform to them, but a threat to how they define what being Chinese means 
based on Huaqiao Chineseness. 
 
4.3.2 Entanglement with the PRC version of Chineseness 
The effect of the educational reform is counteracted by suspicion that the Chinese 
education of the PCERC merely follows the PRC version of Huaqiao Chineseness, 
rather than creates a new Huaren Chineseness. This is because the PCERC, the founder 
of Huaren education, maintains dubious relationships with the most influential provider 
of Huaqiao Chineseness, the PRC. Although it purports to create Huaren education 
exclusively for Chinese Filipinos and independently, through the Chinese community’s 
own efforts, the PCERC in fact receives a great deal of educational resources from the 
PRC to achieve this aim, as was shown in chapter 3. As a result, the PCERC is 
inevitably under the influence of the PRC version of Chineseness, which is exemplified 
in its use of Pinyin and simplified Chinese characters in its pedagogy.  
The PCERC’s ‘Ten-year Syllabus of the Chinese Teaching in the Philippine Primary 
and High School’, for example, requires elementary-school students to master the 
Pinyin system (Shen, 2011: 58). The textbook that is based on this syllabus, and which 
the PCERC edits, ‘the Chinese Course Book for Filipinos’, also adopts Pinyin, rather 
than Zhuyin, to teach Mandarin pronunciation. Further, the textbook has simplified 
Chinese as well as traditional Chinese versions. Due to the fact that most Chinese 
schools are used to traditional Chinese characters, the latter is more popular than the 
former. Nevertheless, the PCERC’s publishing of the first simplified Chinese textbook 
can be seen as an act of promoting the PRC version of Chineseness in the Chinese 
community. 
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From the viewpoint of some educationalists, then, the pedagogy of, and educational 
reform led by, the PCERC is merely for the promotion of the PRC version of 
Chineseness, which is actually a new form of Huaqiao Chineseness provided by 
mainland China. As a result, the educational reform is widely seen as a transformation 
from the ROC to the PRC version of Chineseness, rather than as the building of Huaren 
Chineseness. The alleged link between the PCERC and the PRC inevitably affects 
Chinese schools’ willingness to follow educational reform, since adopting the 
pedagogy of the PCERC would be considered ‘pro-China’. For example, an 
administrator of Chiang Kai Shek College said: ‘the Philippine Cultural College is all 
following mainland China. Their textbook is PCERC’s, using simplified Chinese 
characters’ (interview with Ms Go, Manila, 8/10/2013). Using simplified Chinese 
characters, teaching Pinyin, being pro-China – these all can become general grounds 
for refusing the PCERC’s pedagogy.  
It is inconsistent to assert that Huaren Chineseness and education are produced by, and 
exclusively for, the local Chinese, when they are still receiving aids from the PRC and 
complying with the PRC version of Chineseness. Hence, having become entangled in 
another form of Huaqiao Chineseness, the PCERC’s educational reform is recognised 
by the community only to a limited extent. 
 
4.3.3 Crossfire between the Two Chinas' Huaqiao Chineseness  
The involvement of the ROC and the PRC, the two governments that produce and 
provide Huaqiao Chineseness, also hinders the progress of building Huaren 
Chineseness. As a project, producing Huaren Chineseness represents the abolishing of 
the fatherland’s influence. It clearly acts against the geopolitical strategies of both 
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governments; certainly, neither country would be supportive of the project. To the 
contrary, their policies of overseas Chinese education tend to seek to undermine it. 
In the early 1990s, the Chinese schools were in relative harmony with each other. 
Almost all Chinese schools, including not only the PCC but also the Chiang Kai-shek 
College (CKSC), attended Bisong Lu’s speech and were enthusiastic about TMSL. 
There was, then, an opportunity to develop Huaren education (interview with an 
administrator of the PCERC, Manila, 11/11/2013). However, the involvement of both 
governments soon complicated the situation.       
The ROC government naturally considers the practices of the PCERC a threat to their 
control over the Chinese school system, as the reform led by the latter targets the ROC 
version of Chineseness. Also, as the PCERC tends to problematise Huaqiao education 
and seeks the answer to this problem from the PRC, the ROC has to react against this 
tendency and prevent Chinese schools deviating from the status quo, that is, their 
favouring of the ROC version of Chineseness.  
The speeches of Bisong Lu received rave notices in 1991 and aroused enthusiasm for 
TMSL in Chinese schools. Lu suggested that there should be comprehensive planning 
and a syllabus for TMSL; the PCERC was established to take on this responsibility. 
Despite the lack of solid evidence, it was believed by some organisers of the PCERC 
that the aim behind the establishing of the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools (the 
ACFSP, detailed in chapter 3), with assistance from the OCAC in Taiwan, was to 
counterbalance PCERC influence and to prevent the latter from uniting Chinese schools 
under its control.  
During several interviews with the PCERC and the ACFSP, I could tell that the tension 
between the two organisations had caused conflict and friction between Chinese schools. 
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The struggle between the ROC and PRC may have had an impact on this tension. Who 
instigated the tension remains unclear to me, but the timeline is as below. 
After Bisong Lu’s speeches, the principal of PCC, Changcheng Yan, initiated the 
establishment of the PCERC in May 1991. Thereafter, Yan began to contact some 
Chinese education-related organisations of the PRC – Xiamen University, Beijing 
Language College, and the Office of Chinese Language Council International – to bring 
about educational reform. At that time, the PCERC was seen as a PCC-affiliated 
association for educational research. At the beginning of 1993, seven of the largest 
Chinese schools in Manila, including PCC and CKSC, went on school visits to 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Chinese schools of these four countries 
proposed the forming of a league of Chinese schools in Southeast Asia; this prompted 
Philippine-Chinese schools to establish an association on behalf of the Chinese schools 
in the Philippines. In the same year, therefore, the principal of CKSC, Janyin Shou, 
proposed the establishment of the ACSFP. The ACSFP was established with the 
assistance of the OCAC of the ROC. In October 1993, Yan held a conference on 
Chinese education, inviting all Chinese schools to discuss educational reform. From the 
viewpoint of Shou and that of his colleagues in the ACSFP, it was disrespectful that 
Yan himself, an executive director of the ACSFP, held the conference on Chinese 
education without informing other members of the ACSFP. Shou thus held a meeting 
with members of the ACSFP on this issue, including most big schools in Manila, and 
made a decision to opt out of the PCERC’s conference. In turn, the decision upset Yan 
since only a few schools from provinces attended the conference. The ACSFP 
condemned the PCERC for underhand tactics. Because of the PCERC’s associations 
with some institutes in mainland China, its efforts to organise the conference perhaps 
aroused suspicion that PRC authorities were involved. In the same vein, the PCERC 
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believed that the ACSFP’s ‘boycott’ was incited by ROC authorities. The two 
associations were thus seriously divided from this point on. 
Excluded by many member schools of the ACSFP, the PCERC and the pedagogy it 
developed have been labelled unorthodox and dissentious. The PCERC’s influence is 
thus limited to a few small schools. Nevertheless, ROC authorities continue to provide 
Chinese schools with a series of educational aids to counterbalance the PCERC’s 
influence, such as textbooks, teacher supplies, and teacher training programs, which are 
still popular among Chinese schools. While only member schools of the ACSFP can 
enjoy all these educational aids from Taiwan, the ACSFP has become the most 
influential Chinese-school association in the Philippines, having far more member 
schools than the PCERC. To a certain extent the efforts of the ROC authorities to foster 
the ACSFP therefore inhibit the PCERC from extending its influence. In other words, 
the development of Huaren Chineseness is impeded by the effective deploying of the 
ROC version of Huaqiao Chineseness. 
On the other hand, the equivocal relationships between PRC authorities and the PCERC 
have also had a subtle, negative impact on the latter’s development. In the beginning, 
the PCERC had its own vision for future development and, from the 1990s on,
 merely cooperated with some educational institutes for Chinese education, like 
Xiamen University, Beijing Language College, and the Office of Chinese Language 
Council International.  
From the 2000s on, China has been gradually unfolding its global strategy for reaching 
out to overseas Chinese, as well as potential Mandarin learners throughout the world, 
mainly through the Hanban and Guoqiaoban. The PCERC’s pursuit of the reform of 
building Huaren Chineseness, to a large extent, hinges on the resources provided by the 
PRC, such as supplies of teachers and advisers. Accordingly, the PCERC’s cooperation 
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with PRC authorities is inevitably subject to the latter’s grand strategy. While the PRC’s 
policy focuses on the promotion of the PRC version of Chineseness, rather than on the 
development of Huaren Chineseness, a tension could nevertheless exist between the 
PCERC and the PRC authorities.  
The tension between the PRC and the PCERC – as well as between Huaqiao and Huaren 
Chineseness – appears in some aspects of teaching practice. That both the Hanban and 
Guoqiaoban have respective official packages of knowledge to connect all overseas 
Chinese throughout the world contradicts the PCERC’s proposal to develop a tailor-
made pedagogy exclusively for the Philippine-Chinese. The PCERC considers the 
textbooks provided by the Hanban and Guoqiaoban unfit for the language ability, 
education system, and local environment of the Chinese schools in the Philippines. For 
example, the two versions of textbooks that Guoqiaoban promotes in the Philippines, 
‘Hanyu’ and ‘Zhongwen’, are edited for the students of new Chinese migrants residing 
in Japan and Western countries respectively, and are too difficult for Philippine-Chinese 
students. Some of the books’ contents, referring to things not seen in the Philippines 
(such as jumpers and snow), might confuse Philippine-Chinese students; these are not 
even taught in the PCC’s class (interview with an administrator of the Philippine 
Culture College, Manila, 21/10/2013). The Hanban’s textbooks such as ‘Contemporary 
Chinese’ (Dangdai Zhongwen) consist of only four books that are not suitable for ten 
years of Chinese learning in Chinese schools. Some schools use the textbooks provided 
free of charge by the Hanban and Guoqiaoban because they want to form relationships 
with them to gain more support. However, these schools cannot really put reform into 
practice without absorbing the TMSL practices that the PCERC proposes, thus 
achieving limited improvement of their Chinese teaching. From the viewpoint of the 
PCERC, the PRC approach to Chinese education in the Philippines is fundamentally 
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misguided.  
Furthermore, the teaching adviser program by Guoqiaoban and the volunteer teacher 
program by Hanban are to a large extent subject to the PRC’s international political 
agenda and in some respects at odds with the PCERC’s education reform project. Some 
of the teaching advisers provided by Guoqiaoban, who are in fact high school teachers 
in China without TMSL background, are unlikely to follow the PCERC’s pedagogy. 
Also, the volunteer teachers do not receive PCERC training, and therefore would not 
practice new pedagogy.  
On the one hand, the PCERC needs the educational aids from the PRC to undertake its 
ambitious and costly reform project. On the other hand, while approving parts of the 
PCERC’s plan for educational reform, the PRC still has its own agenda to pursue and 
might not entirely comply with the PCERC’s ideas. To a degree, the PCERC is in an 
awkward position in that it is labelled ‘pro-China’ while not enjoying full support from 
the PRC. All these complicities present difficulties to reform.  
 
4.3.4 Lack of Support from the Community 
When the community and the schools are generally controlled by those who have 
Huaqiao identity, and are therefore under the overwhelming influence of the two 
versions of Huaqiao Chineseness, the project of building Huaren Chineseness can 
hardly expect to receive support. The focus of the debate on Chinese education is 
usually on accepting Huaqiao Chineseness from either China or Taiwan, rather than on 
building Huaren Chineseness in the Philippines. When major Chinese associations, 
such as the Philippine Jinjiang General Association and the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, intend to fund Chinese education, they 
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do not necessarily fund the PCERC’s project to build Huaren Chineseness; rather, they 
tend to cooperate with PRC authorities producing Huaqiao Chineseness. For example, 
Lucio Tan, a Chinese-Filipino billionaire businessman who is enthusiastic in promoting 
Chinese education, chooses not to directly fund the PCERC despite his close 
relationship with the latter. Tan has commissioned the PCERC to organise educational 
events and provides venues for the PCERC, but has never given a dollar to its project 
class (interview with an administrator of the PCERC, Manila, 11/11/2013). Instead, Tan 
tends to fund educational activities based on the PRC version of Huaqiao Chineseness: 
since 2001, he has paid for thousands of students and teachers to participate in summer 
study tours in China. As a result, while Huaqiao education still casts a large shadow 
over teachers and students, Huaren education remains rudimentary.        
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Caught by the two governments’ versions of Huaqiao Chineseness, the building of 
Huaren Chineseness and Huaren education has made little progress. A senior teacher 
and administrator of the PCERC, who has been dedicated to the education reform for 
two decades, bemoaned the little that has been achievement despite ongoing 
commitment: 
There are political disturbances, partisan disturbances, and the clashes between 
old and new ideas. They are all obstructions. In my opinion, for education my idea 
is, we are alive, and we still have the affinity for Chinese culture. We believe it can 
make contribution to the world civilisation, so if we do not do it, nobody would. 
We just do as much as we can. Maybe there will be successors to keep going after 
we made the first move. If not so, to be honest, there is not much improvement 
and achievement of what we have done for twenty years (interview with an 
administrator of the PCERC, Manila, 11/11/2013).  
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All in all, the entangled complexity of Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness leads to 
confusion about the meaning of being Chinese in the Philippines. Deeply implicated in 
Chinese politics, a pedagogy of Mandarin teaching based on genuine Huaren 
Chineseness is unlikely to come about; in turn, the natural growth of a new meaning of 
what it is Chinese in the Philippines is impeded. As the younger generation has 
gradually integrated into Philippine society and as Chinese schools still struggle to 
clarify their raison d’être, in the foreseeable future Chinese education in the Philippines 
will continue to decline due to its entanglement with Huaqiao Chineseness. 
As was discussed in the last chapter, Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao education have 
proven detrimental to the effectiveness of Mandarin teaching. The current era favours 
Huaren Chineseness and Huaren education, but those who support Huaqiao education, 
however, deny the fact that Huaqiao Chineseness is outdated. Thus they continue to 
allocate all resources to Huaqiao education, while resisting, if not directly combating, 
Huaren education.     
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Chapter 5 
Communal Chineseness for Integration into Domestic Philippine 
Society 
5.1 Introduction 
In contrast to ‘assimilation’, which implies a minority group giving up its cultural traits, 
integration means that an immigrant can absorb the major cultural elements of a 
mainstream society while preserving his or her minority ethnicity (Joppke and 
Morawska, 2003). Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) indicate that there can be different 
spheres of integration whereby an immigrant may be well integrated into one sphere 
but not equally integrated into another. For example, a person of immigrant background 
can receive education and pursue a career in the mainstream while developing a social 
network mainly within his or her own community. From this perspective, integration 
has occurred among Philippine-Chinese, especially among the younger, local-born 
generation (See, 1997), who might identify themselves as Filipino while preserving 
Chineseness. Although the younger generation are increasingly aware of their Filipino 
citizenship, live very ‘Filipino’ lives, speak fluent Tagalog, attend Philippine 
universities, and pursue their careers in Philippine society, they remain Chinese by 
taking part in Chinese schools as ethnic institutions within the Chinese community. 
As previous chapters have shown, however, Philippine-Chinese are divided as to what 
‘being Chinese’ and Chineseness mean. In some Chinese-oriented people’s view, for 
example, integration is no different from assimilation in that they perceive the younger 
generation’s inability to speak Mandarin as a feature indicating the loss of Chineseness. 
For those who are in favour of Chinese-Filipino identity, integration is inevitable and 
the main concern should be how to revitalise Chinese education by means of teaching 
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Mandarin as a second language (See, 1997).  
On the one hand, Huaqiao education contradicts the Chinese-Filipino identity of the 
younger generation. On the other hand, Huaren education is yet to be accepted by, or to 
exercise influence over, the whole Chinese school system. The Chineseness that both 
Chinese governments and the old generation intend to build appears increasingly 
irrelevant to students’ surrounding environment. But is the whole Chinese school 
system in the Philippines as irrelevant to each aspect of the students’ lives as Mandarin 
teaching? What kinds of Chineseness are Chinese schools producing, in addition to 
Mandarin teaching by means of either Huaqiao or Huaren education? Which version of 
Chineseness most influences Philippine-Chinese people’s everyday life and career 
development in Philippine society? And what role do Chinese schools play in 
promoting social mobility and social reproduction?  
This chapter aims to discover the kinds of Chineseness, apart from Mandarin teaching, 
that Chinese schools provide. It also looks into the Chineseness which is functional in 
domestic Filipino society. Opposing the commonly held view among some Filipinos 
that the Philippine-Chinese are unassimilable due to the existence of the Chinese school 
system (see Batnag, 1964; Sussman, 1976), I argue that Chinese schools have 
transformed so that their institutional role in fact fosters integration into the Philippine 
mainstream, and does so with the support of the whole Chinese community, particularly 
after the processes of Filipinization for all Chinese schools and naturalisation for the 
Chinese in the 1970s.  
I advance that the decline of Mandarin learning in Chinese schools has been 
overemphasised, while, by contrast, the schools’ function in preparing the younger 
generation for integration is a raison d’être that has been relatively underemphasised. I 
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propose the possibility that Chinese schools are producing their alternative version of 
Chineseness not only to bypass the Chinese national outlook, but also to help the 
younger generation adapt to Filipino society. The Chineseness produced, disseminated, 
and practised in Chinese schools is initiated and generated neither by the Chinese nor 
the Philippine governments, but by the Chinese community in the Philippines. I 
highlight the role that the Chinese school system plays in bridging the gap between life 
in the Chinese community and in larger Philippine society. In turn, the achievements of 
Chinese school graduates in terms of their career development within Philippine society 
can also benefit the Chinese community’s prosperity.  
Therefore, I refer to the distinct ethnicity produced in Chinese schools as ‘communal 
Chineseness for integration’. It is a version of Chineseness that makes the students not 
only genuine Chinese (from the perspective of the local Chinese community), but also 
full Filipino citizens with certain advantages that follow from integration into 
Philippine society. In other words, the Chinese schools have transformed into Filipino 
ones to help Chinese students adapt to their Filipino citizenship.  
In this chapter, I first discuss how Chinese schools nurture Chinese students’ sense of 
Filipino national identity to lay the foundations for integration. Second, I show how 
Chinese schools have facilitated integration into upper-middle class Philippine society 
through community-based resources that do three things: shape ‘Chinese-school 
identity’, upholding ‘symbolic Chineseness’ to distinguish students from the lower 
class Philippine majority; offer students access to the ethnic networks of the Chinese 
community to generate ‘selective acculturation’; provide education that not only 
complies with the national curriculum of the Philippines but also maintains high-quality 
teaching to facilitate class reproduction through education.  
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After Filipinization, the Chinese school system became an integral part of the Philippine 
education system. Access to Philippine citizenship meant that a wide variety of trades, 
occupations, and professions, which were exclusively the preserve of Filipino citizens, 
were now opened to the Chinese. With the lifting of such institutional restraints on 
integration, ‘structural assimilation’ – a concept of Milton Gordon’s (1964) referring to 
the outcome when the minority has been integrated into the social customs, institutions, 
and social groups of the host society – thus began to happen. With the Philippine-
Chinese having greater educational and career opportunities, it became possible for 
Chinese schools to really nurture the next generation of Filipino citizens.  
As I show below, the Chinese school system is able to play an active role in facilitating, 
rather than restricting, the younger generation’s integration into Philippine society. 
Filipinization does not necessarily cause a further decline in the students’ ability to 
speak Mandarin, but it greatly promotes the conception of Philippine citizenship among 
the young generation, something which proves beneficial to the development of the 
Philippine-Chinese community.  
The data for the discussion of this chapter based on my observation during the one-year 
teaching experiences in which I found the high degree of the Chinese students’ intimacy 
with ethnic Filipinos in Chinese schools and of their integration into the mainstream.  
 
5.2 Filipinization and Banal Nationalism at School Level 
As mentioned in chapter 2, following the Filipinization policy of the 1970s, Chinese 
schools have, in a legal sense, become nationalised. Even with this enforcement, 
however, Chinese students would not have automatically become Filipino or integrated 
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into the Philippine nation without the complement of everyday practices at school level. 
In fact, it is through immersion into a series of practices of Filipino nationalism in 
ordinary life (including inside Chinese schools) that all the Philippine-Chinese have 
been turned from ROC citizens into Philippine citizens. Chinese students are turned 
into Philippine citizens. 
Michael Billig (1995) emphasises the impact of daily routine on the formation of 
national identity, referring to it as ‘banal nationalism’. In contrast to the commonly-
held view that the practice of nationalism can only be discovered in extremist 
expressions like extreme nationalism, independence movements, and xenophobia, 
Billig focuses on the everyday representations of a nation. He suggests that symbols, 
habits, and other things that people take for granted in daily life can actually reproduce 
a sense of nation.   
Below, I offer a complete picture of how Chinese schools nurture students’ Filipino 
national identity through everyday practices. Beyond institutional factors like the 
Filipinization policy and Filipino citizenship, ‘banal nationalism’ at school level can 
make students increasingly ‘Filipino’ and facilitate the process of full integration into 
Philippine society. Integration thus can truly happen on the premise of the younger 
generation’s solid Filipino national identity.  
 
5.2.1 Ritual Display 
When I taught in St. Joseph High School and lived in the dormitory on campus, I was 
usually woken up by the national anthem of the Philippines, Lupang Hinirang. The 
students and I both began the day with the flag ceremony; it was the first thing students 
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did in school. Following that, all students recited the patriotic oath (Panatang 
Makabayan) concerning the love and duty for their beloved motherland and the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the Philippine Flag. They looked not particularly passionate, but none 
of them forwent the ritual: it was just part of their everyday life. Ethnic Filipino pupils 
in other Philippine schools begin their school day similarly, so, of course Philippine-
Chinese pupils, as co-nationals, are no exception.     
To many Philippine-Chinese people, the Philippines is their sole motherland. When a 
sample of people – students, civic organisations, and alumni and parents ranging from 
17 to 60 years old – was asked in the 1995 Identity Survey ‘what country do you call 
your home?’, 97.3% (496) of the 510 respondents answered ‘the Philippines’ (Ang See, 
1995). Another survey of 2,021 Philippine-Chinese students’ identity (Zhang and Lu, 
2009) suggests that 97.3% of them have a very clear sense of their Filipino citizenship; 
only 2.7% answered that they were Chinese citizens. When asked ‘do you feel obligated 
to serve the Philippines in the future?’, the majority of these same students (61.6%) 
answered ‘yes’, only 14.6% said ‘no’, and 23.8% answered ‘it doesn’t matter’ (Zhang 
and Lu 2009). Since 1975, the Filipinization of Chinese schools prescribed that only 
the Philippine flag can be flown in schools (See, 1997: 48). The Philippine flag hung 
high and at the most noticeable place of St. Joseph High School, reminding everyone 
(including me) that this school had become a Filipino school and that the students were 
Filipino. 
Although I thought the students did not care about repetitive ritual displays, I was 
proven wrong. During a flag-lowering ceremony that Chinese teachers need attend only 
once a month, I let my arms hang naturally and stared indifferently as the Philippine 
flag was lowered, accompanied by the national anthem. A girl in my class 
discontentedly asked me to salute the flag and said, ‘you should do like this to show 
156 
 
your respect’. She then showed me how to salute by repeatedly placing her right hand 
over her heart. It seems that I had unintentionally completed a ‘breaching experiment’ 
revealing the social rule that a patriotic Filipino should not only respect the national 
flag, but also have the duty to remind those who do not.  
 
5.2.2 National Curriculum 
While the Chinese curriculum’s function in shaping Chinese identity is widely 
emphasised, the role of the national curriculum that is prescribed by the Philippine 
Department of Education in significantly producing the national identity of the 
Philippines tends to be ignored.  
The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions of the Philippines all advocate that schools 
should aim to develop civic conscience and teach duties of citizenship, love of country, 
patriotism, and nationalism (Almonte-Acosta, 2012). Chinese schools are by no means 
an exception. According to the Reconstructed Basic Education Curriculum (RBEC) 
initiated in 2002, students of Chinese schools are required to systematically acquire the 
value of patriotism through the new subject of ‘Makabayan’ (patriotism). From 
elementary to secondary school level, all students must take Araling Panlipunan (Social 
Studies) and Edukasyon Pagpapahalaga (Values Education), patriotic-relevant subjects 
which are components of Makabayan. Further, to build a common language among 
Filipino nationals, the national language of the Philippines, Tagalog, is a required 
subject for all Filipino students from elementary to high school. 
The national curriculum, consisting of the idea of Filipino citizenship, patriotic values, 
common national language, and knowledge of Philippine society, can help students of 
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Chinese descent forge a shared sense of belonging to the Philippine nation and shape 
Filipino national identity. 
 
5.2.3 The Use of National Language 
The most commonly heard language in the St. Joseph High School is neither Chinese 
(Mandarin or Hokkien) nor English, but Tagalog. While working in the school office, I 
could immediately feel that I, as a native Mandarin-speaker without any Tagalog 
language ability, was completely an outsider. All staff there, whether they are ethnic 
Chinese or Filipinos, communicated, chatted, and joked with each other in Tagalog. In 
the so-called Chinese school, Tagalog is apparently the lingua franca which almost 
everyone feels comfortable speaking. 
This is even more apparent among students, who speak Tagalog in the rough and tumble 
both inside and outside of the classrooms. If they wanted to tease a foreign teacher like 
me and say something to each together without me knowing what was being said, 
Tagalog is the most effective tool. Thus language use in school constantly reminded 
both the students and me of two things: that we come from, and belong to, two entirely 
different nations, and the salient fact that it is actually a Filipino school. 
Ironically, Tagalog, the language students use most commonly when playing and having 
fun, is the language they learn the most effectively in Chinese schools.18 Although the 
majority of students of the Chinese schools are native Tagalog speakers, a few students 
(either conservative Chinese who are not fond of speaking Tagalog or new migrants 
                                                     
18 A survey conducted in 2009 suggested Tagalog (54.1%), over Hokkien (25.3%), English (18.1%), 
and Mandarin (1.6%), was Chinese students’ most-used language while communicating with family 
and friends. See Zhang & Lu (2009).   
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from other overseas Chinese communities) were not confident speakers of the national 
language at the beginning of their education. However, they were able to acquire 
Tagalog later on in school. 
Russel Co was a quiet, gentle, and hardworking boy in my class. Among his classmates, 
he was not the most sociable, though he was able to speak Tagalog well. After 
interviewing his mother, I learned that Russel basically did not speak Tagalog at home: 
Russel spoke Hokkien and English to his parents, and just English to the ethnic-Filipino 
helper at home (interview with Mrs. Co, Manila, 2/10/2013). At the start of his studies 
in St. Joseph High School, Russel did not know how to talk to classmates without 
Tagalog ability. However, he started to speak Tagalog comfortably in the third grade of 
elementary school after years of everyday conversations with classmates.          
Another case is Shuya who was born in mainland China and then brought to Manila by 
her parents when she was three years old. She can speak perfect Mandarin and Hokkien 
because they are the languages used at home. Shuya can speak Tagalog, too. When 
asked ‘is her [Shuya’s] Tagalog any different from yours?’, a student responded that 
while her Tagalog is occasionally ungrammatical, this does not affect communication 
(personal communication, Manila, 2/7/2011). When I asked Shuya how she could speak 
Tagalog, she simply answered, ‘just frequent conversation with my friends’ (personal 
communication, Manila, 2/7/2011). As she communicated with most of her friends in 
school, obviously her Tagalog was learnt there. 
Chinese schools to a degree have turned themselves into staunchly Filipino 
environments in which students can practise their Tagalog language skills. As language 
is the primary symbol of a nation, fully grasping the language represents a sense of 
‘being part of the nation’. 
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5.2.4 Interethnic Intimacy in School 
Chinese schools may be the first place in which Philippine-Chinese youths have close 
and extensive contact with ethnic Filipinos other than helpers at home. Harmonious 
interpersonal relationships based on education can spontaneously bypass ethnic and 
class boundaries. St. Joseph, for example, is staffed with a number of ethnic Filipinos 
from various social backgrounds, such as classmates19, teachers, administrators, sport 
team coaches, librarians, janitors, guards, and cleaners. As a result of having worked 
for a Chinese school for years, these fellow Filipinos have common characteristics: they 
know how to get along well with Chinese students, feel familiar with the Philippine-
Chinese way of thinking and of doing things, and tend to interact with them with 
goodwill. Closer social distance between the ethnic Chinese and Filipinos can help 
forge a sense of belonging to one nation based on mutual understanding and can reduce 
ethnic barriers.  
I could readily sense a close interethnic intimacy between students and staff in St. 
Joseph. Students often joked in Tagalog with Filipino teachers, coaches, janitors, and 
guards, laughing loudly. As I observed, students were even closer to Filipino teachers 
than to Chinese ones, even though it is a Chinese school. This is not just because 
students pay more attention to English subjects (which are normally taught by Filipino 
teachers), but also because Filipino teachers tend to be younger, funnier, more 
approachable, and more knowledgeable about Filipino things – and, of course, they 
                                                     
19 Typically only a few Filipino parents send their children to Chinese schools due to the heavy burden 
of learning a new language. However, being aware of the growing importance of the Chinese language, 
an increasing number of Filipinos want their children to study it in Chinese schools.  
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speak better Tagalog.   
In a sense, Chinese schools generate a simulation of wider Philippine society, one that 
is free from external discrimination: in school, Chinese students can practise Filipino 
ways of socialisation and thereby increase their adaptability to the mainstream. As their 
experience of interaction with Filipinos is generally positive, they tend to feel less 
psychological pressure when encountering larger society. Automatically expecting a 
harmonious interethnic relationship, they eventually becoming an integral part of the 
Filipino nation.   
Hence, all these everyday practices of Filipino nationalism in Chinese schools help to 
shape a sense of national identity and reproduce next generations of Filipino nationals. 
It is evident that the schools established by the Chinese community are no longer 
Chinese national schools, but Filipino ones. In other words, the Chinese school system 
based on community-based resources in fact provides Chinese students a ground for 
building Filipino national identity.  
 
5.3 Chinese Schools for Integration 
Under the influence of Filipinization, Chinese schools function as institutions of 
integration in the following three aspects. 
 
5.3.1 Symbolic Chineseness 
Given that integration is a state of identifying with the mainstream in general, and 
preserving a certain kind of ethnicity in particular, I want to firstly indicate how 
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Philippine-Chinese maintain their ethnic/communal identity via Chinese schools in a 
symbolic way. Regardless of Filipinization, Chinese schools are still pivotal to the 
production of Chineseness for the Chinese community. This Chineseness, however, 
serves as a symbol rather than an economic utility.  
Gans (1979) refers to the expressive use of ethnicity among temporary American 
ethnics as ‘symbolic ethnicity’, describing how the young generation can maintain their 
ethnic identity on the basis of newly-interpreted cultural traditions without this really 
interfering with their everyday life. If we apply Gans’ analysis to Chinese schools in 
the Philippine, three characteristics of symbolic ethnicity can be drawn to illustrate the 
features of Chineseness in Chinese schools.       
First, symbolic ethnicity needs to be easily expressed and highly visible to the extent 
that both insiders and outsiders can clearly identify what kind of ethnic identity the 
symbol aims to represent. Symbols or ‘ethnic goods’ can be foods, written materials, 
holidays, and rituals, etc.  
Second, the expression of symbolic ethnicity should be at low cost. In fact, symbolic 
ethnicity happens when the younger generation has realised upward mobility.  It is 
their roles and positions in the upper-middle classes of the local and national 
hierarchical social structure that make them feel secure expressing their ethnic identity. 
Thus its practice cannot be at the expense of the current life that they are satisfied with.  
Third, the outcome of the practice of symbolic ethnicity depends on the ethnic relations 
between the ethnic group and the mainstream. It is viable only when the mainstream 
society has a positive impression at best or a neutral impression at the very least. If so, 
sometimes it can be beneficial for the members of the ethnic group to distinguish 
themselves from the mainstream. 
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In light of these three characteristics, I discuss what sorts of ‘symbolic Chineseness’ 
Chinese schools produce and how they function, as follows. First of all, attending 
Chinese schools itself is the most common and crucial practice of symbolic Chineseness. 
Of course, attending Chinese schools has instrumental functions, but the symbolic 
functions of this are less touched on. Remarkably, the Philippine-Chinese community’s 
commitment to Chinese education is based on the belief that Chinese school can 
reproduce the next generation of Philippine-Chinese, thereby assuring the persistence 
of the community. Sending their children to Chinese schools thus signals parents’ 
endorsement of the belief and support for the Chinese identity shared by the whole 
community. Therefore, despite the ineffectiveness of Mandarin teaching, according to 
the survey by Zhang and Lu (2009), 89.6% of Chinese school students responded that 
they were still willing to send their children to learn Mandarin in Chinese schools, while 
only 10.4% were not. This result corroborates the study conducted by Tilman in 1974. 
Tilman points out a mentality among Philippine-Chinese that ‘it is the right of the child 
to resist Chinese education, but it is the duty of the parents to demand it’ (Tilman, 1974: 
46). Accordingly, although Chinese students complain about Mandarin learning when 
they are in school, they still expect next generations to enrol in Chinese schools with 
few exceptions. 
To a degree, a kind of informal membership of the Philippine-Chinese community can 
be exclusively obtained for those who are enrolled in Chinese schools. There is a 
Hokkien word, Lán-lâng, which literally means ‘our own people’, and is commonly 
used by the Philippine-Chinese to refer to themselves. Who are Lán-lâng? Lán-lâng 
simply are those who have attended Chinese schools. When defining the scope of his 
study on Philippine-Chinese, Chu (2010: 4) takes ‘attend[ing] one of the several 
“Chinese schools in the Philippines”’ as one of the indicators of being Lán-lâng. Tilman 
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(1974) also indicates that, however burdensome they felt when studying in Chinese 
schools, the Chinese will nevertheless tend to send their children to Chinese school 
because it is the most important instrument to perpetuate Chinese identity. 
It is noteworthy that the definition of Lán-lâng excludes Chinese ‘mestizos’ who have 
Chinese blood, have been assimilated into the mainstream prior to the emergence of 
Chinese nationalism in the late 19th century, and are unlikely to attend Chinese schools. 
It also excludes ‘new migrants’ from mainland China since the 1980s who did not attend 
Chinese schools and whose Chineseness is based on the PRC version of Chineseness20. 
In other words, Lán-lâng is a local, ‘Chinese-Filipino’ identification that can be 
recognisable by the symbol of attending Chinese schools.      
Moreover, attending Chinese schools is the easiest and least costly way of being Lán-
lâng, and the most effective way of demonstrating symbolic Chineseness. Although 
attending Chinese schools takes time (up to 14 years from kindergarten to high school) 
and higher tuition fees, it guarantees students’ symbolic Chineseness, and with it, the 
life-long membership of being Lán-lâng and local Chinese. With the studentship of 
Chinese schools, the students are even not required to speak good Mandarin to be Lán-
lâng.  
To a certain degree, students’ enrolment in Chinese schools is merely for symbolic 
Chineseness. Although Chinese education is in decline, when I asked the head of a 
sectarian Chinese school, which planned to reduce the hours of Chinese curriculum and 
                                                     
20 Recently more and more ‘new migrants’ from China have settled in the Philippines and sent their 
children to Chinese schools. However, as far as I know Philippine-Chinese of this generation rarely 
refer to themselves as Lán-lâng. It is unclear whether this next generation of new migrants will be 
included into Lán-lâng if they integrate into the mainstream, as well as the Chinese community, by 
attending Chinese schools.   
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put more emphasis on English ones, about whether they had thought about closing the 
Chinese department, he simply answered, ‘no, if we do so, there will be no students to 
come’ (interview with Mr. Huang in St. Peter High School, 16/11/2013). The Chinese 
curriculum, regardless of its effectiveness, is still the most important resource of 
symbolic Chineseness for the Philippine-Chinese. Abandoning the Chinese curriculum 
means the absence of symbolic Chineseness, no differentiation with other private 
Filipinos schools, and thus the undermining of students’ and parents’ incentive to attend 
the schools.       
In the view of Philippine-Chinese, graduation from Chinese schools means similar 
school experiences and shared values based on Chineseness. United by the shared 
experience of having attended Chinese schools, the Federation of Filipino Chinese 
Alumni Associations was established to unify all alumni associations of Chinese 
schools and to promote a sense of community and ethnic solidarity. It has even opened 
a branch in North America (joined by 24 alumni associations of Chinese schools) to 
gather the Philippine-Chinese residing there together. Hence, a distinct community-
based ‘Chinese-school identity’ has been commonly formed among Philippine-Chinese.  
Further, the symbolic function of attending Chinese schools is exceptionally visible not 
only to Philippine-Chinese, but also to other Filipinos. Mainstream Philippine society 
can also identify the Philippine-Chinese by the fact of their attending Chinese schools. 
Despite Filipinization, the association between Chinese schools and the Philippine-
Chinese is widely known by ethnic Filipinos: whether the Chinese symbols in their 
names have been removed or not, these ‘former’ Chinese schools are undoubtedly 
‘Chinese’ schools still. Many Chinese schools are quite well-known not only for their 
distinct Chinese background but for their good reputations. It therefore presents no 
difficulty that graduates of Chinese schools will be automatically identified as Chinese 
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via their curriculum vitae when applying for university or a job. In additional to Chinese 
surnames and facial features, the Chinese-school diploma is, to the mainstream, the 
most visible symbol of being Chinese.  
To outsiders, the visibility of symbolic Chineseness is sometimes beneficial and can 
lead to ‘positive discrimination’, through which Philippine-Chinese can achieve a 
distinct advantage. Upon being identified as ethnic Chinese by ethnic Filipinos, some 
commonly-held stereotypes may appear, such as being ‘business-minded, good in 
mathematics, rich, industrious, thrifty, dynamic, and persevering’ (See, 1990: 26). 
Nevertheless, in a capitalist society like the Philippines, these qualities are not 
necessarily negative, and in a sense account for the upper-middle class status of the 
Philippine-Chinese. When I asked Chinese-school graduates who had just started their 
careers whether their Chinese background was an advantage or a disadvantage, one of 
them (a graduate from from Chiang Kai Shek College) answered:  
Some advantages. People tend to look up on you. If you look like Chinese, they 
will assume you know many languages and something beyond their knowledges, 
so they will think highly of you (Interview with Ms. Tan an alumni of Chiang Kai 
Shek College, Manila, 9/23/2013).  
The Chinese teaching and extracurricular activities of Chinese schools substantially 
enhance the distinctiveness of symbolic Chineseness. Writing their own Chinese names, 
greeting people in Mandarin, singing some well-known Chinese songs, reciting Chinese 
poems, telling Chinese historical stories and mythologies, and indicating the meaning 
of Chinese traditional festivals are some of the ways that these symbolic resources act 
as distinguishing markers for young Chinese.  
A weekly television program, ‘Chinoy TV’, to introduce Chinese-Filipino lifestyle and 
culture for the Chinese community, as well as the Philippine mainstream society, for 
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example, is used as a vehicle for the display of the distinctiveness of symbolic 
Chineseness. Both of the two hosts, Willord Chua and Gretchen Ho, are alumni of two 
well-known Chinese schools, Hope Christian High School and Immaculate Conception 
Academy, respectively. The program contains basic Mandarin teaching, introductions 
of Chinese culture and customs, such as the ‘ghost month’, a Chinese talent competition, 
etc("Chinoy TV,")("Chinoy TV,"). The hosts might master these Chinese cultural 
symbols when attending respective Chinese schools.    
In particular, Chinese schools’ celebrations of traditional Chinese traditional festivals 
play an important role not only in manifesting symbolic Chineseness to the public, but 
also in creating a special Chineseness that is exclusive to the Philippine-Chinese. For 
example, every year the Chinese community have a ‘Chinese New Year Solidarity 
Parade’ in the Chinatown area. This special event is joined in only by the Chinese, but 
also by some mainstream governmental officials and politicians, such as mayors of the 
city of Manila, as a gesture of friendship with the Chinese. Most Chinese schools send 
a group of students to increase the momentum, raising the public’s (as well as the 
students’) awareness of the uniqueness of the Philippine-Chinese community as an 
ethnic minority (observation, Manila, 04/02/2011).  
This public display of symbolic Chineseness could only be possible under the condition 
of a sense of security. In terms of citizenship, upon obtaining Philippine citizenship the 
Chinese have enjoyed equal status in almost all areas, including educational 
opportunities, career choice, political participation, and economic development. Equal 
political rights (derived from Filipino citizenship) have particularly facilitated the 
political participation of Philippine-Chinese, who have had unprecedented input in 
many significant political events, such as the People Power Revolution (EDSA 1) 
against the dictatorship of Marcos in 1986, and the EDSA 2 Revolution against the 
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corrupt Estrada administration in 2001. When a spate of kidnappings targeting 
Philippine-Chinese escalated in the early 1990s, the Chinese mobilised to collectively 
demonstrate against the Philippine government’s lack of action towards solving the 
problem (See, 2013). Political participation by the Philippine-Chinese continues to 
grow not only through voting but also through participation in local politics as 
candidates for congressional districts, city mayors, and councillors (See, 2013). For 
example, in 2011, there were 26 senators and representatives of Chinese origin in the 
Congress of the Philippines, accounting for more than 12% of the total seats (Zhuang, 
2012: 571). This active political participation by the Philippine-Chinese shows their 
commitment and ties to the Philippine nation. As a result, the public display of Chinese 
symbols is widely accepted by the mainstream.   
At an official level, Chineseness has become a welcome symbol that receives explicit 
recognition, especially when China has been growing as a regional power and has 
normalised relationships with the Philippines. President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino’s 
public claim to Chinese ancestry and her visit to her family’s ‘hometown’ in Fukien 
Province in China in 1988 was a breaking point: Chineseness in the Philippines received 
an open acknowledgement. Following this, President Fidel Ramos also publicly 
recognised the contribution of the Chinese to Philippine society. In her second visit to 
the Chinese community for a pre-Independent Day celebration held in St. Stephen High 
School in 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo attended the Philippine flag-raising 
ceremony, recited the Patriotic Oath (Panatang Makabayan) with Chinese students, and 
gave a speech regarding the importance of Chinese education in the Philippines (Rappa 
and Wee, 2006: 73). These symbolic actions are important to signal the harmonious 
coexistence of Philippine-Chineseness and Filipino patriotism. It also indicates official 
recognition of the Chineseness of the Chinese community in general, and of Chinese 
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schools in particular.  
On an everyday level, racial bias and prejudice between Chinese and Filipinos do exist, 
but are likely to be gradually reduced by increased personal contact. The image of the 
Filipino in the minds of some old-generation Chinese is biased because their personal 
contact with Filipinos is limited to the working class, such as the labourers and 
housemaids whom they employ, corrupt officers such as policemen, firemen, and tax 
gatherers, and unscrupulous politicians (See, 1997: 39). On the contrary, the younger 
generations who master Tagalog, attend Philippine universities, join Filipino groups, 
and work and socialise with Filipinos have closer personal contacts with Filipinos (See, 
1997: 110).  Compared to the status quo ante, in which the Chinese were labelled by 
the mainstream as disloyal, unassimilable aliens and avaricious ‘economic animals’ 
who controlled the Philippine economy but transferred what they earned there to their 
hometowns in China (See, 1990; Go 1996), equal citizenship status, intermingling, and 
shared Filipino identity and outlook between two groups might help in lowering the 
ethnic barrier, paving the way for integration.  
The relatively favourable conditions nowadays allow the Chinese to manifest symbolic 
Chineseness and to form a kind of Chinese-school identity. It is the symbolic 
Chineseness produced in Chinese schools that unifies the community of the Philippine-
Chinese. The making of a sense of Chinese community and ethnic solidarity that is 
allowed by attending Chinese schools may be the foundation of integration into the 
mainstream.  
 
5.3.2 Social Capital for Upward Mobility  
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Classic assimilation theory (which focused solely on instances of assimilation in North 
America) assumes that immigrants need to abandon the ethnicities they bring from their 
homelands to successfully become an integral part of mainstream. The conception of 
‘selective acculturation’, by contrast, emphasises the importance of the family and 
community in providing resources to support the younger generation of immigrants in 
adapting to larger society (Portes and Ruben, 1996; 2001). As illustrated in Portes and 
Ruben’s in-depth empirical studies of second generation immigrants, this path proves 
likely to direct the younger generation to upward mobility while they retain their home 
languages and cultural traditions. 
Further, Portes and Zhou (1993) indicate three different paths through which 
immigrants adapt to the host society: the first leads to the classic mode of integration 
into the middle class in the mainstream; the second leads to downward assimilation into 
the lower class; the third leads to upward mobility by intentional preservation of ‘the 
immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity’ (Portes and Zhou, 1993: 83). Portes 
and Zhou (1993) refer to the difference in the path of integration as ‘segmented 
assimilation’. 
In the case of the Philippine-Chinese community, the preservation of communal 
Chineseness is likely to facilitate upward mobility. In terms of this third path of 
integration towards upward mobility, ethnic community plays a pivotal role in 
providing ‘social capital’ to the younger generation. The accessibility of social capital 
determines the likelihood of their upward mobility. Social capital, in this context, means 
‘the ability to gain access to resources by virtue of membership in social networks and 
other social structure’ (Portes and Ruben, 2001: 353).   
Social capital can function in a variety of forms. For the younger generation, social 
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capital can refer to some intangible supports, such as higher expectations for 
achievements, positive cultural orientations and social norms, and also to some 
organisational resources, such as ethnic institutions and organisations (Zhou, 1997).  
The Chinese school system, as a community-based institution, also serves as a 
mechanism for generating, assembling, aggregating, and distributing social capital. 
With the backing of the entire Chinese community, parents and schools need not go 
alone while educating the next generation. Given that Chinese schools are private 
schools that offer a formal curriculum while receiving no funding from the Philippine 
government, and given that they are mainly supported by the local Chinese community, 
to a degree the Chinese younger-generation has been raised by the entire community. 
As mentioned above, community-based resources are accessible only to those who have 
attended Chinese schools and thus acquired membership of the Chinese community. 
The Chinese school system therefore acts as an intermediary institution between the 
community and students to distribute social capital. This social capital aims to help 
students attain the highest possible levels of educational and occupational achievement.  
As is the case with various other groups of Asian immigrants throughout the world, the 
educational culture of the Philippine-Chinese community falls under the influence of 
Confucian values. It heavily emphasises educational achievement and academic 
performance, thus mobilising all possible resources in education21. Positive qualities 
                                                     
21 It is noteworthy that the extremely strict and intensive educational culture of the Philippine-Chinese 
has been much discussed in public, with the best-selling book ‘Battle Hymn of Tiger Mother’ (2011). 
sparking off heated debates. Amy Chua, the author, is herself a second generation Chinese-Filipino 
immigrant living in America. The book depicts Chua’s strict but loving Chinese parenting style with 
her two daughters, both of whom have grown up to be healthy, sound, and brilliant. The last part of the 
book recalls that her father, who grew up in the Chinese community in Manila, earned his BA degree in 
the Philippines and emigrated to America, adopted similar parenting when raising her.     
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for learning like self-discipline, hard work and obedience are greatly encouraged. A 
word in Hokkien, ‘piánn thâu-miâ’ (competing for the first place), is often heard among 
parents and teachers. The ranking of high-grade students represents not only excellent 
academic achievement, but also ‘face-saving’ for parents and families in front of their 
friends and relatives. In the annual commencement in St. Joseph High School at the end 
of every academic year, parents of the top three-ranking students in the Chinese and 
English curricula are invited to attend an award ceremony. They step onstage to take 
photos with their children – under the gaze of other, off-stage students, who no doubt 
harbour mixed feelings (observation, Manila, 25/3/2011). Even after graduation, a 
graduate’s outstanding academic achievements, such as accepting ‘Magna Cum Laude’ 
in a university, doing well in licensure examinations, or receiving scholarship from a 
prestigious foreign university, are heavily advertised as honours of the school and 
parents: congratulatory banners are hung on the school gate and the good news is 
published in local Chinese newspapers. The considerable emphasis on academic 
performance can heighten students’ educational expectations.     
 
 
Figure 2  News about a son's 'passing the exam for the qualification as a lawyer' in a local Chinese newspaper 
(The World News, 6/5/2017) 
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Figure 3 A banner made by the PCC to honour three students who won in a Mathematical Olympiad Challenge 
 
This educational culture leads to a daily pattern of student life which is highly intensive 
and burdensome. Consider the teaching schedule of St. Joseph High School. 
Elementary school students start their first class at 7:30am. There are 6 40-minute 
classes in English until 12:55pm. After lunch there are 4 classes in Chinese from 
1:25pm to 4:05pm. They then attend tutorials, where schoolwork is reviewed under 
tutors’ supervision until around 7pm22. They might therefore leave home at 7am and 
return at 7pm daily. Some of them even have tutorials on Saturday.  
Despite the pressure to learn, this educational culture assures students of an all-
embracing learning environment: completely surrounded by the co-ethnic school 
setting, there is little or no space for anything outside. Students may not necessarily do 
well in exams, but they are prevented from external ‘bad influences’ likely to orient 
them towards downward mobility.   
As other scholars have noted, the Philippine-Chinese have the most extensive ethnic 
                                                     
22 Tutorials are special, informal after-school programs for those who want to achieve better grades. 
Many tutors are schoolteachers who work for the Chinese schools in the daytime. The aim of the 
tutorial is to prepare for both English and Chinese exams at school. The tuition fee is also an important 
extra bonus for schoolteachers to compensate for the relatively small salaries they receive from the 
schools.  
173 
 
networks of all overseas Chinese communities (Wickberg, 1992). There are 
approximately 1,000 Chinese community-based organisations, including associations 
(whose names consist of surname (clan) and locality (district, hometown)), such as the 
Philippine Chinese Wei Due Fraternity and the Philippine Lam An Association; 
chambers of commerce, such as the FFCCCII and Philippine Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry; brotherhoods, such as the Progressive Mason Club, INC. Philippines; 
alumni associations, such as St. Stephen High School Alumni Association; educational 
associations, such as the ACFSP; and religious organisations (Wickberg, 1992: 45). 
These organisations also provide a variety of educational resources for students of 
Chinese schools.  
Study tours in China to enhance Mandarin ability and to expand students’ horizons are 
the most popular educational activities among students and parents, especially when 
tour fees are partly sponsored by some organisers. For example, the Tan Yan Kee 
Foundation, set up and funded by a Chinese-Filipino ‘Taipan’ Lucio Tan alluded to in 
chapter 4, has since 2001 organised 55-day educational tours exclusively for students 
of Chinese schools. The tour takes place in South Fukien province, the hometown of 
most of the Philippine-Chinese. Annually Lucio Tan sponsors flight tickets for every 
tour participant, as well as covering all fees for 200 low-income students. To 2015, there 
have been 11,015 participants in total. Others, like the Philippine-Chinese Education 
Research Center (PCERC), Philippine Jin-Jiang General Association, Hong Meng 
bodies, and a number of alumni associations and locality associations, have similar 
summer camps for Chinese students to take part in. In addition, various Chinese art 
classes, talent contests, and extracurricular activities are frequently held and sponsored 
by Chinese organisations. All these activities provide a supportive, sociable, inspiring, 
and caring learning environment for students surrounded by co-ethnic friends and 
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teachers who share similar educational values.  
As shown in chapter 4, the Kaisa, an unconventional Chinese organisation built by some 
middle-class, well educated, second-generation Philippine-Chinese, has a unique 
contribution to the younger generation. The aim behind the establishment of Kaisa was 
to bridge gaps not only between mainstream Philippine society and the Chinese 
community, but also between older and younger generations of Philippine-Chinese, and 
to advocate integration into the mainstream. To relieve the identity crisis among the 
younger generation, Kaisa promotes a new self-appellation, ‘Chinese-Filipino’, that 
aims to ‘revival of Chinese culture with full integration of Chinese into the larger 
society as Filipinos of Chinese heritage’ (Wickberg, 1992: 55); to enhance the mutual 
understanding between the Chinese and Filipino community, Kaisa effectively employs 
the media as an information campaign tool by publishing an English periodical, ‘Tulay’ 
(meaning ‘bridge’ in Tagalog), along with a Chinese edition, ‘Ronghe’ (‘integration’ in 
Chinese); to promote Chinese-Filipino identity, Kaisa has constructed ‘Bahay Tsinoy: 
a Museum of Chinese in Philippine Life’, and conducts some Chinese-related events 
for Chinese youths; to bring in some academic perspectives, Kaisa conducts research, 
issues publications, and organises conferences on ethnic Chinese issues; to raise public 
awareness and to protect the rights of Philippine-Chinese during the 1990s kidnapping 
epidemic mentioned above, Kaisa participated in anti-crime efforts and organised a 
mass demonstration against the Philippine government’s inaction (See and Go, 2004). 
Kaisa may not directly contribute to the upper mobility of Philippines, but it lays out a 
broad vision of integration for the next generation.  
As a number of Chinese businessmen regard donating to Chinese education as an 
honour and a gesture exemplary of the ‘Confucian entrepreneur’ spirit, Chinese schools 
also greatly benefit from other financial contributions to school construction, teacher 
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training programs, and so on.     
In terms of financial support, some organisations offer scholarships to students of 
Chinese schools from low-income family backgrounds in the event that they cannot 
afford the relatively higher tuition fees of Chinese schools. The rationale behind the 
existence of these scholarships is that, were these students forced to go to Philippine 
public schools, they would gradually lose their Chinese identity. Due to concerns about 
the Chinese schools’ recent falling enrolment figures, the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FFCCCII), for example, collects funds 
from the community to sponsor hundreds of students in financial difficulties to the 
amount of 10,000 pesos per year; in 2015, for example, the FFCCCII sponsored a total 
of 949 students (FFCCCII, 15/9/2015). Meanwhile, locality associations such as 
Quanzhou Association, clan associations such as Liu Kwee Tang, surname associations 
such as Xihe Lim Association, and alumni associations such as Alumni Association of 
No.2 Middle School of Shishi have provided scholarships exclusively for children of 
fellow members.  
One of the most important functions of Chinese schools is cementing co-ethnic 
networks within the Chinese community. Within this closed learning environment, 
Chinese students tend to mostly socialise with co-ethnic schoolmates of similar cultural 
and socioeconomic backgrounds and with similar educational and career expectations. 
As Huang (2012: 28) indicates, while the notion of clanship and locality among the 
younger generation has faded away, Chinese schools nevertheless have become the 
centre of social gatherings through school organisations like alumni associations, 
trustee boards, student unions, and parent associations. Graduates are likely to translate 
the associations and companionship gained from Chinese schools into social ties and 
connections in universities, and, later in their lives, possibly the marketplace (See, 
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1985).  
There are Philippine-Chinese student associations in a number of Philippine 
universities, including the ‘Big Four’, that is, UP Chinese Student Association (UPCSA) 
in University of the Philippines (UP), Ateneo Celadon in Ateneo de Manila University 
(ADMU), the ‘Englicom’ in De La Salle University (DLSU), and the SCARLET in 
University of Santo Tomas (UST). Mainly consisting of Chinese-school alumni, this 
sort of association helps students build social ties and connections with fellow members 
of Chinese-school background and further community-based networks. The UPCSA in 
UP, for example, states that ‘it [the association] aims to encourage concern over 
problems of the Chinese community and enhance fraternal cooperation among them 
(the official website of UPCSA)’. It therefore extends to the university the ethnic 
networks built by Chinese schools, serving to maintain Chinese communal identity after 
graduation. 
Meanwhile, almost all Chinese schools have alumni associations to preserve the ties 
and connections built in Chinese schools. Alumni gatherings function not only to 
cultivate friendship between alumni, but also to establish business networks. I was 
invited several times to attend dinner parties before the monthly meetings organised by 
the alumni association of St. Joseph High School. The members appeared quite keen 
active to participate this kind of gathering. When I asked the organiser how they 
maintained interest among members to take part in gatherings, he answered: ‘we are all 
old friends. It’s good to meet our friends regularly. Sometimes we share information 
about business and talk about business cooperation’ (personal communication with Mr. 
Go, Manila, 1/9/2010). Thus alumni association can sometimes serve to expand ethnic 
networks and integrate resources between Philippine-Chinese businessmen. In other 
words, the social capital derived from Chinese schools can be furthered and embodied 
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by organisations affiliated with the schools, such as student and alumni associations.      
Worth noting is that the UPCSA also recruits Filipino members who are interested in 
Chinese culture to encourage friendship between the two communities:    
While most members are from Chinese schools, there have been and there still are 
Filipino members in the roster who are interested in the Chinese culture as well as 
maintaining the bond between both the Filipino community and the Chinese 
community (the UPCSA official website).  
The shaping of Chinese communal identity is therefore not necessarily at the expense 
of the younger generation’s integration into the mainstream.  
Social capital thus gives Chinese students certain advantages in seeking educational 
achievements. Benefiting from community-based resources provided by co-ethnic 
networks that are mostly upper-middle class, Chinese students have better opportunities 
to maintain their socioeconomic status and even achieve upward mobility. As a result, 
Chinese students tend to move towards integrating into the upper-middle class of 
Philippine society.  
 
5.3.3 Mechanisms of Class Mobility and Social Reproduction 
As mentioned above, social capital gathered and distributed by Chinese schools can 
facilitate the path of integration toward upward mobility. But how does the social 
capital that is derived from Chinese schools lead to upper mobility and social 
reproduction that, in turn, allow for integrating into the upper-middle class of Philippine 
society? Wickberg (1992) depicts a model of socio-cultural stratification and mobility, 
as the graph below shows. 
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Figure 4 A Model of Socio-cultural Stratification and Mobility in Philippine-Chinese Society (Wickberg, 1992) 
The boxes in the centre represent the community core of Philippine-Chinese made up 
of four social strata, stratified by economic and cultural success (Wickberg, 1992: 60). 
The broken-line boundaries between the strata refer to the likelihood of up or down 
movement. Also featured is a loosely-connected ‘Chinese society’ around a community 
core that is surrounded by larger Philippine society. The boundaries between the 
Chinese community, Chinese society, and Philippine society are penetrable through 
certain paths indicated by dashed lines. 
From Wickberg’s diagram it is apparent that there are two paths of integration into 
Philippine society. One leads to success in Philippine society (from the top right), 
whereas another leads to failure in Philippine society (from the bottom left). The top-
half of those in the community core, who are culturally and economically successful, 
are likely to move horizontally to get out of the community core, to enter successful 
Chinese society as well as successful Philippine society, and to become an integral part 
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of the Filipino elite. Notably, as these Philippine-Chinese obtain symbolic Chineseness 
from Chinese schools, they are still identified as Chinese no matter the extent of their 
integration.   
By contrast, while losing not only economic capability but also Chineseness, the bottom 
20% of the community core face the possibility of leaving the Chinese community and 
dropping out of sight of organised Chinese society. They are likely to eventually 
disappear into the great mass of Filipino poor and completely lose Chinese identity. 
In the mechanism of class mobility, I advance that Chinese schools play a central role 
in maintaining, increasing, or deducting advantage. People’s positions in the stratum 
can determine their intention in respect of school selection. As depicted by Wickberg, 
at the top are the leaders of the most important organisations (5%); beneath them is the 
‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’, consisting of those with prospects of 
moving to success in Chinese as well as Philippine society (45%); beneath them is the 
last layer, the ‘Non-emergent Community Core’ (30%), who are the ‘hard core’ of the 
Chinese community with little or no prospects of movement. The 80% of the Chinese 
population in the above three strata are the main participants in Chinese schools. The 
bottom 20% are the unsuccessful who are less likely to attend Chinese schools due to 
struggles with the higher tuition fees and higher standards of academic performance.  
In the following, I introduce what roles the different types of Chinese schools play in 
the stratification of the Chinese community, as well as in larger Philippine society, in 
correspondence to the four strata shown above. Accordingly, I first classify Chinese 
schools into three types according to their tuition rates, academic standards, and 
educational resources, as shown in the table below. I argue that school selection 
between the three types can affect not only students’ future class mobility and social 
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reproduction, but also the path that they each individually follow to integrate into the 
Philippines.  
Chinese School Types Type A Type B Type C 
Tuition Rates (annual) Highest 
(>100,000 
pesos) 
High 
(40,000~70,000 
pesos) 
Modest (<40,000 
pesos) 
Entry 
Requirements 
as well as 
Teaching 
Quality and 
Level 
General Highest High Modest 
Chinese Modest Highest Modest 
Enrolees Leaders;  
Prospectively 
Emergent 
Community 
Core 
Leaders; 
Prospectively 
Emergent 
Community 
Core; Non-
emergent 
Community 
Core (fewer) 
Non-emergent 
Community Core; 
Unsuccessful(fewer) 
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Educational Resources Highest High Modest 
Academic Performance Excellent Good Mediocre 
Likelihood of Class Mobility High High Low 
Table 5 Three Types of Chinese Schools 
Among the three types of Chinese schools, Type A has the strictest entrance 
requirements, the highest tuition fees (>100,000 pesos per year), the highest standard 
of academic performance in English, and largest educational resources. Xavier School 
and Immaculate Conception Academy are the only two schools of Type A. Totalling 
7,618 enrolees, their students in 2012 accounted for 13.9% of all Chinese students 
(54,658) in the Greater Manila Area (Zhuang, 2012). Take Xavier School as an example. 
A Chinese Catholic school (having been established by the Jesuits), it stresses academic 
excellence and targets an elite enrolment, yet its formation differs from other traditional 
Chinese schools. Xavier School generally pays more attention to English learning and 
has only one Chinese class (40 minutes) a day. In a sense, it serves as an international 
school. It is worth mentioning that Xavier School was granted ‘International 
Baccalaureate (IB) World School’ status in 2012, enabling its selected graduates to gain 
access to study in overseas universities. One of my interviewees, who studied in Xavier 
School, told me that English is the common language among students and that they 
rarely spoke Chinese and Tagalog in the school.    
Besides the highest tuition fees, Type A also has the toughest entrance exam. Those 
parents who can afford the tuition fees may still be rejected if their child receives a 
failing grade in the exam. Two of my students in the elementary school of St. Joseph, 
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for instance, intended to study in Xavier School and took the ‘Xavier High School 
Entrance Examination’; one of them was one of the best in terms of English ability. 
That both of them failed to meet the requirements shows the difficulty of entering Type 
A schools. The exam, however, does not test Chinese ability, so it is open to students 
with limited Chinese background; it therefore attracts a number of ethnic-Filipino 
students from prominent families (such as those of politicians and wealthy 
businessmen), and some international students.    
Type B are those with high tuition fees (approximately 40,000~70,000 pesos per year), 
a high standard of English, and the highest standard of Chinese ability. They are so-
called ‘Manila schools’, mainly located in the old downtown district of Manila where 
the majority of the Chinese reside. Included here are the oldest Chinese schools with 
the highest enrolments and the strongest tradition of Chinese teaching, such as Chiang 
Kai-shek College, Philippine Cultural College, St. Stephen High School, Grace 
Christian College, and St. Jude Catholic School. In terms of directing the development 
of Chinese education, they are the most influential in the Association of Chinese-
Filipino Schools in the Philippines as well as in the whole of the Chinese community. 
44.4% of students (24,288) were enrolled in Type B in the 2012-2013 academic year 
(Zhuang, 2012). 
Compared to the other two types, Type B spends the most time on Chinese teaching, 
thus enabling its students to acquire the highest Chinese ability of all three types. St. 
Joseph High School, for example, has four Chinese classes out of the daily total of ten. 
In order to maintain its high standard of Chinese ability, the entrance exam for Type B 
also tests students on Chinese comprehension, thus effectively excluding students 
without Chinese background.  
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Type C are those with the lowest tuition fees (<40,000 per year) and a modest standard 
of academic performance in both Chinese and English curricula, such as Philippine Sun 
Yet Sen High School. Those students whose parents are unable to afford the tuition fees 
of Type A and Type B but still want to maintain at least a minimal amount of 
Chineseness tend to attend Type C. In general, its standards of Chinese as well as 
English teaching are the lowest of all three types. Philippine Sun Yet Sen High School, 
for example, does not require Chinese ability and recruits a number of ethnic-Filipino 
students. Students can waive the Chinese curriculum at their request. In 2012, 22,752 
(41.6%) students had enrolled in Type B (Zhuang, 2012).  
Given the high tuition fees, Type A schools are affordable only to the ‘Leaders’ and 
better-off among the ‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’. Those of the ‘Leaders’ 
and the ‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’ who want their children to spend 
less time on Chinese and focus on English tend to choose Type A – if their children can 
pass the entrance exam. Of course, Type B is still a possibility, should they want their 
children to acquire greater Chinese ability. As a ‘leader of the Philippine Chinese’ (qiao 
ling23) told me, the rich Chinese who prioritise English tend to send their children to 
Xavier School (a Type A school), which is commonly seen to have the highest standard 
of English teaching, while those who value Chinese ability would choose St. Jude 
Catholic School (a Type B school), which has the reputation for having the best Chinese 
teaching as well as good English teaching (personal communication with Mr. Kwong, 
Manila, 07/10/2013). It is a common practice among most of the ‘Prospectively 
Emergent Community Core’ to choose Type B as a means of keeping balance between 
                                                     
23 ‘Qiao-ling’ (‘leader of the Philippine-Chinese’) is a common usage among Philippine-Chinese to 
refer to figures who are, because of achievements, affluence, and power, the most influential in the 
Chinese community.  
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Chinese and English learning. A few choose Type A, if their economic situation allows 
it, in order to open up better educational opportunities.  
The ‘Non-emergent Community Core’ would prefer Type B as they are the ‘hard core’ 
of the Chinese community and value its higher standard of Chinese learning. They are 
also likely to choose Type C in cases where the tuition fee of Type B is unaffordable or 
its academic standard is too high. The ‘Unsuccessful’ Chinese are highly unlikely to 
afford the tuition fees of Chinese schools and might be forced to attend public schools, 
thus raising the possibility to move to the underclass of Philippine society.  
In fact, there had been a decrease of 10% in the number of students attending Chinese 
schools between 2001 and 2006 (Huang, 2012: 113), and this decrease still continues. 
As mentioned earlier, in response to the younger generation’s gradual loss of Chinese 
identity, some scholarships have been made available for students who suffer financial 
hardship to help them continue to study in Chinese schools. These supports, however, 
cannot completely prevent a substantial number of the unsuccessful from attending 
public schools and being assimilated into the underclass of Philippine society.    
With respect to social capital, given the fact that those who attend Type A already come 
from a privileged class in both the Chinese community and Philippine society, they tend 
to have greatest access not only to community-based resources but also resources from 
mainstream elite-class networks. Because some enrolees are of elite Filipino 
background, graduates of Type A may possess a wider network in the future. The 
community-based resources owned by students of Type B and Type C mostly obtain 
from the Chinese community. The more successful graduates Chinese schools are able 
to nurture, the larger and more powerful their alumni associations, and the greater social 
capital the students can have access to. Thus Type A offers the greatest accessibility to 
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social capital. Type B has greater access to the resources from the co-ethnic networks, 
whereas Type C has less. Those Chinese who attend public schools basically isolate 
themselves from their co-ethnic networks and have no community support. 
When it comes to ‘social reproduction’, both Type A and Type B (which are, as noted, 
attended mainly by the upper-middle class) sustain advantages in educational 
opportunities to maintain their superior status. In addition to their Chinese curriculum, 
the quality of their teaching of the core curriculum (as prescribed by the Philippine 
Department of Education) outclasses that of public schools and at least matches that of 
elite Philippine private schools and top specialised public high schools (e.g. Philippine 
Science High School). Type A and Type B have gained a reputation for excellent 
academic performance not only among the Chinese community, but also in Philippine 
society. Despite the lack of substantial statistical information, graduates of both Type A 
and Type B are known for doing quite well in the entrance exams of the Philippine ‘Big 
Four’ universities. Their teaching quality and level is well recognised by these 
prestigious universities. Among the 200 recipients in 2014 of the ‘Director’s List 
Scholarship’, which awards those who have achieved top grade in the ‘Ateneo College 
Entrance Test’, 70 had graduated from Type A (36) and Type B (34) Chinese schools 
(ADMU, 2014). Another example is that, when DLSU planned to form teaching 
partnerships with certain high schools to prepare the graduates of partner schools for 
the requirements and challenges of higher education, 7 of the 11 partner schools were 
Chinese schools of Type B (DLSU, 2016).  
The higher the tuition fee that Chinese schools charge, the more funds they can allocate 
for improving teaching facilities, faculty, and educational activities, and the more 
educational opportunities they can offer students to help them enter good universities. 
Type A especially maintains the highest quality of English teaching since it has the most 
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international faculty and student base, something which creates a rich multilingual 
environment. Type B also has high teaching quality to help students reach good 
academic performance. Due to the association between academic performance, career 
achievement, and social class, in terms of social reproduction, Type A is the best, Type 
B the second best, and Type C can little help students to move up.  
Despite the lack of official statistics, my fieldwork allows for the making of a crude 
comparison of the academic performance of Type B with that of Type C, as follows. 
When I was a Chinese teacher in St. Joseph, a Type B school, there were four sixth-
grade classes, of which I taught two. In 2009 and 2010 they accounted for 86 students, 
or around half of all sixth-grade students. I have kept in touch with most of them since 
then. Deducting those who have since transferred and those with whom I have lost touch, 
72 students remain. Since 2015 all 72 have begun university studies, with 61 of this 
number attending one of the so-called Big Four universities. It is clearly an impressive 
achievement that 87% of them can enter the Big Four. In comparison to the performance 
of Type B, Type C’s performance is mediocre. One of my friends taught a graduating 
class of 8 students in Philippine Sun Yet Sen High School, a Type C school. 7 out of the 
8 students entered universities in 2014, and one began working. None of the 8 students 
attended Big Four universities; the best result was one who entered Philippine Normal 
University. My friend also mentioned that the best of his 2015 graduates entered Chiang 
Kai Shek College, and that no one attended the Big Four this year either. From this 
information, the gap between Type B and C in academic performance appears quite 
large.  
As for class mobility, except for the ‘Non-emergent Community Core’ stratum, the 
movement seems larger for the top half and the bottom stratum. As mentioned earlier, 
the two paths of integration, movement towards success as well as failure in Philippine 
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society, represent upward and downward mobility, respectively. For the former, because 
most of the top half send their children to Type A and Type B, which have wider access 
to social capital and higher academic standards, they have greater opportunities to enter 
the elite Philippine universities and become professionals, thus being part of the 
successful side of larger Chinese society and of the Filipino elite class. As a result, they 
are most likely to ultimately achieve ‘structural assimilation’. Again, the university that 
a Chinese-school graduate attends can affect the way that he/she integrates into the 
Filipino upper class. While mingling with a group of ethnic-Filipino classmates of the 
same age during university, he/she can establish his/her first ethnic-Filipino connections. 
Better universities provide students more opportunities to interact with the higher class 
of Filipino connections, thus increasing their social capital to create opportunities for 
upper mobility or class reproduction. Therefore, as Type A and B schools can help 
Chinese students enter better universities, they also can enhance students’ possibility of 
upward mobility or class reproduction.         
Most of the ‘Non-emergent Community Core’, who might enrol in Type C (with a 
minimal amount of Chineseness that allows them to stay in the community core, and 
limited access to co-ethnic networks), face little risk of downward mobility, but have 
little opportunity of upward mobility either. The unsuccessful Chinese who live in 
poverty and who cannot afford Chinese schools are at serious risk of downward 
mobility, and of absorption into the underclass of Philippine society.    
As discussed above, the socio-cultural stratification within the Chinese community is 
not a closed system, but is highly embedded in the social structure of larger Philippine 
society. Attending Chinese schools can help Philippine-Chinese secure their upper-
middle class status (at least in the Philippines), and can even generate upward mobility 
to enter Filipino elite class, achieving the third path of integration as indicated by Portes 
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and Zhou (1993).  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated how Chinese schools produce a spontaneous, highly 
Filipinized, community-based, Chinese-Filipino version of Chineseness, a mixture of 
Chinese, Filipino, and modern values, within the domestic and national Philippine 
setting. The Chinese students might develop Filipino national consciousness by the 
specific route of attending Chinese schools, shaping their identity, mobilising 
educational resources, and achieving class status in Philippine society. All these 
practices ultimately lead to integration. 
The formation of national identity and Filipino nationalism through the everyday 
practices of Chinese schools make the Philippine-Chinese younger generation 
thoroughly Filipino, and remove the ethnic barrier between the two communities. In 
respect of Filipino national identity, integration has been happening. Rather than 
inculcating Chinese nationalism, as was the case in the past, the Chinese-related content 
acquired by students in schools serves to symbolically form a Chineseness by which 
Philippine-Chinese can preserve a sense of Chinese community. With this sense of 
Chinese community, the Philippine-Chinese can deploy and distribute community-
based resources to the younger generation to aid in their achieving better academic 
performance. Better academic performance allows them to either move up to higher 
class or maintain their superior status in larger Philippine society. Despite differences 
in social class, the Philippine-Chinese do not isolate themselves from the mainstream, 
but strive to enter the Filipino elite class.  
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Hence, after Filipinization, Chinese schools have transformed themselves from a 
ghettoized institution to an institution that facilitates integration into mainstream 
Philippine society. By the same token, through the effort of Chinese schools, the 
Chinese community in the Philippines have also become an ethnic minority open to 
integration into, rather than isolation from, larger Philippine society.   
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
Based on the findings, this concluding chapter of the thesis aims to elaborate the 
characteristics of the Chineseness constructed by the Chinese schools in the Philippines. 
As noted, the thesis originates from my own frustrated experiences of teaching in a 
Chinese school in the Philippines. To an extent, the bitterness between students and 
teachers in Chinese schools has been caused by the presumed oneness of Chineseness 
that is propagated by Chinese nationalistic ideology. This bitterness, one that can be 
shared by Chinese both inside and outside of China, inspired me to understand this 
oneness of Chineseness – and examine the possibility of transcending it. Therefore, in 
light of the discussions in previous chapters, this concluding chapter indicates two main 
characteristics of Chineseness in the Philippines. They are ‘multiplicity as 
cosmopolitanisation’ and ‘entanglement and complexity’. Finally, I discuss some 
implications for further research related to immigrant groups and citizenship education.   
 
6.1 Multiplicity as Cosmopolitanisation 
An array of factors has contributed to the emergence, within the Chinese schools of the 
Philippines, of multifarious forms of Chineseness: the Philippine-Chinese people’s 
long-lasting involvement with ‘fatherland’ politics, as well as tangled cross-Strait 
relations, complicate the elements of Mandarin teaching in Chinese schools; the shift 
in citizenship status has led to transnational commitments and multiple identities among 
Philippine-Chinese; and their increasing integration into the Philippine mainstream has 
prompted them to transform Chineseness to adapt to the local context. As a result, there 
are three main ideal types of Chineseness: Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren Chineseness, 
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and communal Chineseness for integration. Together, they demonstrate the multiplicity 
of Chineseness.  
These three versions of Chineseness represent a shift of the meaning of being Chinese, 
from a China-centred (even ethnocentric) view to an attitude towards otherness that is 
more open-minded. If cosmopolitanism generally means openness to others, the 
multiplicity of Chineseness contained within Philippine-Chineseness testifies to the 
potential of Chineseness for cosmopolitanisation. Cosmopolitanisation in this context 
might refer not only to embracing difference and otherness, but also to adjusting 
Chineseness to suit the context of the local environment in which Chinese live. These 
three versions of Chineseness thus demonstrate three different levels of 
cosmopolitanisation. 
Huaqiao Chineseness, based on overseas Chinese nationalism, takes a China-centred 
viewpoint to stress the oneness of the meaning of being Chinese. This sense of oneness 
comprises the notion of one nation, one people, one culture, and one language among 
those of Chinese descent. Overseas Chinese education, aided by ‘the two Chinas’, aims 
to cultivate this sense of oneness in order to unify Chinese overseas. It takes as a given 
China’s dominant role as the fatherland, thus authorising the Chinese governments to 
define Chineseness and Chinese education for Chinese overseas. To attract the 
contributions of Chinese overseas to the ‘transnational mobilisation system’, the two 
Chinas uphold the everlasting bond between China and a people linked by common 
ancestry, shared cultural traits, and a collective historical memory. A perfect 
isomorphism between nation, people, culture, and language is thus assumed. As 
‘Huaqiao’ is defined by some essentialised characteristics, there is a set of permanent, 
immutable, and indispensable principles relating to how to be Chinese abroad, what 
and how to teach in Chinese schools, who are Chinese and who are ‘others’, and how 
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to handle the relationship with Filipinos. The ideological foundation of Huaqiao 
Chineseness is close to the conception of ‘ethnic nationalism’ which, in defining a 
nation, also emphasises essentialised characteristics, calling into question existing 
political boundaries to unify all the co-ethnics across state borders, as 19th-century 
German nationalism did (Roshwald, 2015). Because Huaqiao Chineseness sets the 
hardest boundary between Chinese and non-Chinese, Huaqiao education also serves to 
ensure that the younger generations remain ‘one of us’ and are prevented from 
becoming ‘others’. Moreover, as Huaqiao education requires students to learn Mandarin 
as a national language (something which, to a certain extent, appears less inviting to 
non-Chinese), the Chinese schools centred on Huaqiao education are mainly reserved 
for those students of Chinese descent. Huaqiao Chineseness is therefore the most 
nationalistic and the least cosmopolitanised version of Chineseness among these three. 
In short, Huaqiao Chineseness is the essentialised one against the possibility of 
multiplicity. 
Huaren Chineseness represents not only a departure from the essentialised, China-
centred view of Huaqiao Chineseness, but also a more open attitude towards the 
Filipino nation and Filipinos, people who were, in the past, deemed others or even 
‘barbarians’. Huaren Chineseness embraces Chinese-Filipino identity, calling for 
recognition of the reality that the Philippines is these people’s first and foremost home, 
and that they should fulfil the commitments inherent in their Filipino citizenship. Where 
Huaqiao Chineseness tends towards ‘ethnic nationalism’, Huaren Chineseness displays 
an ‘elective affinity’ with ‘civic nationalism’, emphasising the common rights, 
obligations, and values of citizenship regardless of any ethnic and cultural differences 
among the citizenry (Roshwald, 2015). Though its ideology remains nationalistic, 
Huaren Chineseness is relatively more open to others. In terms of Chinese education, 
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recognising the fact that Mandarin is no longer their first and national language, a group 
of educationalists proposed ‘Huaren education’ reform that would accommodate the 
younger generations’ Chinese-Filipino identity and Filipino citizenship. Furthermore, 
Huaren education exploits the pedagogy of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’ 
(TMSL), thus teaching the younger generations of Philippine-Chinese through methods 
which had previously been used to teach non-Chinese foreigners. In other words, a 
person can be still Chinese even if he or she identifies as a Filipino and learns Mandarin 
as a second language. Consequently, Chinese-Filipino identity and TMSL together call 
into question the aforementioned isomorphism between nation and people as well as 
between nation and language; they demonstrate a possible and desirable combination 
of Chineseness and Filipino citizenship. Therefore, despite cultural and education ties 
to the fatherland, Chineseness in the context of the Philippines shows its potential to 
become an ‘open signifier’ that adds Filipino characteristics to the constitution of 
Chineseness. It also encourages Philippine-Chinese to examine their own othering of 
Filipino and raises the level of flexibility in defining Chineseness with Filipino 
characteristics. Compared to Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren Chineseness is far more 
cosmopolitanised in respect of citizenship values. 
Communal Chineseness for integration embraces the utility value of being Philippine-
Chinese. Despite the sense of being ‘our own people’ (Lán-lâng) that is formed through 
Chinese-school identity and displaying symbolic Chineseness, the Chinese in general 
have no intention of isolating themselves from the mainstream. In contrast, their 
ultimate goal is to make the Chinese an integral part of Philippine society, despite their 
targeting of only the upper-middle class. As most Philippine-Chinese come from the 
upper-middle class of Philippine society, being ‘our own people’ means access to a 
range of social capital and the community-based resources to achieve better academic 
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performance, brighter career prospects, and eventually social reproduction. In other 
words, to be Lán-lâng is to be Filipino with higher socioeconomic status. Therefore, 
communal Chineseness for integration serves as a tactic of resource allocation for 
facilitating social reproduction and upward mobility. Thus it can be seen as a ‘strategic 
cosmopolitanism’ by which Philippine-Chinese engage with otherness for the future 
livelihood prospects of the whole Chinese community in the Philippines. As this 
communal Chineseness for integration rarely entails substantial Mandarin ability – 
indeed, it detaches Chinese language from Chineseness – it fundamentally destroys the 
isomorphism between being Chinese and speaking Chinese language. It implies that a 
person can be Chinese even when he holds non-Chinese citizenship, speaks little 
Mandarin, and actively strives for integration into the mainstream of the destination 
nation. Communal Chineseness for integration thus fundamentally challenges what 
being Chinese means, as previously defined by Huaqiao Chineseness. It is 
cosmopolitan because not only does it adjust Chineseness to the context of the 
Philippines in order to achieve ‘structural assimilation’, but it transforms itself by being 
a culturally and socially integral part of Philippine society. Due to its pragmatic 
approach, among the three versions of Chineseness, communal Chineseness for 
integration is the most cosmopolitanised one.  
In all, this thesis juxtaposes three versions of Chineseness to reflect a general trend 
towards the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness, one that gradually transcends the 
primordial, essentialist, and monolithic view about the meaning of being Chinese.  
  
6.2 Entanglement and Complexity 
Although there is a chronological order in the time of occurrence of these three versions 
of Chineseness, the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness in the Philippines does not 
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simply follow a linear progression from Huaqiao to communal Chineseness for 
integration. Instead, different versions of Chineseness overlap, display great complexity, 
and do not necessarily fulfil the potential for cosmopolitanisation.  
Huaqiao Chineseness still predominates in Chinese schools, especially in terms of 
Mandarin teaching. Its predominance can be largely attributed to the presence of 
educational aids from China as well as Taiwan. As each of the two Chinas regards 
support for overseas Chinese education as of geopolitical importance in terms of 
operating systems of transnational mobilisation, they will continue to provide 
educational resources to cement these given transnational ties. The resources they 
provide (such as textbooks, teacher supply programs, teacher training programs and so 
forth) are the very embodiment of Huaqiao Chineseness, manifestations of the long-
lasting ties between Philippine-Chinese and the fatherland. The educationalists in 
Chinese schools with Huaqiao identity also embrace these resources for two reasons. 
On the one hand, Huaqiao Chineseness has characterised the Chinese school system 
from the beginning and, to a certain degree, has been enshrined as an essential element 
in Chinese education. Any attempt to change it would be regarded as a threat to the 
foundation of the school system. On the other hand, these educational resources 
substantially assist in the maintenance of Chinese schools, reducing the responsibilities 
to be borne by the schools. Therefore, preserving Huaqiao Chineseness is the path of 
least resistance for Chinese schools, despite its devastating effect on Mandarin learning 
and the inherent contradiction with the younger generations’ identity and citizenship 
status.      
So entrenched is Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools that Huaren Chineseness has 
generally failed to establish itself as the core conception of the Chinese school system. 
Likewise, the PCERC lacks support in implementing Huaren education. Since the 
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proponents of Huaren education claimed independence and detachment from any 
government authority, almost all parties concerned refute its agenda for educational 
reform. China, the largest provider of Huaqiao Chineseness, has no interest in Huaren 
education; Taiwan regards the reform as a campaign against the impact of the ROC 
version of Chineseness on Chinese schools; the old-generation educationalists in charge 
of Mandarin teaching take the reform as a challenge to their authority; the Philippine 
government may welcome Chinese-Filipino identity and stress the importance of 
Mandarin learning in the Philippines, but will not offer any substantial resources for it, 
apart from paying lip service; even those in high places in the Chinese community value 
the relations with China in the form of receiving educational aids. While independence 
and detachment from a China-centred view as well as Huaqiao Chineseness can be a 
progress in terms of cosmopolitanisation, it also means maintaining critical distance 
from all national governments. As a result, the reform has endured great hardship due 
to lack of source of education aids to maintain itself.   
At an everyday level, it is communal Chineseness for integration that exercises an 
influence and has put cosmopolitanisation into practice. It is not involved in the political 
entanglements between Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness which have no real-world 
help. In the process of integration, Mandarin learning plays only a symbolic role in 
helping Chinese students achieve social reproduction and upward mobility. This is not 
to say that practical Mandarin skills are useless in the Philippines. Rather, Mandarin 
can only hope to be symbolic of being Chinese: current Mandarin teaching in Chinese 
schools, deeply entangled with Huaqiao Chineseness and Chinese nationalistic ideology, 
hardly helps Chinese students to master practical Mandarin skills. Therefore, communal 
Chineseness for integration translates some elements of Chineseness into substantial 
community-based resources, such as social capital and educational culture, to achieve 
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higher socioeconomic status in the Philippines. This pragmatic use of Chineseness and 
Chinese education is often ignored by those who limit their focus to Huaqiao education, 
yet it is the most cosmopolitanised because it distances itself from nationalistic ideology. 
In fact, the Chinese school system necessitates a process of cosmopolitanisation that 
removes the nationalistic ideology from Chinese education because its entanglement 
with overseas Chinese nationalism and Chinese politics proves meaningless to the 
Chinese’s actual lives – indeed, it has a negative impact on their integration into 
domestic Philippine society. Therefore, communal Chinese for integration turns to 
maximise the utility value of Chineseness in schools for the prosperity of the whole 
Philippine-Chinese community.    
In general, the Chinese school system in the Philippines can be divided into two parts. 
The Mandarin teaching part is thoroughly enmeshed with Chinese nationalistic 
ideology, inculcates in the younger generation a sense of being Huaqiao, and tends to 
otherise Filipinos and the Filipino nation as a whole. Mandarin teaching is thus far less 
cosmopolitanised and fails to prepare the younger generations for the increasingly 
cosmopolitan settings of Philippine society. The part that is not Mandarin teaching is 
orientated toward cosmopolitanisation to a considerable extent, opens up the younger 
generation’s opportunity for their settlement in the Philippines, advances mutual 
understanding between Chinese and Filipinos, and will eventually contribute to a high 
level of Chinese integration into the Philippines.    
 
6.3 Implications for Further Research and Citizenship Education 
Finally, from the empirical data of this thesis I would like to draw two implications for 
further research related to immigration and one practical implication for citizenship 
education.   
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For further research, first, methodological cosmopolitanism is a promising lens through 
which to understand cultural diversity in the education of an ethnic group and their 
multiple identities as a result of their changing citizenship status. Two approaches to 
probing the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness of Chinese overseas specifically, and 
the ethnicity of an immigrant group in general, are involved in this thesis. 
On the one hand, the study of an ethnic school system of an immigrant group should 
focus on the interplay between transnational ties to the group’s nation of origin and 
struggles not only to preserve cultural identity but, simultaneously, to seek recognition 
from their nation of destination. Cosmopolitanisation might occur when an immigrant 
group turns the national culture of their nation of origin, such as cultural practices and 
national language education, into a minority group’s ethnicity in the context of their 
nation of destination and when they in turn exploit the resources deprived from 
transnational ties to their ‘fatherland’ in order to enrich their ethnicity and their 
language education system in the nation of destination. It necessities dual perspectives 
on how an immigrant group copes with their relationship with the nation of origin and 
with the nation of destinations to project and construct their ethnicity and identities. 
Only insights from methodological cosmopolitanism, which attempts to grasp the 
meaning of cultural and educational practices from different angles, can provide a 
comprehensive account of the process of cosmopolitanisation; methodological 
nationalism, by contrast, considers the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis and 
follows only the fixed and rigid either/or logic of nationality, separating one nation from 
another in dealing with issues interconnected to a variety of nations.  
On the other hand, corroborating Ulrich Beck’s differentiation between ‘normative 
cosmopolitanism’ and ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’, in some cases 
cosmopolitanisation results mainly from the benefits to which having an open attitude 
199 
 
toward others leads. Therefore, cosmopolitan studies should pay special attention to the 
utility value, rather than the moral value, of the cosmopolitanisation that stimulates an 
immigrant group to embrace openness. Although moves towards intermingling with 
others such as social and political integration, selective acculturation, and structural 
assimilation may be strategic in meeting existence needs in the beginning, they have 
the potential to evolve later into outcomes with progressive values, thus ultimately 
transforming actually existing cosmopolitanism into normative cosmopolitanism.  
Second, on immigrant-related research, the findings of this thesis suggest that the level 
of cosmopolitanisation of an immigrant group’s ethnic culture (such as their language 
education) can determine opportunities for their cultural preservation in the context of 
their country of destination. The lower the level of the cosmopolitanisation of language 
education, the lower level of openness toward the local settings, and the less likely the 
language is preserved from generation to generation. As Mandarin teaching of the 
Chinese schools in the Philippines is so little cosmopolitanised and densely interwoven 
with nationalistic ideology, it lacks the flexibility to adapt to the local circumstances of 
Philippine society as well as the ability to accommodate the changing needs of younger 
generations. From the perspective of these younger generations, the given Mandarin 
teaching in Chinese schools is not only irrelevant to their everyday lives and future 
prospects, but also incapable of developing their practical Mandarin skills, so they are 
reluctant to learn Mandarin. Their reluctance might eventually contribute to the further 
decline of Chinese education and jeopardise Mandarin learning’s chances of survival 
in the Philippines.   
In respect of practices of citizenship education, I will highlight three principles for 
young people of immigrant background to foster an open attitude towards others. First, 
apart from discriminatory practices due to racialist or nationalistic ideologies of a host 
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nation against immigrant groups, the ethnocentrism of an immigrant group itself to also 
needs to be addressed. In the case of the Philippine-Chinese, their ethnocentric view is 
likely to lead to isolation from the mainstream and the maintenance of strong political 
ties with their fatherland, both of which can hinder younger generations from nurturing 
an open attitude towards others and cultural diversity, and from developing multiple 
and dynamic identities. Therefore, citizenship education should serve to challenge 
essentialist views of identity which regard ethnicity as permanent and immutable. 
Instead, citizenship education can include the idea and historical facts that identity and 
ethnicity are likely to be constructed through interaction with others, thus being 
reshaped, multiplied, and even cosmopolitanised in the long run.  
Second, from the perspective of an immigrant group, equal citizenship rights are the 
best citizenship education: through them, young people automatically come to 
acknowledge the value of justice and equity in a democratic state. The younger 
generations can only acquire a well-developed sense of citizenship, with all the 
institutional protection that comes from equal citizenship rights, when benefiting from 
it. On the contrary, they cannot feel commitment and loyalty to a nation which does not 
treat them equally in terms of education and career development. In respect to the host 
nation, it necessitates a shift of its nation-building from ‘ethnic nationalism’ to ‘civic 
nationalism’, valuing the common rights, obligations, and values of citizenship 
mentioned above, rather than nation-centrism and ethnocentrism.  
Third, citizenship education needs to emphasise not only the moral value, but also the 
utility value of cosmopolitanism. Based on equal citizenship rights, the younger 
generations of an immigrant group are likely to make a good living on their own merits 
rather than on skin colour or other ethnic features. While pursuing good living in the 
host nation, integration and cosmopolitanisation may occur spontaneously as people of 
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different cultural backgrounds closely interact with each other. Remarkably, it is often 
ignored that the inner drive that directs an immigrant person to embrace others is the 
attraction of good living rather than morality.  
All in all, academic study on, or educational campaign for, cosmopolitanisation needs 
to be as open-minded as cosmopolitanism itself to pay attention to each transnational, 
border-crossing, intercultural practice that has the potential to make an ethnic group 
more open to others, whether for progressive or utility values. By so doing, for one 
thing, the understanding of cosmopolitan modernity that characterises the coming 
global risk society can be gradually broadened, deepened, and enriched. For another, 
citizenship education can achieve what Osler (2010: 247) refers to as ‘education for 
cosmopolitan citizenship’ which instils in young people the value of respecting 
diversity and cultural heritage, and of promoting solidarity and equity at national and 
international levels.       
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Appendix 1: The Interview Guide for Teachers and Administrators 
Aims: 
 To explore the function of Chinese school system at domestic and national level 
(social mobility and multiculturalism). 
 To identify the experience of participating in transnational education practices 
(transnational community, space, and social field) 
 To explore the 'cosmopolitanisation' of the school system with respect of both 
macro(institution) and micro(person) level. 
Research Questions 
 How do Chinese schools affect students' educational aspiration and career 
development? 
 How do Chinese schools affect younger generations' integration into the Philippine 
society? 
 How is the transnational education system being put into practice? 
 How does these transnational practices affect Philippine Chinese's citizenship 
 In what aspects cosmopolitanisation is happening in the Chinese education system? 
1. Introduction 
 Introduce the study, its aims and the researcher 
 Brief discussion of ethical issues i.e. confidentiality, anonymity and recording 
2. Context and background 
 Details of family background (immigration history, where they stay, family 
structure) 
 Education background (Chinese school? study abroad? why?) 
 Language use at home and Language ability (Chinese, Hokkien, English, Tagalog) 
 Citizenship 
 Religion 
3. Life in school 
 What the Chinese schools do you teach? why you make this choice? 
 What subjects do you teach there? 
 What language do you use during class and after class? 
 Do you know why parents send their children to Chinese schools? Do Chinese 
schools successfully fulfill the aim?  
4. Tutoring 
 Do you tutor students after school?  
 What subjects do you teach?  
 What language do you use? 
 How do you enroll your student? 
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 What do you do in tutor place?  
4. Career development 
 What kind of college will you attend after graduation? 
 Why do you choose to be a Chinese teacher? 
5. Transnational education and the possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education 
 What kind of activities hold by China or Taiwan have you attended? 
 How do you feel about the teachers from Taiwan (or China) ? 
 language teaching 
 class management 
 private communication 
 Do you know why China and Taiwan offer the educational aids? 
 How do you think the competition between China and Taiwan in education affairs? 
6. The possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education 
 What identity would you like to be called? (Chinese? Filipino? Chinese Filipino? 
both/and?) 
 How often do you make use of your Chinese language ability other than school 
works? 
 What kinds of popular culture do you identify with more? (dancing, music, movie, 
TV series; Chinese, English, Filipino)  
 Who are friends you usually hang out with in and after school? What language do 
you speak with them? 
 Who are your neighbours? 
 If you can choose, where do you want to stay for life?  
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Appendix 2: The Interview Guide for Students and Parents 
Aims: 
 To explore the function of Chinese school system at domestic and national level 
(social mobility and multiculturalism). 
 To identify the experience of participating in transnational education practices 
(transnational community, space, and social field) 
 To explore the 'cosmopolitanisation' of the school system with respect of both 
macro(institution) and micro(person) level. 
Research Questions 
 How do Chinese schools affect students' educational aspiration and career 
development? 
 How do Chinese schools affect younger generations' integration into the Philippine 
society? 
 How is the transnational education system being put into practice? 
 How does these transnational practices affect Philippine Chinese's citizenship 
 In what aspects cosmopolitanisation is happening in the Chinese education system? 
1. Introduction 
 Introduce the study, its aims and the researcher 
 Brief discussion of ethical issues i.e. confidentiality, anonymity and recording 
2. Context and background 
 Details of family background(immigration history, where they stay, family 
structure) 
 Education background (Chinese school? study abroad? why?) 
 Language use at home and Language ability(Chinese, Hokkien, English, Tagalog) 
 Citizenship 
 Religion 
3. Life in school 
 What the Chinese schools do you teach? why you make this choice? 
 What subjects do you teach there? 
 What language do you use during class and after class? 
 Do you know why parents send their children to Chinese schools? Do Chinese 
schools successfully fulfill the aim?  
4. Tutoring 
 Do you tutor students after school?  
 What subjects do you teach?  
 What language do you use? 
 How do you enroll your student? 
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 What do you do in tutor place?  
4. Career development 
 What kind of college will you attend after graduation? 
 Why do you choose to be a Chinese teacher? 
5. Transnational education and the possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education 
 What kind of activities hold by China or Taiwan have you attended? 
 How do you feel about the teachers from Taiwan (or China) ? 
 language teaching 
 class management 
 private communication 
 Do you know why China and Taiwan offer the educational aids? 
 How do you think the competition between China and Taiwan in education affairs? 
6. The possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education 
 What identity would you like to be called? (Chinese? Filipino? Chinese Filipino? 
both/and?) 
 How often do you make use of your Chinese language ability other than school 
works? 
 What kinds of popular culture do you identify with more?(dancing, music, movie, 
TV series; Chinese, English, Filipino)  
 Who are friends you usually hang out with in and after school? What language do 
you speak with them? 
 Who are your neighbours? 
 If you can choose, where do you want to stay for life?  
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Appendix 3: The Timeline of the Historical Development of the Chinese School   
           System in the Philippines 
 
Stages Year The Chinese 
Community 
The Philippines China 
The 
Spanish 
Period 
1560s  The building of Spanish 
colony  
 
1570 150 Chinese in Manila   
1580s The establishment of 
Parian (the Chinese 
ghetto) 
  
1790s The demolition of 
Parian 
  
The 
American 
Period 
1899 The establishment of 
Chinese Consul and 
the Anglo-Chinese 
School 
The cession of the 
Philippines to U.S. after 
the Spanish-American 
War 
 
1902 The extension of the 
Chinese Exclusion 
Law 
  
1909   The first Chinese 
nationality law 
1912   The founding of the 
Republic of China; the 
1912 Chinese nationality 
law 
1928   The Establishment of 
Nanjing Government by 
the KMT 
1935 58 Chinese schools 
with 7,214 students 
The establishment of the 
Commonwealth of the 
Philippines 
 
1937   The breakout of the 
Second Sino-Japanese 
War 
1939 The establishment of 
the Chiang Kai Shek 
High School 
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1941  The breakout of the 
Pacific War; the Japanese 
occupation 
 
The Cold 
War 
Period 
1946  The independence of the 
Philippines 
 
1947  Sino-Philippine Treaty of 
Amity 
 
1949   The establishment of the 
PRC government in 
Beijing by the CPC; the 
ROC government in 
Taipei by the KMT 
1950 The executive order to 
prohibit the Chinese 
from immigration 
 The breakout of the 
Korean War 
1952 the mass roundup of 
the Chinese 
  
1954   The beginning of the 
policy of overseas 
students education in 
Taiwan 
1955 The establishment of 
the Overseas Chinese 
Teacher College; First 
Congress of Chinese 
Schools in the 
Philippines 
A memorandum signed 
by the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs and the 
Chinese Ambassador 
 
1958  the ‘Filipino First policy’  
1972 the Filipinization of 
Chinese schools 
  
The Post-
Cold War 
Period 
1975 Mass naturalization the Letter of Instructions 
No. 270 
The establishment of the 
diplomatic relations with 
the PRC 
1991 the establishment of 
the Philippine Chinese 
Education Research 
Center 
  
1993 The establishment of   
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the Association of 
Chinese-Filipino 
Schools 
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